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Thematic Section: Exhibiting Europe

Stefan Krankenhagen
*Exhibiting Europe: The Development of European Narratives in Museums, Collections, and Exhibitions* ................................................................. 269

Torgeir Rinke Bangstad
*Routes of Industrial Heritage: On the Animation of Sedentary Objects* ........................................... 279

Alexander Badenoch
*Harmonized Spaces, Dissonant Objects, Inventing Europe? Mobilizing Digital Heritage* ................................................................. 295

Nanna Thylstrup
*The Digital Dimension of European Cultural Politics: Index, Intellectual Property and Internet Governance* ................................................................. 317

Kerstin Poehls
*Europe Blurred: Migration, Margins and the Museum* ................................................................. 337

Ljiljana Radonic
*Croatia – Exhibiting Memory and History at the ‘Shores of Europe’* ........................................... 355

Steffi de Jong
*Is This Us? The Construction of European Woman/Man in the Exhibition It’s our History!* ................................................................. 369

Wolfram Kaiser
*From Great Men to Ordinary Citizens? The Biographical Approach to Narrating European Integration in Museums* ................................................................. 385
Exhibiting Europe
The Development of European Narratives in Museums, Collections, and Exhibitions

By Stefan Krankenhagen

‘Unity in diversity’ – the motto of the EU reflects the closed circuit of the European self-image. After its enlargement to include 27 member-states, anyone who wishes to discuss Europe now explicitly or implicitly represents and analyzes the EU, too. In this sense, the contemporary construct of Homo Europaeus (Schmale 2001) cannot be avoided. In order to achieve legitimacy for the current and future transformation within Europe, traditions, historical images and the political presence of Europe blur into each other: thus, the reasons for, the course and the aims of Europeanization cannot be separated from each other analytically.

The development of European narratives in museums, collections and exhibitions accordingly provides an exemplary field of inquiry for understanding Europeanization as a cultural process. This process is both affected and promoted by state and societal actors that collaborate on the European and nation state level, as well as on regional and local levels. The present edition of Culture Unbound thus tracks and analyzes contemporary Europeanization and contemporary musealization processes. Both of these processes are, of course, not coextensive, but they certainly do react to each other. What happens, then – to ask our question – when the indistinct image of a European history and presence meets the ‘identity factory’ of the museum (Korff & Roth 1990)?

It has become commonplace to define Europe as the place that evades all definitions. According to Edgar Morin ‘Europe is a concept with many faces that cannot be superimposed on each other without creating an indistinct image’ (1990/2009: 210). The French thinker can appeal to prominent pioneer thinkers such as Georg Simmel and Paul Valéry (Delschen & Gieraths 2009), each of whom declared the ‘impossible definition of Europe’ (Landwehr 2007) to be its destiny. Europe thus becomes a continuous process, a non-place in the real sense of the term, a Utopia. ‘Is there a completely new “today” of Europe?’ This question was posed by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1992: 12) at the end of the twentieth century.

At the same time, Europe has been defined – and probably more often and more directly in the last twenty years than in the history of the continent hitherto. Yet, while the cultural elite understand Europe in the ‘difference with itself’ (Derrida 1992: 9, italics in original), politicians and senior officials in the European Union (EU) proceed in an incomparably more prosaic manner. Europe is, according to the European Commission (2007), ‘an unprecedented and successful social and
cultural project’, one that can appeal to common cultural and historical root, as Jean-Claude Trichet (2004), the President of the European Central Bank has emphasized:

Although not all of us are necessarily aware of it, all Europeans exist in a unique cultural atmosphere that is jointly influenced and inspired by the poetry of Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, Baudelaire among many others. An atmosphere that is also shaped jointly by the thoughts of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Erasmus, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Kant, Kierkegaard.

Europe is imagined as a common historical and experiential space whose abundance is ostensibly captured by the unique characteristics of the continent. Thus, from the many histories of Europe, there emerges the ordered and ordering image of a European ‘unity in diversity’, of an imagined property of Europe as the legitimation of its present and future political composition. In this sense, Hans-Gert Pöttering, the former President of the European Parliament (EP), understands the future House of European History, which was initiated by him, as a reinforcement of Europe's cultural integration. ‘The House of European History will bring Europe's history alive for everyone, but especially young people, and will thereby help promote an awareness of European identity.’

With this, two apparently irreconcilable positions confront each other. On the one hand the reflexively cultural-philosophical view of the pitfalls of essentialist ideas of Europe throughout history and in the present day; on the other hand the at best naive, at worst hegemonic projection of imagined communities of cultural and historical unity and superiority in the name of Europe. From this perspective, the process of Europe's integration represents a repetition of the nationalization processes of the nineteenth century under post-national conditions.

II. Making Nations, Making Europe

The political pitfalls of a construction of cultural unity – whether in relation to the nation or to Europe – continue to be practically tangible in the present day. For example, in the plans currently being developed in countries like Poland, France or the Netherlands for their own national history museums. Thus, France's President, Nicolas Sarkozy wants his plans for a national history museum to be understood as an answer to the French identity crisis diagnosed by him and others, the purpose being ‘to reinforce national identity’ (quoted from Chrisafis 2010). The Dutch social democrat Jan Marijnissen presented a similar argument in 1994, when justifying the founding of a national history museum for the Netherlands on the basis of the loss of societal cohesion (interview Byvanck). The identity factory of the museum is politically positioned in this way: as a moment of the compensation for post-national and post-modern insecurities.

The academic fields of cultural science, social anthropology and ethnology have reacted to this situation. In his analysis of the cultural-political and symbolic interventions of Europe since the 1980s, Cris Shore (2000: 50-53) refers to three
particular features of this new iconography of Europe. This is, firstly, teleologically oriented and thus committed to the nineteenth century conception of history. Secondly, the symbols of the new Europe replicate those of the old national states. And, thirdly, a paradoxical situation is arising with regard to the construction of a cultural unity of Europe that is simultaneously already present and still to be created. Susan Sontag once described this process as ‘the Europeanization not of the rest of the world, but […] of Europe itself’ (quoted in Morley & Robins 1995: 88), in which a common European culture and history has become the condition for and the strived-for result of the cultural policy of the EU. As a fourth feature we can add the danger of an implicit exclusion of specific ethnic and social groups, such as immigrants or religious minorities, by means of a possible ethnocentric conception of European identity and history (Bhabha 1998; Strath 2000; Eder 2001; Balibar 2005).

In line with the criticism of the convergence-oriented policies of the EU institutions formulated here, the few works of political science (Theiler 2005; Littoz-Monnet 2007; Staiger 2009, 2008) that have dealt with European cultural policy have concentrated on the EU level and on the role of various state actors. This highly constricted point of view often leads to the perception that the EU cultural policy primarily involves ‘top-down symbolic dynamism’ that is only then aimed at generating a ‘bottom-up’ process of cultural identity-formation (Theiler 2005: 4). Shore (1999: 63) has strongly criticized this supposed attempt to create a more strongly pronounced common European identity on the basis of a larger cultural feeling of togetherness. This involves a characteristically top-down, managerial and instrumental approach to ‘culture building’ and its assumption that ‘European identity’ can somehow be engineered from above and injected into the masses by an enlightened vanguard of European policy professionals using the latest communication technologies and marketing techniques.

In practice, however, this clear juxtaposition becomes blurred, in the same way that the normatively argued critique of the leading role of Brussels in the cultural sector proves to be untenable. For the making of Europe is to a large extent characterized by competition and cooperation between various state and societal institutions on the European, national and regional levels. Here the actors in the cultural sector do not merely react passively to the pressure to fall in line (Caporasos, Green Cowles & Risse 2001) that emanates from political and economic integration in the EU, rather, they act themselves, driving forward, modifying or blocking the processes of Europeanization. Although the European institutions do not have a cultural-political executive (Gordon 2010), in the last 20 years a knock-on effect on cultural actors in the member states has developed in such a way ‘that the cultural sector has increasingly been “talking Europe”’ (Karaca 2010: 125). New research on the negotiation of the European cultural heritage (Vos 2011) or on transnational subsidy programmes in the arts (Karaca 2010) confirm this development.
Europe can thus be as little thought of apart from economic and political integration as it is completely subsumed in these processes. In all of the forms of Europe there instead takes place a continual ‘blending of the idea of Europe with the cultural-political project of the EU’ (Poehls 2009: 10). This necessarily results in asynchronicities in Europe: related according to generation to societal and individual experiences of Europeanization; geographically related to the linking of everyday experience and institutionalization to Europeanization; historically related to the national, regional and local memory narratives and their possible convergence in and through Europe; culturally related to the various ethnic preconditions for Europe; institutionally related to the relevance in terms of content and the structural influence of the European institutions.

It is these asynchronicities that become tangible in the collections and exhibitions in Europe’s museums. ‘Today [museums] are part of the re-negotiation of what it means to be a nation in a late-modern world of migration, internationalisation, and globalisation and, in Europe, a growing community: namely the EU’ (Aronsson 2010: 556). Yet the demand to measure the Europeanization of the museal field has not been met by current research. The book *Europa ausstellen. Das Museum als Praxisfeld der Europäisierung* (Kaiser, Krankenhagen & Poehls 2012) takes up this issue in greater detail.

### Exhibiting Europe

Building on the seminal works of cultural science (Vergo 1989; Pearce 1990; Karp & Lavine 1991) and history (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), museum science has provided a constructivist perspective since the beginning of the 1990s. The functions of cultural objects in the processes of nationalization and colonization in the nineteenth century (Stewart 1984; Pomian 1987; Handler 1988; Kaplan 1994; Clifford 1994; Pearce 1995) have been the focus of interest alongside detailed studies on national history of museums (Korff & Roth 1990; von Plessen 1992; Raffler 1997) and the production of classification criteria of the modern age (Hooper-Greenhill 1992; Benett 1995). In recent years, these perspectives have been broadened, principally by comparative studies on national museums (Knell et al. 2010) as well as works on transnational places of remembrance (Macdonald 2003; Williams 2007; Ostow 2008; Wahnich, Lášticová & Findor 2008; Aronsson 2010) and the influences of migration on museal constructions of identity (Baur 2009). What is missing however, is genuinely transdisciplinary perspectives that productively links together the processes of Europeanization and musealization. The essays in this volume are intended to address this gap.

For the museal self-image changes in step with society, as Klas Grinell (2010: 178), curator of the Museum of World Culture in Gothenburg, has stated: ‘Many nationalistic projects are today under re-evaluation under pressure from
globalization, large scale immigration and regionalization. As he shows, due to growing cultural and ethnic diversification in society, museums today no longer possess a comprehensive power of representation. This is an observation that can be applied to the Europeanization of the museal field: there is no longer any single narrative that is so powerful as to be capable of establishing itself as a new master narrative – including any European master-narrative in a museum.

Instead of this, museums today are understood as an arena (Karavanagh 2001), a place of negotiation (Aronsson 2010) and a ‘conquest of the future’ (Imhof 2008: 49, italics in original). As such, the museum is – to speak with Nietzsche – leaving the realm of antiquarian history and becoming an actor of the present and future. Europe can be written into this discourse and serves as a watchword of modernization for museum theorists and museum practitioners alike, as all of the articles in this volume demonstrate in different ways. The manner in which the watchword ‘Europe’ is used in order to initiate, legitimate and possibly realize various innovations is shown by the essays in this volume.

Torgeir Rinke Bangstad’s article Routes of industrial heritage: on the animation of sedentary objects gives an example of how museological discourses and Europeanization sometimes go hand in hand. In his investigation of industrial heritage routes and the way they functionalize and animate remaining sites of previous industrial enterprises, he traces the European Route of Industrial Heritage back to its German blueprint, the Route Industriekultur. Analyzing the loss of meaning of already abandoned factories, the links between local and trans-local connections in heritage routes, the role of routes in rethinking cultural identities, and the new ethics of conservation, Bangstad’s article offers an understanding of cultural routes as an object of the reanimated circulation of the most heavy, sedentary objects conceivable.

Another attempt at modernizing both museological practices and the idea of national or regional spaces is the highly contested field of virtual exhibitions. In his article Harmonized spaces, dissonant objects, Inventing Europe? Mobilizing digital heritage, Alexander Badenoch presents a twofold argument. Badenoch shows, firstly, how a European (self-) perception and the construction of European identities are centred on forms of mobility. This cultural path dependency makes it more feasible for European agents in the heritage field to design a common European vision of a mobilized collection in the virtual world. Challenging this harmonized notion of digital heritage, secondly, the article presents insights into the making of the collaborative online exhibit Europe, interrupted. This platform, of which Badenoch is the chief curator, reveals various forms of technological transnational entanglement as well revealing rather than concealing the navigation of dissonant objects in the virtual world.

Digitizing objects and collections is not only an attempt at harmonizing cultural visions of Europe. It is, as Nanna Thylstrup reveals, to an even greater extent part of a global competition in relation to property rights and technical standardization.
Her article *The digital dimension of European cultural politics: Index, intellectual property and internet governance* shows why and how the internet has become a central issue of EU politics. The digital collection Europeana here serves as a kind of flagship for European politics to negotiate and promote cultural, economic, legal and political paradigms for the future.

Just as digitizing Europe, mapping Europe has become a frequent rhetorical figure within cultural studies. Rarely, however, has it been taken as literally as in Kerstin Poehls’ article *Europe blurred: Migration, Margins and the Museum*. In her analysis of recent exhibitions of migrant life and migration, the object of the map is assigned a central role. Covering a large geographical range, stretching even outside of the space of the European Union, the article conceptualizes migration as a *boundary object*. The uses (and misuses) of maps in these exhibitions are meant to blur both the cultural and the geographical borders of Europe, making the museum an important actor in the political discourse. Likewise, and as a structural motif of Europeanization, dealing with issues of migration might change, as Poehls believes, the exhibitionary complex itself.

Ljiljana Radonic’s article again follows memory politics between universalization and Europeanization. *Croatia – Exhibiting memory and history at the ‘shores of Europe’* traces how the tendency to establish standards for new European Holocaust memorial museums affects both national and local policies of commemoration. Based on examples from Hungary and on a detailed case study of such policies in Croatia, the author explores the local responses in adopting and adjusting this tendency in accordance with the prevailing national history narratives. The article pays particular attention to the failure to develop the memory of perpetrators and crimes in the background of initiatives to commemorate the victims and to maintain victim narratives.

In conjunction with Radonic’s topic, the article *Is this us? The construction of European Men in ‘It’s our history’!* examines the confrontation with the ruptures of Europe’s past. Steffi de Jong takes up a highly relevant phenomenon of both public and museal significance, namely the figure of the witness. In her article, she shows how witness accounts in museums and exhibitions around Europe are inscribed into a European narrative and the construction of a European memory. Her main thesis links the use of witnesses in historic exhibitions to the post-modern turn in museology as well as to the process of finding a common foundation for a European memory, embedded in the cultural politics of the EU institutions. Building on the assumption that the witness is a socially constructed and legitimized figure of post-Holocaust discourses, a microanalysis of two exhibitions of the Musée de l’Europe traces the pitfalls of a European memory narrative.

Wolfram Kaiser’s article, finally, deals with what one could call the founding problem of exhibiting the contemporary history of Europe: the lack of drama and its preoccupation with treaties rather than stories. *From Great Men to Ordinary*
Citizens? The Biographical Approach to Narrating European Integration History in Museums identifies biographical approaches in museums and exhibitions as ways to meet this challenge. Hence, the article distinguishes between different varieties of the biographical approach that differ with regard to who features in the exhibitions and how the biographies are presented. Contrasting those approaches to each other, the author opts for narrative pluralism where conflicting views of Europe co-exist and argues that the history of Europe will not – and should not – produce a new historical master-narrative.

The articles in this volume are the result of the international conference Exhibiting Europe. The development of European narratives in museums, collections and exhibitions, which took place from 7-9 April 2011 in Oslo. My thanks go to all of the participants for the productive atmosphere. Thanks to Gerard Delanty for an inspiring key-note lecture. Particular thanks go to the commentators Brita Brenna, Isabelle Benoit, Klas Grinell, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Wolfgang Kaschuba, Guido Vaglio and Nikolai Vukov. Thanks also to Hans Philipp Einartsen of the Interkulturellt Museum Oslo for organizational assistance and to Steffi de Jong, Anja Loy and Torgeir Rinke Bangstad for further support. Finally, I would like to convey my appreciation to the Research Council of Norway, which supported Exhibiting Europe as part of its KULVER-programme. Thanks to Kjersti Bale, the chair of the KULVER-programme board for the introductory words to the conference, whose results are collected here.

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Routes of Industrial Heritage: On the Animation of Sedentary Objects

By Torgeir Rinke Bangstad

Abstract
In this article, the recent proliferation of cultural heritage routes and networks will be analyzed as an attempt to animate and revitalize idle artefacts and landscapes. With a specific focus on the sedentary, immobile sites of former industrial production, it will be claimed that the route is an appropriate and understandable way of dealing with industrial sites that have lost their stable place in a sequence of productions. If the operational production site is understood as a place of where, above all, function and efficiency guide the systematic interaction between labour, raw material and technology, then the absence of this order is what makes an abandoned factory seem so isolated and out of place. It becomes disconnected from the web of production of which it was part and from which it gained its meaning and stability. In this regard, it makes sense to think of industrial heritage routes as an effort to bring the isolated site back into place. Following Barbara Kirshenblatt Gimblett, we have come to think of cultural heritage as an opportunity that is granted to artifacts, lifestyles and places of a 'second life'. Industrial heritage routes occasion such a reanimation of former industrial sites according to the principles cultural tourism, place production, professional networking and best practice learning. As a mode of operation, the route has some potential advantages over the bounded, site-specific approach. It extends the historic context of the site in question beyond the isolated, geographical location. Orchestrating sites in a wider heritage network is a way of emphasizing a notion of culture that stresses interaction, movement and encounters with that which lies beyond the local. It may also grant heritage professionals an opportunity to work in closer relation to what goes on elsewhere.

Keywords: Industrial heritage, route, networks, Route Industriekultur, site, ERIH
Introduction

In his analysis of industrial ruins, the cultural geographer Tim Edensor (2005a: 66) describes ruination in terms of a disintegration of the organized sequences of production and the breaking up of the ordered relations between things, people and machines which characterize the industrial space. In the ruin, he claims, these sequences of productive action reliant on the organisation of time, space and materiality are now absent. For abandoned factories suddenly lose their position in the networks which render their meaning and function stable, as the complex infrastructure which surrounds the operation of an industrial site comes apart.

Edensor (2005b: 313) also describes industrial plants as ‘exemplary spaces in which things are subject to order’, adding that at the moment an industrial site is closed down it is ‘dropped from these stabilizing networks’. The sudden absence of regimes of ordering means that the production site that used to belong to a greater production network becomes detached and loses its ‘epistemological and practical security’ (ibid.). If we follow this line of reasoning, this would imply that a deserted and run-down factory detached from a functional production network will soon be considered as matter out of place. This article will address the issue of how these sites are granted a position in networks of a different kind, namely in the routes designed for cultural tourism which seek to re-establish historical links between dispersed sites which were once part of the industrial infrastructure.
The profound structural change and economic decline in many industrial regions across Europe in the second half of the twentieth century has introduced the complicated issue of how to deal with the large-scale remains from decades of industrial production. A common understanding of these industrial sites suggests that they are so fundamental to the rhythm of quotidian life that they often go unnoticed. The overwhelming familiarity of industrial buildings may hinder our appreciation of them and once production halts, these sites regularly fall into neglect and disrepair. However, with rapid deindustrialization a desire to keep some of the most important industrial landmarks as an expression of cultural identity and local history is likely to occur. In this way, technology, artefacts, traditions and buildings dropped from a functional order are reanimated in the exhibitionary realm and given a ‘second life as heritage’ (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998). One might say that upon being preserved for posterity, these industrial remains enter new networks of order and stability where they are once again granted a degree of epistemological security as cultural heritage rather than as production utilities.

In recent years, various heritage routes have featured as a means of tracing the cross-fertilization of cultures throughout history and as a way of mapping the extensive circulation of people, technology and goods. A route is typically made up of individual sites that are connected into a wider network either on a local, regional, national or even European scale. The routes represent ideas of social interaction and cultural exchange and may also make individual sites part of a larger cultural property context. A characteristic feature of cultural heritage is to occasion a movement of artifacts from ‘local descent’ to ‘translocal consent heritage’ (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006: 170). A cultural heritage route can aid this movement because it moves beyond the view of heritage management as a predominantly local concern to being something that is addressed as a shared responsibility with repercussions beyond the local community.

In the first part of this article, I will outline the genealogy of some recent cultural heritage routes before I go on to explain the proliferation of the route as a mode of assemblage within industrial heritage more specifically. Industrial heritage routes will be explored with reference to the German Route Industriekultur in the Ruhr area, which has inspired similar initiatives in other regions and on a European transnational level. Furthermore, I will point to some of the characteristic features of the Route Industriekultur that recur in similar projects in different contexts. The main purpose of this article is to explore if and how these attempts to route historical monuments across geographical distances might affect the notion of cultural heritage as site-specific. Secondly, I will explain how these recent trends correspond to general shifts within the cultural heritage sector. I claim that industrial heritage routes are significant because they offer a way to include the local as a part of a translocal heritage discourse and practice, and that as such they offer a strategy of ‘Europeanizing’ cultural heritage and move it beyond mere national priorities and interpretations. If cultural heritage is traditionally perceived
as ‘sedentary rather than mobile’ and concerning ‘objects that are connected um-
bilically to a geographical location’ (Gibson & Pendlebury 2009: 5) – then the
process of routing extends the notion of heritage beyond the specific geographical
location and offers a strategy for – and representation of – cross-cultural interac-
tion within contemporary heritage management. Following Sharon Macdonald’s
(2009) understanding of cultural heritage as an optimal means of assembling and
sustaining the local, but also of incorporating global elements in its capacity to
move across and reconstitute specific situations, the cultural heritage route is a
device that demonstrates the capacity of global forms to de- and recontextualize.
A cultural heritage route does not sever the connection of an artifact to a specific
geographical location, but it may facilitate the movement from one cultural prop-
erty context to another, turning the local landmark into a token of a translocal and
shared cultural heritage.

The Development of Cultural Heritage Routes Since the 1980s
The attempt to systematically connect cultural heritage sites into larger tourist
itineraries and routes is a fairly recent undertaking that gained prominence only in
the late 1980s with UNESCO’s The Silk Roads Project, which emphasized the
long history of trade and cultural exchange between the East and the West and
stressed the significance of intercultural dialogue in the present as well. Another
important initiative from the same period was the ten-year project Iron Roads in
Africa, launched in 1991, which sought to trace the common heritage of ironwork-
ing across the continent. Referring to these projects, Barbara Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett (2006: 171) claims that the process of orchestrating heritage around a
route or road was a way for UNESCO to use travel and trade as a positive histori-
ical reference point for globalization and models of cultural dialogue and ex-
change.

It is in this capacity that cultural heritage routes have recently been employed
on a European level as well. During the last two decades, cultural heritage routes
have been promoted as an important means to foster and improve upon existing
pan-European dialogues. The genealogy of cultural heritage routes in this context
reaches back to the initiatives of the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1987, when a
program aiming to illustrate how cultural diversity in Europe was in fact also a
shared heritage was launched. This was the same year as the Santiago de Compo-
stela Pilgrim Route was established as the first cultural route within the CoE pro-
gram. Later additions covering several European countries included The European
Textile Network, the Hansa League and routes dedicated to parks and gardens as
well as one commemorating the Jewish heritage. In 1998, a resolution that identi-
fied the reasoning behind CoE’s involvement in the routing of cultural heritage
was adopted by the Committee of Ministers. The resolution states that routes ‘lend
themselves to long-term European co-operation programs in the fields of research,
heritage enhancement, culture and the arts, cultural educational youth exchanges, cultural tourism in Europe and sustainable cultural development’ (Council of Europe 1998). Here, the cultural heritage routes are primarily employed for the purpose of mobilization – whether mobilization of individuals, organizations, institutions or other structures in Europe (Council of Europe 1998). The CoE also identifies industrial areas as a prioritized field because these are often located outside the hubs that have traditionally benefited from tourism.

Along similar lines, policies concerning cultural routes have also been developed within the framework of the European Union. Cultural heritage routes figure prominently in a recent call from the European Commission (European Commission 2011) aimed at supporting and promoting cross-border tourism products and facilitating the exchange of information and best practice in this field. Here too, destinations off the ‘beaten track’ were regarded as the prime beneficiaries of the initiatives. In these and similar calls designed to animate a specific cross-cultural response on behalf of heritage institutions, the interaction, the exchange and the network are placed at the center of attention.

Why would routes, itineraries, networks and exchanges figure as particularly favourable modes of presentation? In explaining why actors respond to certain calls in the way they do, Greg Urban (2001: 179) claims that imperatives works as ‘models of how to respond to the [imperatives that] are contained in prior discourse’. The attempt to promote the exchange of information and best practices within a cross-cultural heritage, as in the case of the call from the European Commission, would certainly privilege the responses that manage to give form to these specific requirements. And a cultural heritage route potentially does this, by giving priority to notions of mobility, change and cultural exchange within a discourse where the notion of cultural permanence and the idea of a bounded site has been part of the orthodoxy.

The cultural heritage route may represent an appropriate response to what David Lowenthal (2009: 19) has called the ‘perpetual state of emergency’ within the cultural heritage sector that tries to be responsive to the desires of governments and at the same time retain its own internal authority and meaning (Gibson & Pendlebury 2009: 11). The needs for reflexive reforms of one’s own heritage institution and the external call to represent an increasingly diverse public and a nomadic and heterogeneous material culture work together here. The cultural heritage discourse of recent years suggests changes in the scale, scope and ambition (Fairclough 2008) of the sector and it seems less confined to a site-specific monument protection. Larger entities of heritage and heritage ensembles are included, as are entire cities. The temporal scope now also includes the archaeologies of the more recent past and the ambitions of cultural heritage are frequently addressed in terms of inventing ecologically and socially sustainable modes of caring for the past. Ensuring active re-use is believed to be the best way for a historic site to remain or become integrated in a community.
Recent developments in the international heritage discourse and particularly ICOMOS’ *Charter on Cultural Routes* (International Council on Monuments and Sites 2008) also reflect a more comprehensive approach to cultural heritage in which the wider context is acknowledged and entire landscapes are considered in addition to only the isolated site or the single monument. In the preamble of this charter, ICOMOS (op.cit.:1) states that the cultural route is a way to allow the wider cultural context of any given artifact to resound in the presentation of a heritage entity. The preamble reads as follows:

> As a result of the development of the sciences of conservation of cultural heritage, the new concept of Cultural Routes shows the evolution of ideas with respect to the vision of cultural properties, as well as the growing importance of values related to their setting and territorial scale, and reveals the macrostructure of heritage on different levels.

Like cultural heritage in general, heritage routes are a new mode of cultural production, produced in the present for the present (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998: 150) and one that attempts to rethink how artifacts, buildings and landscapes are assembled as heritage. The heritage route is described as a mode of presentation that is apt for representing the rich diversity of contributions to cultural heritage and ICOMOS claims that the more extensive notion of cultural heritage requires new approaches to describe and protect ‘significant relationships associated with its natural, cultural and historical setting’ (International Council on Monuments and Sites 2008: 1).

The route renders legible connections between dispersed locations and is in this sense an appropriate didactic device. However, we may also think of the route as an interpretive device because it informs our understanding of place with reference to forces external to the place. The context of the particular place is extended quite significantly and the place is rendered as part of a larger whole. By emphasizing – for instance – movement, networks, patterns of trade, and labour migration, the route is also a device that informs a notion of culture as change and exchange rather than a static entity with stable borders. In this sense, the route reflects the project of rethinking cultural identity in line with what Stuart Hall (1996: 4) calls ‘not the return to roots but coming to terms with our routes’. The potential of the route in this rhetorical sense is to reconcile the project of identity construction with a more heterogeneous notion of cultural heritage.

The reason for this reconciliation effort is the realization that heritage production is often conceived as a territorialization of landscape, a procedure which radically alters the social character of a landscape and turns it into an archaeological zone, a historical place or a monument site (Breglia 2006: 33). The process is well-known; a heritage site is governed by legal designations, zoning regulations, modes of conduct, archaeological mappings as well as the markers of site specificity, whether the entrance gate, the ticket booth, information boards or signs of inscription categorizing the specific site as part of an officially sanctioned heritage canon.
Our understanding of the heritage place thus requires these external entry points around the specific site itself to demarcate the boundaries of the archaeological, historical zone. But these boundaries also reminds us of just how intimately the concept of cultural heritage is tied to the discourse of ownership, inheritance, competition for land use and the struggle for urban space (Samuel 2008). Cultural heritage routes do not deconstruct the place and its boundaries, but they supply us with a supplementary instruction for interpretation, rendering the whole as greater than the sum of its parts. The organization of cultural heritage in routes has importance beyond supplying tourists with possible itineraries. They also provide means of conveying a broader and more exhaustive account of cultural change where it is simply too extensive to be contained by any single site or monument. This certainly applies to the many imprints of industrialization which are in places so numerous, omnipotent and extensive that one may even talk of ‘total industrial landscapes’ (Hartmut & Mazzoni 2005: 16).

**Routing the Artefacts of Industrial Production**

Within the management of industrial heritage, the cultural heritage routes offer a way of working around the challenge of presenting dispersed entities which collectively constituted a network of production. If we consider the profound cultural change that industrialization gave rise to, it is difficult to imagine how a single architectural landmark can convey the comprehensiveness of this transition. The artefacts of industrialization are not always easy to single out and isolate in places where the entire landscape bears the imprint of industrial production. In an archaeological survey of ‘the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution’, Ironbridge Gorge in the UK, Kate Clark (2005: 99) notes that the first casualty of the undertaking ‘was the idea of the bounded archaeological site’. She goes on to claim that ‘[t]here were no sites in the Gorge, instead, this was a complex landscape in which it was impossible to isolate individual sites. There were hundreds of buildings from cottages to villas, and from backyard brew-houses to major industrial complexes’ (ibid). The same untidiness applies to many other industrial landscapes as well. Infrastructure, workers’ housing settlements, waterways, underground mines and spoil tips are all part of the complex landscape of industry where many elements are complementary and make less sense in isolation.

Industrial production plants often appear as disorderly in a temporal sense. During their functional phase, building stocks were frequently extended or dismantled to accommodate new production requirements and changing production quotas. The difficult task of industrial heritage is to maintain a degree of permanence also within the more recent industrial complexes that were often built to allow for flexibility and to respond to sudden fluctuations in the global market situation. It may seem paradoxical that industrial heritage wants to make permanent what was originally meant to be flexible. Any factory must accommodate new production pro-
cesses, new technology as well as rapid changes in demand and supply. This often results in a complex assemblage of different styles, building materials and production regimes. Buildings are continually removed, extended or altered. According to Föhl and Höhmann (2010: 20), the industry ‘cannibalises’ its production sites.

Another challenge of representing the complexity of industrial heritage concerns the relations of one single site to the greater production network. A production site may, following Edensor (2005a: 66), be understood as ‘the stabilisation of relations between the things, people and machines’ depending on ‘relations with other spaces which precede and follow them in the sequence of production, and also implicitly with more distant parts of the wider network into which the factory is installed’. This holds true for most production sites which are usually only one element in a complex line of production. When a site is cut off from the larger sequence of production and the connections which rendered it functional, the result is what Edensor (2005a: 63) calls a ‘phantom network’ that evokes merely a ‘shadow of order’.

**Route Industriekultur**

The attempt to tell a more representative story of how these production networks were originally ordered, or how distant sites were part of the same sequence of production, is what a route of industrial heritage might contribute to by presenting and making accessible a larger ensemble of sites. One of the important precursors in this regard was the German *Route Industriekultur* in the Ruhr area. This particular attempt to route industrial heritage in the Ruhr has acted as a model of successful industrial heritage in Europe in recent years. According to a Belgian industrial heritage specialist, Patrick Viaene (2005), the approach in Ruhr has provided a long-term inspiration and works as an ideal in regions affected by industrial decline. It has influenced policies in other former industrial regions, such as the Spanish Asturias, the Flemish regions in Belgium, Nord in France, Alsace, Lorraine, Polish Silesia as well as in parts of Greece. This list is likely to grow due to the fact that Ruhr is frequently cited as a reference point for many urban planners, architects and conservationists engaged in large-scale regeneration of industrial areas.
Route Industriekultur © Torgeir Rinke Bangstad
The Route Industriekultur brings together a variety of quite extensive sites tied to the thematic focus on industrial culture and structural change in the region. The route was established to sustain and communicate the results of a large urban planning scheme called Internationale Baumausstellung Emscher Park (IBA Emscher Park), which took place in the Northern parts of the Ruhr area in the period 1989-1999. It is the impact of the regeneration efforts in this period that has resulted in the renown of the Ruhr as a mainstay of sustainable models for industrial heritage planning. IBA Emscher Park was not solely committed to industrial heritage, but industrial heritage was an integral part of the approach towards landscape recovery and urban planning in the old industrial region. The regeneration efforts furthermore included park planning, cleaning up polluted rivers, improving infrastructure, modernizing residential quarters and changing the public image of the post-industrial landscape through extensive investments in landscape art and green recreational areas.

The Route Industriekultur was established in 1999 and commissioned by the regional association Regionalverband Ruhr. This organization has members from 53 Ruhr cities and it has historically been important in the urban planning of the region. The route introduces visitors to the 52 sites and 25 key locations of industrial heritage, the latter are the so-called anchor points that include Zeche Zollverein and Landschaftspark Duisburg-Nord, both prominent architectural highlights of the regional industrial heritage. The route also singles out important workers’ housing settlements, the so-called ‘Arbeitersiedlungen’ some of which were renovated during the course of the IBA Emscher Park-project. As for the means of connection, the cycling and walking trails are also emphasized in the route maps – as are the different points that offer a panoramic overview of the industrial landscape. Some of these points are located on top of giant slag heaps and are part of the manufactured landscapes produced through decades of intensive coal mining, which have now been creatively integrated in the IBA Emscher Park-project.

This particular route vividly chronicles just how profoundly the industrial activity has changed every aspect of the region from the landscape to modes of living, cultural landmarks, urban infrastructure, migration patterns as well as the social structure of a region. The circular route is 400 kilometres long and presents several impressive landmarks of more than 150 years of industrial history in the region. Even though all of the sites engage with the historical identity of the Ruhr area as a region of coal and steel industries, the sites assembled in the route are frequently referred to as locations of the future to undermine simple notions of industrial nostalgia. These sites do not simply memorialize the past, but have in effect also acted as laboratories for how to engage with the preservation and adaptive reuse of giant structures. One of the outcomes of this learning process is a creative approach witnessed, for instance, in how industrial wastelands are ‘dignified’ (Raines 2011: 198) through art projects and how uncontrolled weed growth is allowed to recolonize even preserved industrial buildings, as can be witnessed in
the industrial nature of the coking plant *Kokerei Hansa* outside Dortmund. Some orthodoxies of the bounded site-specific preservation were challenged by the IBA Emscher Park, which instead took the vast industrial landscape into consideration, and recognized that conservation of heritage should not be limited to the obvious individual buildings or pieces of machinery, but in reality the entire landscape was steeped in industrial heritage, and that other traces should be called out and treated in some way (Raines 2011: 195).

Due to the extensive and holistic approach of IBA Emscher Park, it seems only natural that the results are communicated through the *Route Industriekultur* as an overarching device for guiding the public through the creatively regenerated industrial landscape.

Similar regional routes are now being planned or have already been established all over Europe. The French-Belgian route *Itinéraire de la Culture Industrielle* traces the common industrial heritage of Wallonia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais and functions as a way to re-appropriate the post-industrial landscapes of the region. In the Polish region of Silesia, a route has been established to reflect its past as a region of heavy industries, and this project is modelled on the German *Route Industriekultur*. Furthermore, similar industrial heritage routes are initiated in the EUREGIO Saar-Lor-Lux, connecting the German Saar, the French Lorraine and Luxembourg together with reference to a shared industrial heritage that transcends political borders. Even in more peripheral locations, routes are developed on the model of German *Route Industriekultur*. One example of this is a Norwegian
route called *Tourism in the Cradle of Industry*, which introduces the hydro-powered chemical industries from Tyssedal/Odda to Rjukan and Notodden. This route was designed with the ambition of being represented as a regional route in the European-wide equivalent of the *Route Industriekultur* called the *European Route of Industrial Heritage* (ERIH). The latter is also based on the German precursor and shares some of its basic features such as the thematic routes, the anchor points and the recognizable signage and site descriptions that provide information about some 850 industrial heritage sites in 32 European countries. At this level of abstraction, however, the route is conceived of primarily as a virtual information portal, but it may nevertheless ‘provide a platform for the exchange of knowledge and experience between different interested parties, and serves as a source of information for the public’ (Lindström 2006). ERIH recognizes that some of the approaches that have been tried and tested in the Ruhr region in terms of large-scale recovery of industrial areas can also be applied in other European regions and that the lessons from Ruhr may prove valuable in a wider European context as well (ibid).

### The Network Form

One question is why the route has come to win such approval within the interpretation of industrial heritage and the re-appropriation of industrial landscapes. For one thing, it seems important to maintain that the effects and challenges of de-industrialization require joint efforts on a regional, national and even a European level. Secondly, the industrial heritage route provides a credible metaphor for the co-operation between several heritage institutions and this strategy is more likely to generate funding from local, regional, national and European sources. A route in this sense rests on a more extensive notion of cultural heritage and reflects what ICOMOS refers to as a new ethics of conservation, calling for common efforts beyond national borders (International Council on Monuments and Sites 2008: 1). This point is stressed in the context of ERIH as well, where the planners claim that the traditional inward focus of industrial history has prevented a full recognition of the transnational dimensions of industrialization (European Route of Industrial Heritage 2001: 11). The ambitions to route industrial heritage by stimulating closer institutional co-operation and by establishing a transnational information system, reflects the widespread appeal of the network as modus operandi. ERIH wants to bring together partners with common thematic priorities and initiatives including several EU member countries may also be eligible of EU funding. The ERIH project also exemplifies what form a network approach might assume in the heritage sector. It works on a public level via a multi-linguistic web portal that guides visitors online, offline and on-site. It also works as a way for the heritage sector to reflect upon their work in relation to what goes on elsewhere. Rather than a traditional linear route, ERIH resembles the network form, which is consid-
ered to be increasingly important in any international institutional context. This particular appeal of the network form in a professional context is explained by Annelise Riles (2000: 186) as follows:

We might think of network aesthetics as aesthetic activation, then – as a matter of how graphics, layout and form of all kinds capture the imagination and guide analysis. The interrelationship of aesthetics and informational content, and in particular the power of design to transmit information across national and cultural differences to effectuate action, is a classic modernist theme.

Some forms have proven more powerful than others to the extent to which they manage to ‘speed the efficient functioning of communication’ or succeed in cutting across ‘differences of culture, nationality or ideology’ (ibid). I claim that cultural heritage routes are powerful forms, and have become widespread within the internationalized framework of heritage institutions because they are appropriate, legible and credible forms that respond to cultural and political imperatives in a certain way. A route in this regard is a form that facilitates, represents and awaits movement either in the sense that it encourages tourists to ‘move on’ or encourages professionals to engage with extended networks of specialized knowledge. Industrial heritage routes have also come to serve as a way to highlight the interconnectedness of European industrialization and employ this as a positive reference point for a common European heritage and as an organizing principle for the contemporary initiatives of cultural dialogue, knowledge transfer and best practice learning.

With this in mind, one might say that a cultural heritage route constitutes a recognizable form that is part of the framework of expectations and potential strategies even in more remote locations. Even if some institutions may choose to remain disengaged from the attempts of routing heritage, it constitutes one part of an array of potential strategies. Even the approaches that are eventually ruled out are part of the negotiation process that informs the final result. Sharon Macdonald (2008: 186) claims that what in the end is realized locally as a materialized cultural heritage project is unique even when it is simultaneously widespread. This is so because what happens locally ‘does so in multiple interactions with various elsewheres – embodied in people, practices and technologies (e.g. visitors, exhibition, advisory committees, books read and visits made by history workers, legislation and funding opportunities)’ (ibid). According to Assman and Conrad (2010) the globalization of memory policies has created framework of mutual attention, circulation and comparison and this new framework is also reflected in the cultural heritage route both as representation and as practice.

Summary
In this article, I have attempted to analyze a specific device of heritage production, namely the cultural heritage route, which is frequently emulated and has become a mainstay of strategies of cutting the umbilical connection between artifact
and a bounded geographical location. The cultural heritage route has proved to be an appropriate means of giving form to extended notion of place that recognizes that external circulatory regimes also take part in the process of forming the local situation. As such, it makes for an apt mode of heritage representation as the professional conservationists have to accommodate or invent forms of responding to changing political frameworks, the new ambitions and new scales of the heritage enterprise, and to employ these forms to reflect on their own practice in relation to similar undertakings elsewhere. While the challenges regarding the maintenance, interpretation and presentation of artifacts, buildings and landscapes as important heritage may seem like something which requires a response according to local needs and local, historical sensibilities only, this is hardly ever the case. Once a site is acknowledged as potentially important heritage with resonance beyond the local community, a myriad of external partners, specialists, tried and tested approaches, professionals with international experience, networks, etc., are available to be mobilized in the attempts of creating and legitimizing cultural heritage locally.

This is particularly apparent within industrial heritage, where the remains of the era of mass industrialization are increasingly framed in terms of a shared heritage and as a common responsibility. Industrial heritage routes are significant in part because they offer a way to make the local part of a translocal heritage discourse and practice. Within the network initiative of the ERIH, this discursive framing of a trans-national, challenging industrial legacy requiring cross-border co-operation is evident. The form of the route was employed at an early stage in the Ruhr area, and it is by now considered to be relevant in other regional contexts and on a wider European scale as well. The route allows the recontextualization of existing sites and hence does not interfere with existing priorities of the conservation practice. Rather, as I have shown in this article, it allows for ruins, buildings and even entire landscapes to be reanimated and signify cultural interaction and transnational connections instead of standstill, isolation and decline. The proliferation of industrial heritage routes all over Europe should be considered as an attempt to reconstitute in the exhibitionary realm a more vivid idea of the complex production networks in the era of mass industrialization. Industrial heritage routes constitute a form of assemblage activity in these ‘phantom networks’ (Edensor 2005a: 63) of former production systems, a way to mobilize the most heavy, sedentary objects conceivable and to grant them a second chance to represent interaction rather than inertia. The most internationally renowned forerunners in post-industrial recovery are the Route Industriekultur and the regional planning scheme of the IBA Emscher Park. These projects were farsighted and have contributed to improving the image of industrial heritage on a more general level. What succeeded in these projects was the reinvention of conservation as regeneration and the rethinking of a memorialization of the past as workshops for the future. Industrial ruins were not written off as non-places but dignified as places in the process
of becoming. The apparent plasticity of the form of the route fits this ambitious task – it is not linear like traditional routes and it is not preordained or unidirectional. It allows a more remote industrial heritage site to be part of a family of already canonized cultural heritage and grants it a place within a network where the even the most static, sedentary and solid artifacts are reanimated as places of movement.

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Harmonized Spaces, Dissonant Objects, Inventing Europe? Mobilizing Digital Heritage

By Alexander Badenoch

Abstract
Technology, particularly digitization and the online availability of cultural heritage collections, provides new possibilities for creating new forms of ‘European cultural heritage’. This essay analyzes the emerging sphere of European digital heritage as a project of technological harmonization. Drawing on Andrew Barry’s concepts of technological zones, it examines the various ways in which agency and European citizenship are being reconfigured around cultural heritage. It explores the “Europeanization” of digital heritage in three areas. In the first section, it analyzes the recent agenda for digital heritage of the European Union as a harmonizing project to create a smooth space of cultural heritage. In the next sections, the development of a harmonized virtual exhibit on the history of technology in Europe forms a case study to explore processes of harmonization at the level of the web platform, and in the aesthetics of digitized objects. It argues that rather than seeking to elide the points of unevenness and ‘dissonance’ that emerge in harmonization processes, we should instead look for ways to embrace them as points of dialogue and discovery.

Keywords: Technology, cultural heritage, digitization, Europe, virtual exhibit, collections
Introduction

In November of 1939, during the first months of the Second World War, the festive opening of a new bridge over the River Sava in Belgrade inaugurated a new highway designed for car traffic from Belgrade to the Hungarian border. This was a nationally-funded project, but was undertaken as part of a larger project to build a road for cars that would pass from London to Istanbul. The Yugoslav Minister of Public Works told the assembled crowd that ‘the obligations we have accepted and the fact that the Western states, as well as Hungary, have constructed their part, have faced us with a pressing duty’ to get the road finished. Now constructed, however, the road would ‘bind our capital to the large countries of Europe’ (in Badenoch 2007: 192). The meaning of this new connection to Europe remained ambiguous, however. To elite readers of the French-language *l’Echo de Belgrade*, which reported regularly on such developments in the country’s tourist industry (as well as the arrival of western tourists), such connections were presented as signs that Yugoslavia was entering into a modern age of motorways at roughly the same time as the West. For motorists from the West, whilst providing a sign of the country’s modernization, it also afforded an opportunity to gaze upon the countryside of the Balkans and its natives, who were portrayed as living in Europe’s past, as well as a route through to its colonial holdings.

This may seem an unusual point of departure for a discussion of digitized cultural heritage, and yet there are a number of aspects of it that will help guide the inquiry at hand. First, it provides a cogent example of the way in which following the transnational circulation of technology can open windows onto the shared, entangled and uneven pasts of Europe (Misa & Schot 2005; Badenoch & Fickers 2010). Indeed, it forms one story in the collaborative online exhibition *Europe, Interrupted* dedicated to exploring such routes. This exhibition was designed to challenge dominant narratives of technology’s role in integrating Europe by pointing instead to a series of technological ‘interruptions’ in European spaces. Within the online exhibition, the story explores the tensions between grand visions of European automobility and the slow and uneven rise of car travel between the wars. Closer engagement with the story’s objects reveals further transnational entanglement: the images of the road were produced in London and Quetta, respectively, and reproduced from documents held in the archive collection of the Dutch touring club ANWB in The Hague. In addition to this, the exhibit also presents to users links to other digitized objects in science and technology museums that suggest further stories about topics such as motorization, car manufacture, and tourism both in national and international contexts.

While these elements of the story highlight the case for critical attention to the role of technology in European integration, in this essay I am interested not so
much in exploring the transnational entanglements of the past, but in thinking about the construction of Europeanized digital heritage spaces in the present. As such, the London to Istanbul road also provides a powerful analogy for exploring the way objects and knowledge are being harmonized for circulation in European spheres. In particular, the London to Istanbul road was a project of technological harmonization, in this case focussed on the road systems of a number of European nations. The Alliance Internationale de Tourisme (AIT), an umbrella organization of national bicycle and auto clubs, had proposed a trajectory for the road based on existing roads, and developed a series of standards for improving them to meet the needs of motor tourists. This included minimum technical specifications for roads to accommodate motor cars, a series of special, standardized road signs, but also streamlined border controls and 24-hour access to border checkpoints. While the organization itself had very little political power, it was able to translate its area of expertise into a series of standards that presented governments with a relatively cheap and flexible option for opening up to international flows of traffic. What was in fact often a series of modest road improvements carried out on a national level could appear – at least on paper – as a unified road spanning the continent. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the road had to do with the modernization of nations, as well as boosting economies through international traffic and job creation. At the same time, however, the emerging structure was built around the ideal subject of the (Western) motor tourist, free to speed through picturesque landscapes or stop and engage with local populations and sights at will. Embracing the analogy of a tourist infrastructure rather than that of a museum, as is often used for digital heritage, reminds us that defining, constructing and creating access to European heritage is a technological project of mobilization and harmonization. This raises a new set of analogous questions for analyzing the emerging environment. What are the spatial dimensions and technological configurations of European heritage spaces? What are the technical devices and skills required to navigate them and how do these construct and/or subvert boundaries? How do these emerging heritage spaces construct ideal subjects – and objects – and what sorts of movements within and views on European heritage do they privilege?

Tony Bennett has pointed to the important role traditionally played by technology in museums, in attempting to foster both technological skill and narratives of progress (1995: 200-201). In looking at the emerging European Union, Andrew Barry (2001) has pointed to the changing role of technological displays in reconfiguring political participation. Interestingly, he theorizes the science museum as an ideal location for understanding this emerging constellation of technology, interactivity and citizenship, where the latter is bound up not so much in discipline as in interactivity, that is, in acquiring new technical literacies and actively exploring cultural zones. Barry’s work is useful here in that it follows the implications of the technological society through a range of zones and sites,
thus placing museum and heritage displays in the broader context of European technological projects, which sheds new light on the stakes of such projects.

The digital revolution, which has fuelled the recent explosion in techniques and technologies of archiving and exhibition, has both pushed and complicated the transnationalization of cultural heritage in Europe. Increasing physical travel to cultural heritage institutions, as well as increasing efforts to create online access to digitized objects of memory and documents have in turn increased the need for heritage collections to address broader audiences. Just as new media technologies are said to be driving forces in a broader digital "convergence culture" (Jenkins 2006) practitioners and theorists alike have noted how the boundaries between museums, archives and libraries are being eroded or restructured, as are the boundaries between these institutions and the flows of global commerce. Objects are here broadly understood as the discrete units of cultural heritage collections, whether physical objects, photographs, texts, sound recordings or audiovisual documents. Digitizing objects, that is, creating digital avatars and affixing accompanying metadata, profoundly transforms how users can engage with them when they are published online. On the one hand, their infinite reproducibility allows them to be easily re-contextualized, downloaded as well as commodified in a number of ways. On the other hand, their flat appearance on small screens and playback devices, as well as circulation within a broad range of commodities, places new aesthetic demands on them that differ from those of previously controlled display environments. Paradoxically, the increased value of circulating digital objects as signs of democratic access to materials and interpretations of the past has coincided with a shift in emphasis in heritage presentations away from objects (as traditionally understood) toward experience and affect (Witcomb 2007). This appears within European contexts as a focus on routes, pathways and journeys through (virtual) spaces – of the museum, such as in the C'est notre histoire! exhibit in Brussels, but also cities, or the entire continent – and various mediations of embodied experience over objects (NicCraith 2008; Macdonald 2008). Such a focus on routes not only grounds a (self-) construction of the EU as a networked state, it also builds on and emphasizes a longer history of constructing European identities around forms of mobility (Buzard 1993; Jensen & Richardson 2004; Badenoch 2007; Verstrate 2009; Badenoch&Fickers 2010). As GinetteVerstraete argues, pointing to the long history of such discourses, ‘the underlying belief is that touring European locations and receiving strangers at home will orientate the individual toward other Europeans and produce identification beyond one’s own locality on a larger European scale’ (Verstraete 2009: 157-8). At the same time, as she highlights, new media storytelling, in part incorporating digital heritage documents, has also been important in artistic endeavours to challenge dominant narratives of European mobility and technological unity to present a more nuanced view of past and future connections.
The role of technological connections – and disconnections – in generating new ways of narrating and displaying a ‘European’ heritage are thus doubly implicated in the *Inventing Europe* virtual exhibit project currently being developed (and of which the author is the chief curator), and due to go online in the Autumn of 2011. The exhibition is an experimental collaboration between scholars and a range of cultural heritage institutions of varying sizes in eight countries, as well as the European digital library Europeana. This project has grown out of an ongoing scholarly effort embedded in a broad research network to tell the history of Europe since the transport and communication revolutions ‘through the lens of technology’.

By following the contingent paths of technological development, this approach seeks to explore more precisely transnational processes of circulation, connection and integration prior to and parallel to the formal processes of political and economic integration after WWII. At the same time, such a critical exploration of technology also remains alert to processes of disconnection, fragmentation and splintering. Attention in particular to the building of technological infrastructures has been central to this agenda (Misa & Schot 2005, Kaijser and Vleuten 2006, Badenoch & Fickers 2010). In building a technological infrastructure in Europe to connect various institutions and users, *Inventing Europe* is thus an instance of the very historical processes with which it seeks to engage. This article embraces this reflexivity and turns the critical tools of historians and sociologists of technology toward the project itself to use it as a case study for understanding the pressures and potentials of the new digital environment for generating new narratives of European heritage. In what follows, I will discuss both the prototype exhibition, *Europe, Interrupted* as well as objects and discussions from two workshops (October 29, 2010 and January 12, 2011), in which heritage professionals were invited to bring and discuss sample objects from their collections with book authors and project developers.

Analyzing the Europeanization of digital heritage as a project of technological harmonization provides a way of examining the various ways in which agency and European citizenship are reconfigured around cultural heritage. I proceed here in three parts, each focussing on a different arena in which digital heritage is Europeanized, analogous to constructing mobility structures such as the London-Istanbul road. In the first section, ‘Network’, I will examine the European Union as an agent in the Europeanization of digital heritage, looking in particular at the recent agenda for digital heritage laid out by the European Commission’s high-level consultation committee. As I will show, such interventions have marked parallels to planning procedures in other technological zones – such as transport and communication – that envision the frictionless mobility of things and people through European space. In delegating action in the sphere of digitization to states and institutions, the guidelines laid down by the Commission construct digital heritage around a mobile and (inter)active European subject configured as both consumer and enricher of heritage. In the next section, “Landscape“, I will use
Inventing Europe and other online exhibits to explore the role of online platforms in configuring users’ navigation through the emerging digital spheres. This will look both at the forms of technological and procedural harmonization that creating such a platform entails, and particularly at how platforms can shape the uses and potentials of harmonized collections. The analysis will focus in particular on the points of disharmony, where borders in the digital sphere become apparent and explore potential strategies for guiding users across them. The final section, ‘Souvenirs’, queries how objects are selected, produced and presented as ‘European’ within ‘European’ digital spaces and explores the possible implications for generating new knowledge of European pasts. In this section I will look in particular at how the new engagement with aesthetics in the interactive digital sphere potentially redefines the role and importance of objects in online European heritage. I will argue that the wealth of potential new narratives generated by digital collections could potentially be undermined by new aesthetic demands placed on objects in the digital sphere.

Network: Creating an Interactive Zone

At the start of 2011, a ‘Committee of Sages’, a high-level reflection group released its recommendation for the future of digital heritage in Europe (European Commission 2011). The report, entitled ‘The New Renaissance’, which will be taken up as part of the Commission’s 2010 ‘digital agenda’ (European Commission, 2010), not only makes recommendations for generating, preserving, and creating access to digital heritage within the EU, but also lays out an agenda for EU involvement in the field of digital heritage. These documents are instruments of harmonization in that they are ultimately aimed at delegation: they create responsibility for others to act in producing a European zone (Barry 2001: 73). They also generate discursive frameworks which cultural heritage institutions increasingly need to adopt to move within national and European policy spaces.

As Nanna Thylstrup argues in her article in this issue, the EU vacillates in its discursive positions between one of cultural authority and one as defender of the single internal market. Both of these agendas are clearly visible within the most recent policy documents. The digital agenda in particular is concerned with producing and strengthening a ‘single digital market’. Michelle Henning has noted more generally that discourses of access, interaction and participation in the museum environment ‘are also marketing terminology, overlaid on another discourse of profitability, cost, customer satisfaction’ (Henning 2006: 314; see also Macdonald 1998). Such overlaps are not necessarily new. Bertekê Waaldijk has compared the Web 2.0 user with visitors to world exhibitions, and has pointed above all an analogous flexibility of identities in the configuration of both. She argues that
both kinds of visitor can create their own trajectories, swapping the identity of a citizen for the identity of a consumer and back again. If we want to understand the participation and citizenship that results from these alternating roles, it is crucial to see how this implies a close link between political participation and consumerist ‘picking and choosing’. (Waaldijk 2009: 117)

Particularly in its role as network co-ordinator, digital heritage is an area in which the EU can easily slip back and forth between its roles as moral force and market force.

Reading the EU’s agendas for digital heritage as a project of technological harmonization, both positions are supported by a positioning of the EU as technical expert, overseeing processes of mobilization. As Barry stresses, processes of harmonization involve diffusion and delegation of action (2001: 73). The EU in particular operates – similarly to the AIT in the example at the start of this article – by creating spaces for others to act. The European Union defines itself and its citizens around ‘four freedoms of movement’ (people, things, ideas and capital). Generating flows over borders forms the underpinning for a range of technological and political interventions, not least in the areas of transport and communication (Shore 2000; Jensen & Richardson 2004), but also in the realm of cultural heritage, where projects such as the European digital library seek to create new platforms for circulating objects and stories across national boundaries to help its mobile citizens to engage with a common past. While the borders of this ‘common past’ are usually elided, borders in the present, and the need for ‘promoting the widest access to the digitised material across borders’ (European Commission 2011: 8, emphasis mine) are stressed. Transnational circulation of heritage objects appears at once as a means of breaking down internal borders within Europe as well as presenting a unified and conscious picture of Europe beyond. The narrative sketched by the committee mirrors broadly the one seen in a number of white papers and recommendations for intervention in a range of technological sectors. Technological development is portrayed as generating a (potential) crisis which only a uniform strategy and harmonized action can avert. In laying out their agenda for digitization, the committee argue from an explicitly moral position as defenders of ‘European civilization’ that:

digitization is more than a technical option, it is a moral obligation. In a time when more and more cultural goods are consumed online, when screens and digital devices are becoming ubiquitous, it is crucial to bring culture online (and, in fact, a large part of it is already there).
If we don’t pursue this task, we run the risk of progressively eroding and losing what has been the foundation of European countries and civilization in the last centuries. It must be clearly understood that if access is the final objective, a tall order, it can only be achieved through preservation of the work. (European Commission, 2011: 9)

This moral encoding of the mission of digitization is further placed in the classic modernist framework, reminiscent of the role of the nineteenth century museum in displaying the progress of the nation-state (Bennett 1995). Digital heritage
appears here as what Bennett (1995: 179-181) calls a ‘backtelling’ of the European project: ‘Europe was constructed with the notion of evolution, thought, creation, research and ingenuity. No one will disagree: each phase of this process is worthy of conservation and study’ (European Commission 2011: 43).

If the visitor to the nineteenth century museum was meant to be disciplined to follow specific paths through the museum space, as Barry stresses, the subjects of the new European state are meant to explore these broad new spaces of heritage, using a range of technical skills. Already a decade before, a research framework written for the EC’s Information Society directorate noted that:

The focus of service delivery is becoming the active user in a shared network space. The user wants resources bundled in terms of their own interests and needs, not determined by the constraints of media, the capabilities of the supplier, or by arbitrary historical practices (Dempsey 1999).

Within the current digital agenda, expanding access to internet and literacy is a further key component in promoting European citizenship (European Commission 2010: 24ff.). The committee argue that Europeana must approach such mobile and skilled users by ‘3) distributing cultural heritage to the users wherever they are, whenever they want it, 4) helping users engage with their cultural heritage in new ways’ (European Commission 2010: 22). On the one hand, they assume a heritage user in the classic position of the consumer: they know what heritage they want, when they want it, and demand a service that is available to them in their own time. At the same time, they require expert assistance in engaging with heritage once they have received it. Like the ideal visitor to the new interactive science museum analyzed by Barry (2001: 149-151) as the model for emerging models of technological citizenship in Europe, the ideal subject of (European) digital cultural heritage expected to be driven by curiosity to explore and connect. Rather than being disciplined to follow the paths set by museum authorities toward individual improvement like their classical counterparts, the new 'users' of digital heritage are meant to interact with heritage objects using a range of technical skills they have acquired for grasping, re-connecting and re-combining the past as part of their lives. Throughout the report, and indeed in its title, the stress on digitization and digital heritage is predicated on its being recombined and re-connected by the users, who are expected actively to create new uses for heritage, not least through acquiring new technical skills. ‘Digitization relies on technological progress, but, in turn, may also spur innovation and creativity. It can contribute to job creation, growth and business development in sectors linked to technology, culture, creativity and innovation’ (European Commission 2011: 43). This promise of growth, based on increased energizing of the mobile citizen in space, echoes through a range of European spatial projects. A website to promote the Magistrale line (of which the contested Stuttgart 21 project is a key node) similarly expounds: ‘The Magistrale increases the population's choices in terms of work, education, free time and consumption. And the predicted economic growth can be expected to lead to increases in income’(Magistrale 2011). This, in turn,
draws on a much longer-standing ‘myth of networks’ that has played an important role in structuring visions and projects for Europe since the early twentieth century (Schot & Lagendijk 2008; Badenoch 2010).

As the Comité des Sages note, institutions’ orientation toward Europe, and particularly the European digital library Europeana, remains quite varied (European Commission, 2011: 22). In addition to their very different collections, the institutions involved in Inventing Europe all have differing agendas both with regard to Europe and to digitization. Many, like the Science Museum and the Norwegian Technology Museum, already have extensive catalogues online, although none have anything near their entire collection online. Especially for larger institutions, Europe is clearly on the agenda as well. Many of the national institutions involved with the project are also oriented toward the central engine of Europeana, which they view both as a tool for networking their collections and as a means for attracting funding for digitalization. Other, more specialized, collections involved are not oriented toward Europeana at all. For them, Inventing Europe represents a relatively small investment that will potentially engage a relatively wide audience with their collection, as well as a demonstrated added value when seeking funds for further digitization. A further attraction of Inventing Europe, even for those institutions that are involved with Europeana, is precisely the narrative contexts into which objects are re-embedded. As one curator remarked, comparing their institution's involvement with Europeana to potential involvement with IE, that Europeana ‘is actually just a big bucket of objects that is easy to search through. The stories are missing. And those are what you find here’ (e-mail communication, 28 October 2010). The curator's words also speak to the motivation for Europeana to use this as a pilot project for their API. Much akin to Europeana’s trial exhibit on Art Nouveau, designed as a ‘showcase’ of Europeana content (http://exhibitions.europeana.eu/exhibits/show/art-nouvea- en), Inventing Europe offers an opportunity to demonstrate what is possible using its massive and growing collection of objects. Notably, the goal of all of the stakeholders is not merely to display collections, but to enrich them, with new contexts, new meanings and new uses. If there is a shared meaning and importance of 'Europe' among the project stakeholders, then, it is precisely the potential enrichment gained by the objects as they circulate through European space – and among the mobile subjects who will interact with them.

Landscape: Configuring European Navigation

While there have long been calls for technological standardization for archives, galleries and libraries in Europe, the push toward a smooth space of European digital heritage is still very much in its infancy (Sieglerschmidt 2006; Waibel & Erway 2008; Erway & Waibel 2009). As Barry has pointed out (Barry 2001: 68-75; see also Turnbull 2000), processes of technological harmonization
are seldom smooth, but are riddled with contestation, and not infrequently reveal and/or maintain ongoing points of difference and friction. The visibility or invisibility of borders is also not merely a question of technical standards, however. Both in the context of the emerging ‘single market’ of Europe as well as the agenda of public access to digital heritage, the crossing of national and institutional borders also has an ideological and a performative character. Such performances could be said to operate along what Thomas Diez has called the ‘subversion paradox’, which entails that ‘the decreasing importance of borders within the EU is based on the recognition of those very borders’ (Diez 2006: 237).

Within the supposedly limitless and borderless space of the internet, the place where these boundaries are rendered visible or invisible and their transgression is performed or elided is not at territorial boundaries but within the web platform. Web platforms play a key role in structuring and labelling user interaction, and as such they are the site of institutional power. As museum designer Nina Simon argues in relation to both web and physical platforms in museums, the agency that works through them is primarily suggestive. ‘Platform designers grant users a few specific, designed opportunities—to create their own content, to prioritize the messages that resonate best for them personally—in the context of a larger overall ecosystem’ (Simon 2010: 121). As the digital media theorist Lev Manovich has argued, new media environments privilege the form of a database or a navigable space of narrative – or both in tension with one another (2001: 191). Each sort of interface raises questions of boundaries in different ways. The networked nature of much European heritage, coupled with the agenda of democratic access to heritage collections has led to heritage platforms that have, for the most part, favoured forms of display that lean heavily toward the database. The practice of digitizing internal museum catalogues for online access supports such interfaces. The portal of Europeana (www.europeana.eu) is a case in point, which presents a single search interface, performing quite deliberately as a one-stop shop of European heritage. When a search result is returned, national and institutional boundaries appear as possible search filters based on the standardized metadata that are available within the classification system – they can either be engaged, or clicked away.

As noted, however, the purely database quality of such an interface appears increasingly ineffective at creating engagement with European pasts. This strongly echoes Manovich’s argument that

in the information age narration and description has changed roles. If traditional cultures provided people with well-defined narratives (myths, religion) and little ‘stand-alone’ information, today we have too much information and too few narratives which can tie it all together (Manovich 2001: 193).

Museum displays, and web portals inspired by them, attempt to take up this challenge by placing objects within a more narrative environment, where objects and their metadata are embedded in a spatial environment that allows a user to follow stories as they move from object to object. Within more narrative
environment, such as the showcase exhibit on art nouveau, by contrast, the issue of borders becomes more prevalent as users move between objects. The exhibit displays art nouveau as a European phenomenon, growing out of the metropoles of Europe before the First World War. The exhibit displays items from a collection gathered from Europeana’s database, and supplied with links to the item within Europeana’s database. The exhibit focuses primarily on the visual engagement with the objects, removing the metadata except for the caption from view unless clicked. The visitor is thus invited to make visual connections that support the narrative theme. In viewing the metadata and the captions, the divisions between the collections then become visible – while the narrative sections are available in a uniform language, the captions and metadata of the objects are in the language of their home collections.

With its explicit agenda of revealing the multiple levels of agency surrounding technological processes and circulation in Europe, Inventing Europe embraces the emerging paradigm in museum practice – and Web 2.0 – of looking to multiply the voices and connections around objects. It seeks to do this in part by means of a technical platform similar to that used by Europeana, geared toward showing objects in multiple contexts, thus multiplying and highlighting border crossings, and generating a vision of uneven space. Besides a series of 'static' objects embedded in the narratives of the site, so-called 'dynamic' objects on the websites of contributing institutions are shown as 'related content' via RSS feeds aggregated on the IE site, as well as a separate feed from Europeana API. A 'dynamic' object thus appears as related to the themed narratives constructed by the IE editorial team, to the coalitions of objects represented by the dynamic content feed, to the objects in situ on their originating sites. Users will be able to ‘collect’ both static and dynamic items within the exhibition, adding tags and notes to create ‘theme paths’ they will have the option of publishing. Besides their appearance in these multiple 'expert' contexts, users will be able to share objects in social media, add links, tags and commentary and use them in making their own connections in the broader realm of the web. As the project develops, ways of feeding such enriched content back into the other spheres will be sought.

A key issue for harmonizing collections is that digitization practices in heritage institutions have often been far more oriented toward maintaining collections than toward placing objects in new and potentially infinite networks of knowledge and expertise (Cameron 2008; Cameron & Mengler 2009). Fiona Cameron has stressed that online heritage collections tend to remediate catalogues and inventories, which classify the objects themselves in a hierarchical taxonomy designed largely for internal use, rather than engaging online users with the multiple meanings of the object (Cameron 2008 on the concept of ‘remediation’ see Bolter & Grusin 2000). This was brought home in an eloquent presentation at Inventing Europe’s October workshop by a curator from the Norwegian Technical Museum, who showed a number of objects from the Norwegian national digital catalogue.
Many of the objects were visually engaging, and, as the curator demonstrated, each had a compelling story of transnational social and cultural entanglement that fitted well within the parameters of *Inventing Europe's* agenda. However, the curatorial knowledge surrounding the objects had not been included in the online documentation of the collection, but was rather knowledge held and transferred—often orally—by curatorial staff. Making this knowledge publicly available raised new questions about the value and meaning of online objects within a national context. As the curator noted, disappointment with the catalogue, precisely for not including the contextual material that would help users to engage with the objects, has led to the placement of a button on the site for users to do this work of enrichment themselves by adding a story about any particular item.

Such regimes of classification also highlight clear boundaries in collections to be linked from the platform. While the DigitaltMuseum displays objects with basic catalogue data, the Science and Society Picture library (in which much of the online collection of the Science Museum can be found), for example, presents images and objects accompanied by texts that offer some cultural interpretation, and a range of keywords, but does not always offer precise information about the specific object and/or image, such as when it was collected or from whom. Comparing Singer sewing machines featured on each portal: (Figures 1 and 2) reveals a remarkable difference. The machine on the Science and Society page is accompanied by a short narrative which includes the contexts of manufacture, the specifications of the object, and the conditions of its purchase and use. It also presents a large range of keywords that would allow a user to seek related content within the collection. Some of these categories, such as ‘personalities’ and ‘musician’ are clearly related to a different definition of ‘singer’, but it offers a wide range of contexts which a user might explore further. My point is not to hold the SSPL up as a more desirable or ‘user-friendly’ portal for digital heritage objects. Indeed one could argue, to the contrary, that while the DigitaltMuseum’s more limited and largely domain-specific set of identifiers potentially make it more difficult for a casual browser to place the sewing machine in other contexts, there is much here that allows for more interaction with the object and participation in generating new meanings for it outside the collection. These include allowing the user to enlarge the image, which shows the pedal and electrical connection, but also an increased capacity to *network* the object outside of the context of the collection, such as sharing the item on social networking sites, and looking up additional information either on Google or Wikipedia. This leads to the crux of my argument, which is that the juxtaposition not only of objects, but of collections, opens up new and potentially complex sets of relations and ways of engaging with and classifying digital heritage objects. The exhibit’s performance of border-crossing also invites users to perform acts of *translation* between different realms of knowledge and their own varying spheres of
experience. Appropriately enough for an online environment, users are called upon to find what Latour calls ‘plug-ins’ of a cosmopolitan nature to bring these various networks within and between collections and within their own networks and interests. Latour uses the term, borrowed from small pieces of adaptive software that allow files to be read or played online, to refer to ‘pellets’ of competence that people can adopt from available social repertoires to perform as active subjects in specific contexts (Latour 2005b: 207-8). Networking allows museum collections to step into the new form of agency described by Cameron and Mengler ‘not just as a symbolic technology but as an influential force, as an attractor in a network bringing together serendipitous elements and as a border zone where heterogeneous systems of representation might meet’ (Cameron & Mengler 2009: 213).

Figure 1 Singer Sewing Machine, Science Museum, Science and Society Picture Library, http://www.scienceandsociety.co.uk/results.asp?image=10221460
While visually or nominally related material (‘sewing machines’) offers an easy basis for establishing relationships, generating relations on the basis of conceptual keywords is also a risky endeavour. From user feedback on ‘Europe, Interrupted’ it rapidly became apparent that the ‘related content’ section had been too well integrated into the site, and that many visitors did not understand that these were displays of content in other contexts. By contrast, a curator from one of the participating museums responded with doubt as to the related nature of the content in one of the thematic essays on standardization and adaptation (http://www.inventingeurope.eu/invent/exhibits/show/europeinterrupted/lost):

> Also it is not clear what the objects have to do with the stories. What for example does the Pye television adapter have to do with broad-gauge railways? I suspect it is actually connected to a related story on colour TV but that will not be clear to the average reader. (Email communication, 26 August 2009).

Ironically, the television adaptor singled out by the curator is related to broad gauge railways in the context of the exhibit: both have to do with standardizing technical systems for circulation. ‘Standard’ was the keyword that linked them. These examples of course point to the need for careful design to strike the balance between portal and display environment, but I would like to highlight here the multiple possibilities for constructing border crossings and spaces for European digital heritage that can make use of the uneven heritage terrain in ways that open viewers and institutions to the unexpected.
Souvenirs: ‘Dissonant’ Objects?

I want to turn now to the objects themselves that are selected and mobilized within the digital heritage environment. The promise of digital heritage is that not only exhibits, but also entire collections become available to suit a range of purposes. At the same time, however, visually-driven online environments and the destabilization of collection boundaries place new demands on objects. While on the one hand, the circulation of objects into new contexts can assemble new voices around them, it is also clear that circulation alone is not sufficient; the new contexts of embedding must offer sufficient enrichment and engagement with the object. The same curator cited above offered particularly sharp criticism on this point:

[A]s a curator the biggest disappointment for me is the site's treatment of objects. The pictures to the right are too small in my view [...] Also we never learn anything about the object qua object, not even its inventory number. The object is treated purely as an image. [...] [T]he key disappointment for me is that no effort is made to actually engage the reader with the objects themselves (Email to the author, 26 August 2009).

While the curator speaks primarily of the impoverished visual appearance of the objects on the site, it is noteworthy that the fear of loss is connected to the loss of its context as part of a collection (note that it is the inventory number that seemed the bare minimum of information) as it moves into new narratives.

As noted, the cataloguing practices surrounding digital collections present challenges for their re-circulation in the multi-vocal, polysemic narratives that Web 2.0 applications seem to promise. In their study of the uses of digital collections in Amsterdam's Tropenmuseum, however, de Rijcke and Beaulieu (2011) show that particularly for curators, digital catalogues can also create a renewed engagement with the objects as images: ‘The images are therefore not only the main material presented, but become themselves forms of engagement and of embedding, that shape access and production of knowledge.’ The referent object, but also the style and aesthetics of the image begin to play a more important role in platforms set up for interactivity. In harmonizing the spaces of circulation, the role of objects becomes, in part, to become dissonant, that is, to speak simultaneously with a number of voices. At the same time however, they seem to be called upon even more to be instantly (visually) engaging and/or self-explanatory. These dynamics are best captured with an item presented as a potential contribution at the January workshop, and queried as unsuitable by some in the discussion.
One item that was produced as a suggestion for a story on the development of broadcasting in Europe was an East German table-top radio (See Figure 3). Stored in an online catalogue similar to those mentioned above, some present at the workshop argued that the metadata was not able to engage a viewer, whilst the object itself did not illustrate anything in particular, other than being an everyday object. The provenance given in the metadata seems to cement a role for the object in a national narrative (of a state that no longer exists), particularly if the viewer is able to decode VEB as *Volkseigener Betrieb* ('People’s Company'), a term unique to the GDR and indexical for GDR state-run production. At the same time, the photograph of the object itself, outside of the context of the home, makes it less visually attractive and difficult to engage with. It was suggested by one participant (a museum curator) that this would be suitable if a number of similar objects from different collections could be presented. Indeed, a number of transnational narratives about the shared qualities of domestic design, or the evolution of broadcasting infrastructures could be illustrated using the object. Within the context of a European exhibit, objects are not necessarily expected to be dissonant, but to be localized instances of European processes. This can, inadvertently, lead away from establishing an object in a range of new networks to its capture and cementing in a new sort of *Heimatmuseum* (See Confino 1997) that grounds a narrative of parallel development and steady integration.

A frequent challenge to this and to other such 'local' objects was 'what's European about it?' Andreas Fickers and I have coined the playful term ‘Europe/technology uncertainty principle’ to describe the difficulty historians have trying to hold technology and Europe in the same frame when studying...
infrastructures (Badenoch&Fickers 2010: 7-10). This is due not least in part to the shifting ideas of what and where 'Europe' is, and the discourses of rationality and neutrality which have tended to surround technological projects up to the present day. A similar phenomenon can be observed with the development of Inventing Europe. Paradoxically, without the a priori definition of Europeanness implicit in Europeana (an object there is European if its collection is in a member state of the European Union), objects are called upon to speak with a European voice to justify their circulation in a 'European' environment. While the processes of harmonization can present the tools for creating new, open and multi-vocal narratives of Europe, at the same time, we run the risk of limiting the possible insights and connections by a selection of objects that is too narrowly focussed on cross-border travel and specific forms of visual aesthetic.

**Conclusion**

The London to Istanbul road was only ever a ‘virtual reality’: a loosely harmonized vision of a smooth roadway that in fact revealed very different positions and divisions within Europe that were soon overlaid with other visions. While most, if not all, of the sections of road that would have comprised the road were indeed completed (or rebuilt) after the Second World War, new borders, new movements, and new stories about Europe emerged. The road was mostly incorporated as route E5 in the new E-road system in Europe. Not just a road for tourists, the South-Eastern section of the E-5 became a corridor of migration, particularly into Germany, and later became a ‘priority corridor’ of the European Union’s Trans-European Networks (TEN-T). Verstraete (2009) has highlighted how visual artists have used new media storytelling to complicate the road’s stories to challenge a vision of Europeanness based around neo-liberal frictionless movement and development of the region.4 Examining the processes of digital heritage in Europe shows similar promises and similar pitfalls. The promise of democratic access to cultural heritage, as with other sectors, is often predicated on similar ideas of a Europe of total movement and individual ideal subjects moving within and interacting with that space. Rather than seeking to elide and eradicate boundaries within the heritage sphere, I hope to have shown how online exhibitions also present an opportunity not to generate smooth spaces but to bring various spaces into dialogue, and to generate new points of dialogue and discovery through acts of translation.
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Notes

1 See Inventing Europe (2011).
2 See the parallel cases of the Council of Europe's European cultural routes' programme with its emphasis on physical tourism, and the “Virtual Museum of European Roots” (European Virtual Museum 2011), which brings together heritage collections in various interactive 'itineraries' throughout the continent; also the new initiative of the Amsterdam Museum Significant Sights which similarly takes a ‘touring’ approach to online European heritage (Plaatsen van Beketenis 2011) and aims to be a collectively assembled Guide Michelin to sights (or sites, in a more literal translation from the Dutch) in Europe.
3 See Tensions of Europe (2011) for an overview of the scholarly projects and output attached to this research network and Making of Europe (2011) for the specific scholarly agenda of the book series.
4 See Angela Melitopoulos’ “Corridor X” project (Melitopoulos 2011).

References


The Digital Dimension of European Cultural Politics: Index, Intellectual Property and Internet Governance

By Nanna Thylstrup

Abstract
The Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) have become dominant fields for European Union (EU) politics. What used to be at the outer fringes of the EU policies has now taken centre stage. The transnational and dialogical structure of the Internet has hardwired it for international cultural politics, yet the very same structure also works to erode the very territorial foundation of traditional cultural politics. Given the delicate and complex terrain cultural politics traverse in international politics, and the trailblazing progression of the Internet, it seems on-line cultural politics is not just the application of existing cultural politics to cyberspace but a new field to be explored, analyzed and taught. The present article maps a constituent European cultural boundary on the WWW as the EU has circumscribed it and places this cultural node within a wider array of Europeanization and globalization processes.

Keywords: digitization of cultural heritage, EU cultural policy, EU citizenship, Intellectual Property, digital culture, Internet governance, privatization.
Introduction

‘Culture’ was introduced as a formal EU competence in 1992 with the agreement on the Treaty of Maastricht. Since its inception, the ‘culture article’ 167 (formerly 128 and 151) in the Treaty of Europe (TEU) has been left relatively undisturbed throughout the different Treaty amendments. It is effectively constrained by a strict application of the subsidiarity principle, and is exempt from legislative harmonization. However, despite the rigorous application of the subsidiarity principle, the article contains a ‘loop hole’- namely, article 167.4 - which reads: ‘The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.’ (European Commission Culture: Article 167 2010). This fourth paragraph underlines the transversal character of culture with regard to other Community actions. The objective of the paragraph is to ensure that Community legislation covers cultural issues. But it also indicates that the EU Commission’s working definition of culture is all-encompassing and consequently difficult to distinguish from political, economic and legal fields as such.

The EU’s inclusion of a cultural dimension invokes two central themes on overarching Europeanization processes. First, it touches upon the genesis of state formation and the philosophy dominant within the EU’s bureaucracy (e.g. supranationalism, liberalism or republicanism) and the degree of autonomy of the scientific fields that fall under it. Second, it reveals the impact transnational privatization has on cultural politics.

By employing Europeana, the EU’s large-scale digitization project, as a case study, the present article maps these ideological fluctuations as they appear in policies and politics in the WWW. Contrary to popular belief, neither the Internet nor the WWW is a borderless sphere. Instead, both realms have become constitutive factors in already-existing geopolitical hegemonic formations along two axes: a vertical axis of territorially bound national and supranational cultural politics and a horizontal axis of ‘rootless’ transnational market forces. The analysis revolves around these two axes: on a vertical plane, it charts out EU’s cultural politics between communitarian and procedural politics as they appear on the WWW. On a horizontal plane, the article describes how globalization and privatization affect, and possibly erode, these vertical strategies.

The article uses three thematic clusters to illustrate how the abovementioned horizontal and vertical perspectives collide: the index, intellectual property rights and Internet governance. The EU Commission has employed Europeana as an incentive for integration and a public service statement, yet at the same time the EU Commission is also restructuring Europeana to fit the transnational horizontal nature by using it as a lever to adjust and harmonise copyright legislation within the EU.

The EU Commission is thus pursuing a paradoxical strategy to maintain its position and that of the EU: On the one hand, the EU Commission is increasingly
emphasising communitarian aspects of culture to unify its citizens (Shore 1993; Galtung 1994; Delanty 1995; Pantel 1999; Pietersee 1999; Shore 2000; Haller & Shore 2005) and at the same time promoting culture as civic rights, welfare principles and scientific autonomy (MacCormick 1997; Weiler 1997; Kaufmann & Raunig 2002; Habermas 2003; Stiegler & Adolphe 2005; Kreis 2006; Müller 2007; Stiegler 2010); yet, on the other hand, the EU is escalating its privatization strategies in the transnational field of neo-liberal politics (Boorsma 1998; Bourdieu 1998; Smithuijsen 1998; Beale 1999; Belke & Schneider 2006; Schmitt 2011). The three clusters cannot be divided with a sharp distinction. Rather, they share some positions while rejecting others and in that respect they all reflect certain aspects of the diverse and strongly fragmented expressions of EU cultural politics (Staiger 2009).

A Note on Empirical Data

It is impossible to analyze EU policy making by means of a domestic state model (Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002; Hajer 2003). The lack of a central agenda setting and coordinating authority, combined with a process that involves constant deliberation and cooperation between several levels of state and non-state officials, makes supranational policy-making a distinctly more complex operation. In addition to this procedural complexity, the national and international adaptation of EU legislation needs to satisfy a multitude of territorial and functional constituencies. For these reasons EU decision-making gives more significant weight to private interest groups alongside European, national and sub-national state officials than national decision-making would (Hix 1998). The present article focuses on the role of the EU Commission because it accepts that the EU Commission remains, despite several political setbacks and harsh criticism from inter-governmentalist theory, a powerful supranational organization with the capacity to set a normative agenda in the EU (Hooghe & Nugent 2006). However, accepting the complex agenda-setting structure of the EU, the argument here is built on the basis of policy documents, official EU communications and interviews with stakeholders, EU officials and Europeana employees.

Europeana – A Brief Introduction

Before embarking on the analysis, a brief introduction to Europeana and the idea of digitizing cultural heritage is in order.

French politicians and practitioners conceived the idea of Europeana in 2005 as a reaction to Google’s invention of Google Books. Emphasising what he perceived as the dialogical and relational nature of books, the then French Minister of Culture, Donnedieu De Vabre, strongly objected to the idea that peoples’ access to French culture online should be facilitated by an “Anglo-American machine”
The French position thus implied not only that artworks are relational and embodied, but also, and more importantly for the present analysis, a discourse on the bias of technology (Winner 1986; Latour 1992; Flanagan, Howe & Nissenbaum 2008) claiming that American technology was essentially discriminatory of French cultural and political values.

Invoking the concept of “cultural diversity” (in this case understood as “cultural exceptionalism” (Vernier 2004)), the French government urged the EU to construct a European alternative to Google’s search engine and archive (Jeanneney 2007). Occasioned by France, the EU Commission promptly adopted the idea of Europeana as a “flagship project” for the emerging EU cultural policy (Interview Luca Martinelli, Principal Administrator at the European Commission, Directorate General “Information Society and Media”, Luxembourg, 2011). The EU Commission’s assimilation of Europeana as a part of their policy objectives was in accordance with general EU cultural objectives aiming at creating cohesion and profit for the EU and its member states while still respecting the principle of subsidiarity. President José Manuel Barroso thus noted in a letter to Jacques Chirac:

Comme vous soulignez, nos bibliothèques et nos archives contiennent la mémoire de nos culture européenne et de société. La numérisation de leur collection – manuscrits, livres, images et sons – constitue un défi culturel et économique auquel il serait bon que l’Europe réponde de manière concertée1

(Letter from Commission President Barroso 2005)

The letter communicated that European cultural heritage was both culturally and economically valuable for the EU. He thus embedded the French-cum-EU initiative as an important element in a double-barrelled strategy aiming first at European polity formation by means of providing pan-European access to Europe’s cultural heritage and second, at EU profit enhancement by means of expanding the EU’s competences on the Internet and the WWW. Soon after José Manuel Barroso’s letter, the EU Commission sent out a statement that contrasted the slow pace of European digitization first to Google’s fast-paced digitization project and subsequently to large-scale digitization initiatives in India and China (i2010: digital libraries 2005). The communication made it clear that Europeana’s ambition was threefold: enforcing integration within the EU, expanding the public sphere on the WWW and enabling competition with third party states. A competitive external dimension, expressed specifically through the juxtaposition with Google Books, was thus adjoined to the integrative and informative internal dimension.

To the wider public, Europeana is primarily perceived as a portal exposing cultural heritage from various sources to Europe's citizens. Hans Jansen, the archive’s Director of e-Strategy, notes that the main difference between Google and Europeana is in the content it provides and the way it accords relevancy to objects (Interview Hans Jansen, Director of e-Strategy, Europeana, Den Haag, 2010).
According to other Europeana staff, however, this distinction does not entirely capture the essential characteristics of Europeana, which are as diverse as the interests invested in it. Europeana has thus been called a search engine, a portal, a cultural institution or, as some of its chief architects explain:

Europeana thus is much more than a Digital Library: it is a DLS [Digital Library System] in the sense defined by DELOS [an international association for digital libraries], and at same time based on a DLMS [Digital Library Management System] as developed in the Europeana V1.0 and EuropeanaConnect projects and which may in turn be used to generate different varieties of Digital Library Systems. (Concordia, Gradmann & Siebinga 2009: 69)

In layman’s terms, the professed main goal of Europeana’s chief architects is to build an open services platform enabling users and cultural institutions to access and manage a large collection of surrogate objects representing digital and digitized content via an Application Program Interface (API). While this may sound like a purely technical discourse, it is in reality a highly politicized enlightenment discourse on how to ensure transparency and free access to knowledge in an increasingly opaque WWW marked by an expanding intellectual property rights regime.

The following pages analyze Europeana as an example of how the forces of globalization and digitization impact traditional cultural politics in the digital sphere.

The European Archive and its Index

Having already established that Europeana’s terminology is not set in stone, we can for the sake of clarity refer to it as a European archive in the broad sense of the word (Derrida 1996; Myerson 1998; Velody 1998; Zajko 1998; Huyssen 2003). When discussing concrete archives the explicitly political question about ‘who’ governs and orders the archive is often reduced to the technically instrumental ‘how’ thereby displacing political-moral questions to technical discourse (Brown & Davis-Brown 1998). This section intends to draw out the cultural politics at play in Europeana’s archives and thus the politics embedded in the digitisation discourse.

Analyzing the cultural political aspects of Europeana, two overall political ambitions seem to dominate: on the one hand, it works to preserve the autonomy of science and art works; on the other hand it aims at instilling Europeans with a sense of unity on the basis of a shared cultural heritage. As I shall argue, the former position echoes civic values, while the latter invokes communitarian ideals.

The scholarly turn towards the concept of cultural identity (Smith 1992; Taylor, Gutmann et al. 1994; Kymlicka 1997; Buchanan 1998) has been a defining moment for the status of cultural heritage. Not all scholars who took an interest in
cultural identity adopted similar approaches, however: there was a discernible school of thought endorsing self-determination in more or less explicit terms (Kymlicka 1989; Margalit & Raz 1995; Taylor 2004). The EU’s appropriation of cultural heritage as a bearer of cultural identity and culture as the soul of Europe resonates with these communitarian convictions (EUROPA: Commission unveils plans for European digital libraries 2005; EUROPA: A Soul for Europe 2006; European Culture Portal). Following Charles Taylor, one could account for the obsession with cultural heritage as being a part of a more general trend – the right to recognition (Taylor & Gutmann 1994). This right to recognition has been appropriated by the French protectionist strategy of French, and European, culture in the face of US cultural hegemony by advocating first cultural exceptionalism, and later modifying it as cultural diversity (Farchy 2004).

Against this cultural view, other scholars have warned that cultural heritage is all too easily reified into closed totalities and opposed the idea that a person’s identities remain dependent upon a defined culture or even the rootedness in a particular culture (Calhoun 1992; Delanty 2000; Habermas 2005; Eriksen & Stjernfelt 2009). Slavoj Žižek (1997) has argued that the dominant WWW discourse, the cultural heritage craze and communitarian politics are all formations of capitalism. As a more optimistic alternative to this ‘prepolitical’ nature of communitarian politics and “postpolitical” nature of the WWW discourse, Jürgen Habermas (1994) has argued that a procedural system of deliberative politics is needed to reinforce the democratic potential of the public sphere. However, to Habermas’ mind the Internet and the EU have yet to prove to be successful public spheres in which citizens can express their views freely and without regard to status (Jeffries 2010).

In the case of Europeana, the division between cultural and civic discourse reveals itself in the EU Commission’s entwinement of a cultural heritage and a knowledge discourse. The knowledge discourse echoes theoretical arguments set forth by Habermas and Žižek while the cultural heritage discourse emphasizes similar points as Taylor and Will Kymlicka. This distinction is important because the different discourses frame and determine the diverse political potential of Europeana. Thus, although the two concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘cultural heritage’ in many respects resemble each other at first sight, the semantic implications of each term differ greatly. What I mean by the semantic division between ‘cultural heritage’ and ‘knowledge’ is the transformation from analogue to digitized heritage caused by the digitization process. The physicality of analogue material conveys what one could call a Kantian separation of content and form. A senior staff working at the EU Commission’s DG Information Society confirms the distinction and explains the difference in the following terms:

Film heritage is the physical copies. Digitizing films is not a way of preserving them. This is a common mistake. When you go into digitization you enter an active process that never ends. While if you keep the analogue material, you keep
it. What digitization is giving us is the possibility of providing access in a way that we have never imagined before. So that is the point of digitization, of providing access. (Interview Marisol Pérez Guevara, Administrator at the European Commission, Directorate-General Information Society and Media, Unit Audiovisual and Media Policies, Bruxelles, 2011)

The digitization process thus transforms heritage artefacts into dynamic digital material without strong boundaries between data and metadata (Abrams, Cruse & Kunze 2009). The difference is also emphasised in the disciplinary discourse of digitization, which differentiates between preservation of physical copies and curation of digital copies (Yakel 2007; Abrams, Cruse & Kunze 2009; McCrary 2011). The political nature of the semantic difference between knowledge and heritage was confirmed by Europeana senior staff, who noted that the EU Commission were very adamant regarding the implementing of the cultural heritage discourse into Europeana’s communication flow (Interview anonymous senior staff, Europeana, 2011).

The EU Commission’s heritage discourse narrates a fragmented European history as a united European collective memory. In this respect the task of Europeana is to communicate European memory as an aesthetic construction of representations of the past in accordance with the needs of the present EU community (Halbwachs 1925). Europeana works as a mediator of symbolic form, constituting and guiding the European Commission’s cultural logic through a specific set of protocols and context (Gitelman 2006: 7). In this sense the Europeana archive makes sense of ‘Europe’ by invoking the collective nature of European cultural heritage. The ‘index’ can be consequently seen as a European algorithm ordering the European narrative in the EU archive.

As a subjective signifier the index, and the right to define it, plays an important role in cultural politics. And it was exactly this right to define the algorithm that orders our perception of the world which motivated the French to invent Europeana in the first place. In his book *Google and the Myth of Universal Knowledge: a View from Europe* Jean-Noël Jeanneney (2007: 47) expounded the urgent need for an autonomous European search engine to serve as an alternative to Google:

A European algorithm ought to be defined, so that it can be used knowledgeably, subjected to criticism, and eventually improved, by anyone who cares to (We know that some Americans favour making algorithms patentable; the former French prime minister, Michel Rocard, along with other European parliamentarians in Brussels, rightly opposed that idea.) The development of an algorithm is not necessarily the prerogative of the public sector … The state, however, should do the instigating.

In the above quote, Jeanneney invokes two central themes: he presupposes a European unity, and he emphasises the importance of Enlightenment as a political practice that stresses the need for a public framework to ensure public
accountability. He thus vacillates between cultural exceptionalism as it has been inscribed in French cultural politics (Farchy 2004), and political proceduralism, as it is understood by Habermas (1994). The former culturalist reasoning is primarily found in the discourses of the EU Commission and the stake-holders. The people constructing Europeana’s technology and infrastructure, however, predominantly appropriate an Enlightenment discourse emphasising issues such as accountability, public service and individual reasoning.

A key ambition for several Europeana core members is to incorporate the information management concept Linked Open Data (LOD, also sometimes referred to Open Linked Data) into Europeana’s infrastructure (Zeinstra & Keller year unknown). Apart from the innovative technological aspects of LOD, the information management concept also contains a highly politicized dimension. From this perspective, the ambition is to make Europeana as ‘open’ as possible with regard to its technical infrastructure and accessibility to content. As a core worker with Europeana explained, LOD can work without being open (which is the case, for instance, in pharmacy industries and biomedical data), however, too much reasoning potential and too many semantic values would get lost behind private property barriers (Interview Dr. Stefan Gradmann, responsible for Europeana’s semantic interoperability, Berlin, 2011). The aim is therefore to incorporate LOD into Europeana as a radical openness concept which goes even further than the current Linked Data concept as it is envisioned by Tom Heath and Christian Bizer (Heath & Bizer 2011).

The incorporation of LOD would have a number of implications for future EU policies. For example, LOD in Europeana would entail complete freedom regarding data usage. This decree would, for instance, enable a link between a classic masterpiece and regular porn. Libraries have objected to this possibility, because it implies a loss of their traditional control over knowledge. Furthermore, several key actors within Europeana have stated that Europeana should make no profit from data access and use. This Enlightenment vision is in line with Bernard Stiegler’s robust defence of civic virtues in contrast to the ‘herdlike collectivity’ that he thinks characterizes politics today (Stiegler 2010: 172).

Looking across different justifications for the existence of Europeana, we can thus trace how the cultural and the civic arguments entwine. The cultural discourse employs aesthetic notions of ‘culture’ and ‘collective memory’, while the civic discourse operates with political notions of ‘knowledge’, ‘individual enlightenment’ and ‘the public sphere’. Both ideological strands narrate European traditions, yet their geneses differ fundamentally. The former justifies the existence of Europeana from a pre-political perspective, whereas the latter invokes political arguments, stressing its inherently democratic, reasoned and liberating potential.
The European Archive as Intellectual Property

The cultural politics of Europeana are inherently linked to the issue of intellectual property rights, including the Anglo-American copyright and Continental author’s rights. In fact, three discursive rationales can be identified in the process of selecting and making available information through Europeana: economic, political and cultural. These three rationales exist in a trialectic relationship: Europeana was discursively launched as a vehicle of European cultural identity (EUROPA: EUROPEANA: un voyage à travers la culture européenne 2008), but prior to that it was embedded as a central part of a larger digital strategy aimed at harmonizing copyright in the internal market (EUROPA: Commission launches five-year strategy to boost the digital economy 2005), which in turn linked to the politically motivated aim of becoming a unified key player in the governance of the Internet itself to ensure legal rights and promote accountability and transparency (EUROPA: The need for accountability in Internet governance 2010).

This means that even though the primary motivation of large-scale cultural digitization projects such as Europeana is formally about preservation and access, in reality it is just as much about intellectual property rights legislation. As most Western societies have moved into the so-called ‘Knowledge Economy’, Viviane Reding has argued that the main challenge for the digitization of cultural heritage today is the fragmented copyright legislation in the EU, which hinders free online-accessibility (EUROPA: The role of libraries in the information society 2005). She addressed what would soon become a core ambition for the EU Commission in the cultural realm: to harmonize several aspects of copyright legislation in the EU in order to facilitate EU’s economic potential in the digital sphere. In the Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy from 2008, which was partly motivated by the then-pending Google Books settlement, the Commission indicated that it was strongly considering the implementation of a European Union-wide legislative measure, especially with regard to legislation on the issue of Orphan Works (Copyright in the Knowledge Economy 2008).

There are many regulatory impracticalities connected to the diverse nature of continental intellectual property legislations, and the EU Commission’s wish to harmonize European copyright legislation is in line with the emergence of a new ‘supra-national regulatory environment’ occupied with questions of economic and competition policy (Morley & Robins 1995: 176). However, a harmonization of intellectual property legislation is not merely a question of pragmatic procedures, it is also a matter of uniting the diverse epistemological differences that are at the heart of what at first glance seems merely to be a question of commercial policy (Roeder 1940; Bécourt 1990; Rosenmeier 2001; Hesse 2002; Lessig 2004; Mayer-Schönberger 2005).

Continental author’s rights and Anglo-American copyright traditions reflect cultural values and norms, which in turn have implications for cultural
expressions, productions and trade (Samuelson 1999). The Continental author’s rights traditions have consequently had a great impact on aesthetic expressions we would categorize as distinctly ‘European’ (Teilmann-Lock 2009). Due to the cultural implications of the legal provision, Member States have long upheld the differences between the Continental author’s rights legislation and the Anglo-American copyright legislation. This distinction also serves as foundation for the vehemence with which several Member States met the Google Books Settlement. France and Germany have been particularly outspoken in their opposition to the initial Settlement. Both countries have submitted amicus curia briefs to Second Circuit judge Denny Chin in which they argue against the inclusion of foreign authors in the lawsuit (Durantaye 2010/11). They have, moreover, both expressed their opposition to Google Books by bringing suits against Google Books for their scanning activities. In addition, both countries tried to exercise diplomatic pressure. Their efforts have resulted in a temporary stalling of the Google Books settlement after judge Chin rejected it in 2011. All of these measures have been thoroughly documented (Courant 2009; Darnton 2009; Hall 2009; O’Brien & Pfanner 2009; Pfanning 2011).

As Katharina De La Durantaye notes, however, it is a less known fact that the EU Commission’s reaction differed from that of some of its Member States. Despite pressure from Member States such as France and Germany, the European Commission elected not to write an amicus brief on behalf of the EU in opposition to the original Settlement (Durantaye 2010/11). Instead the Commissioner Charlie McCreevy and Commissioner Reding stressed the necessity of, and potential for, public-private partnerships as a means to effect the digitization of books (EUROPA: It is time for Europe to turn over a new e-leaf on digital books and copyright 2009).

These public-private partnerships could consist of relatively conservative forms of cooperation, such as private sponsoring or payments from the private sector for links provided by Europeana, as well as of more far-reaching involvement of private parties that, according to the EU Commission, could go so far as turning the management of Europeana over to the private sector (Europeana: next steps 2009). In a similar vein, a report authored by a Comité de Sages set down by the EU Commission opened the door for public-private partnerships and also set a time frame for commercial exploitation:

It is logical that the private partner seeks a period of preferential use or commercial exploitation of the digitized assets in order to avoid free-rider behaviour of competitors. This period should allow the private partner to recoup its investment, but at the same time be limited in time in order to avoid creating a one-market player situation. For these reasons, the Comité set the maximum time of preferential use of material digitised in public-private partnerships at maximum 7 years. (The New Renaissance 2011: 39)
These considerations stand in stark contrast to previous statements made by the EU Commission, which envisioned a bigger role for the public sector in the administration of Europeana (Digital Libraries: Recommendations and Challenges for the Future 2009: 7). Furthermore, they indicate that the EU Commission encourages horizontal transnational privatization initiatives that may go against the national cultural politics of the Member States. Coming back to the cultural nexus, this development might end up affecting the democratic potential of the public sphere and encroaching on the autonomy of science and culture as such. Several scholars have argued that public-private partnerships displace public accountability and that if this is true they should be conceived as incompatible with democratic accountability (Bourdieu 1998; Mörth 2009; Schinkel & Houdt 2010; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). Thus, privatization processes may erode the democratic potential of the public sphere in favour of the efficiency of the private sphere (Mörth 2009).

**Europeana and Internet Governance**

The dominant issues of cultural content and its legal protection are also determining factors in what is now called Internet governance. Internet governance tackles central questions such as: who rules the Internet, in whose interests, by which mechanisms and for which purposes, including issues such as censorship, access and context (Lessig 1999; Bernstorff 2003; Mayer-Schönberger 2003). In 2009, the Internet Governance Forum identified key policy areas, including issues relating to the use of the Internet such as national policies and regulations and issues with wider impact than the Internet such as competition policy, privacy and Intellectual property rights (Internet Governance Forum: Creating Opportunities for All 2009). The EU Commission’s role in the development of Internet governance has therefore been highly relevant for Europeana and vice versa. Europeana serves as a counter example to Google on several Internet governance issues such as privacy and intellectual property.

Due to the historical development of the Internet, the notion of Internet governance has only recently gained prominence. In its early years, the Internet was perceived as borderless and ownerless and these distinctive characteristics had wide theoretical consequences. The Internet put into question everything from geographical distances to notions of space, from legitimacy of law to state sovereignty, and from the location of power to potentials for political action (Branscomb 1996; Kittler 1999; Reidenberg 2002; Nye 2004; Dahlberg 2007). In short, the expansion of the Internet fuelled the notion of a space where normal forms of control, regulation and norms were taken up for renegotiation and in some cases elimination. It sometimes even echoed the discourse of the old West: a new frontier for people not comfortable with the constraints and rules governing the more physically felt analogue space.
This notion has since been challenged, however, by a sharp increase in walls and borders fencing in the supposed commons (Mayer-Schönberger 2003; Wu & Goldsmith 2006; Rogers 2008; Zittrain 2008). The enclosures have been erected on two levels: on the vertical level of states, and on the horizontal level of corporations (Wu 2010). The physical structures of the Internet that have always been the spine of the World Wide Web are beginning to emerge from below the ‘Schein’ like a skeleton supporting the body of bits and bytes that connects the world, reminding us that the Internet is as physical and fragile as anything else that exists in this world. As Manuel Castells (2009: 115-116) has noted in Communication Power: ‘… the Internet submits, as everything else in our world, to relentless pressure from two essential sources of domination that still loom over our existence: capital and the state.’

As a reaction to these developments, the EU Commission claimed a state-like responsibility in its negotiations on Internet governance (Internet Governance: the next steps 2009), expressing its will to achieve a vision similar to what Joseph Weiler (1997: 45) projected in an article several years before: ‘The Internet in our vision is to serve as the true starting point for the emergence of a functioning deliberative political community, in other words a European polity cum civic society’. Weiler thus emphasized the civic potential in an EU polity context. Not long after Weiler’s vision, the EU Commission began paying attention to the Internet. Until the second half of the 1990s, the Internet was almost an irrelevant issue in the plans of the EU Commission. This changed when the Internet started to develop from a research computer network into a universal infrastructure used for commercial, political and individual purposes (Leib 2002). The commercialization and securitization of the Internet thus transformed the Internet from a creative playground to a highly politicized realm. Today, Internet policy has become a vital plank of the EU Commission’s information sector policies.

The governance of the Internet has hitherto divided the US and the EU on a range of issues, including privacy laws and the state’s role in regulating the Internet. Shalini Venturelli has identified several overarching differences between the EU and the US Internet policies. Among other things, Shalini Venturelli (2002) has noted that the US is removing most constraints on vertical and horizontal consolidation of media, infrastructure, and information industries. Furthermore, the US is lifting most public interest, non-commercial obligations from the content industry, and from the cable and telecommunications infrastructure industries. In contrast to this, the EU’s path to Internet regulation is more concerned with social models and political traditions of public service regulation. This is, among other things, reflected in higher levels of protection for individual citizens in cyberspace. Last but not least, the EU still places a strategic importance on the vertical issue of national identity and preservation of national culture as a fundamental matter of social solidarity, demonstrated in relatively higher levels of content regulation). These differences between European and US
governance objectives determine the shape and content of Europeana and Google respectively: they regulate content, they dictate the rights of the user and they provide the framework for the archives.

Needless to say, the emergence of a political arena on the Internet has resulted in ideological clashes between the EU and the US, particularly on the issue of public governance and privacy regulation. Thus the EU Justice Commissioner Reding has stated that:

The data revolution is putting individuals centre-stage when it comes to the “management” of their personal data. This requires a shift of focus for the policy makers … Internet users must have effective control of what they put online and be able to correct, withdraw or delete it at will. In the recent public consultation on the review of the data protection rules, we were told that there should be “a right to be forgotten”. (EUROPA: Building Trust in Europe’s Online Single Market 2010)

Reding’s emphasis on the reader and the right to be forgotten addressed a contemporary problem in Internet governance (Mayer-Schönberger 2009). And it was immediately succeeded by several concrete clashes between the horizontal practices of Google and the vertical European privacy laws (Liguori & Santis 2011). That the EU asserted European privacy regulations on the Internet and that it maintained the necessity of public governance suggested that the EU upheld European governance traditions. However, a closer reading of the EU Commission’s communication Internet governance: the next steps dilutes the strict distinction between private and public in its views on the various levels of Internet governance: ‘Private-sector leadership and effective public policies are not mutually exclusive’ (Internet Governance: the next steps 2009: 4). This weakening of the public-private distinction could lead to an opaque accountability policy, however. An example is the way the EU has delegated the responsibility of guarding the Internet against crime to private bodies.

The EU has thus put pressure on Internet service providers (ISPs) to enforce what could essentially be seen as the task of the EU. As a study by Christian Ahlert, Chris Marsden and Chester Yung (Ahlert, Marsden & Yung) has shown, the EU has been pressured by copyright holders and mounting concerns regarding the protection of minors from harmful content, child pornography and other worries about the abuse of the Internet. In practice, ‘single points of content control’, which are increasingly being used to remove content from the Internet, have been identified. The EU has thus realized that governing the Internet requires the services of an Internet Service Provider. And in contrast to the EU-US culture clash regarding privacy regulations, the EU and US strategies on this issue resemble each other: the state has granted genuine powers to private actors in what could be called ‘delegated self-regulation’. The EU exerts its powers on ISP providers through the E-commerce Directive from 2000. However, the E-Commerce Directive does not provide any clear guidelines for ISP providers to distinguish between legal and illegal content (Nas 2003). Ahlert, Marsden and Yung (Ahlert, Marsden & Yung: 27) diagnose the situation as follows: ‘Under
this delegated (self)-regulatory regime the peculiar, technological architecture of
the internet is utilized to induce technological control mechanisms by private
parties, without duly considering their powers, interests and normative standards’.
In principle, this situation could be seen as privatization of censorship, a
development with huge implications for all cultural content on the Internet, both
in terms of expression and access.
Taking the various Internet governance steps of the EU Commission into
account, we can thus trace two corollaries in the European polity: on the one hand,
a public reassertion with regard to the Internet and on the other hand an
endorsement of privatization.

Conclusion
Europeana’s content and framework epitomize the way European cultural,
economic, legal and political paradigms are increasingly being coupled with the
ongoing techno-territorialisation of the Internet. Thus, three paradoxes stand out
in the digital dimension of European cultural politics. First, the cultural politics of
the EU Commission’s seems to straddle the divide between cultural and civic
concerns. Second, and following from the first, there is a semantic divide between
technological and political discourses, with the former promoting Enlightenment
politics and the latter invoking cultural cohesion. The inherently political nature of
Europeana’s procedural structure, which is intended to support individual
Enlightenment, is rarely discussed in forums that exist outside the tech-
environment. Instead the general public is left with the EU Commission’s
nebulous communitarian rhetoric. Third, the digitization of European cultural
heritage elucidates the EU’s contemporary cultural politics as a contradictory field
of a discursive emphasis on the public sphere and public governance and a
practical implementation of public-private partnerships and imposed delegation of
governance to private intermediaries.

When vertical cultural politics go on-line, they are faced with the daunting task
of dividing and conquering the networked WWW to assert their cultural
boundaries, in line with what Richard Rogers (2008: 1) has called the ‘revenge of
the geography’ in cyberspace. It is becoming clear, however, that these cultural
boundaries are not immediately reconcilable with the increasing opacity of the
WWW and knowledge politics as they are evolving on the Internet today.
Europeana thus serves as a good example of how the EU Commission’s policies
have developed into a Janus-faced public administrator of civic and cultural
values in the privatizing sphere of globalization.

The political paradoxes reflect underlying conflicts between the interrelated
movements of neo-liberal, cultural and civic ideologies. Time will tell which of
the ideologies will end up dominating the future development of the WWW and
what implications it will have. At the moment, however, it seems certain that the
EU’s cultural territories are caving in under pressure from the transnational movements of the market. The progression so far reads as a European narrative without denouement. Instead, we are left with an open-ended question of how, and by whom, the autonomy of science and culture and the respect for basic civil rights will be upheld in Europe in the years to come.

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Notes
1 As you emphasize, our libraries and our archives contain the memory of our European cultures and societies. The digitization of their collections - manuscripts, books, images and audio recordings – pose a cultural and economic challenge, to which it would be good if Europe responded in a concerted manner. (author’s translation).

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Europe, Blurred: Migration, Margins and the Museum

By Kerstin Poehls

Abstract

More and more museums all over Europe are discovering migration as a topic for exhibitions. These exhibitions on migration question notions of objectivity or of European universalism. This article looks at a broad range of recent exhibitions and museums that address the topic of migration. Taking into consideration their varying scope and institutional context, this text argues that exhibitions on migration tell several stories at once: Firstly, they present stories of migration in a certain city, region or nation, and within a particular period of time. For this purpose, curators make extensive use of maps – with the peculiar effect that these maps blur what seems to be the clear-cut entity of reference of the museum itself or the exhibition. To a stronger degree than other phenomena that turn into museal topics, 'migration' unveils the constructed character of geographic or political entities such as the nation or the European Union. It shows how, hidden below the norm of settledness, mobilities are and have always been omnipresent in and fundamental for European societies. Secondly and related to this, exhibitions on migration add a new chapter to the meta-narrative of museums: implicitly, they challenge the relevance of the nation - specifically, of both the historical idea that initiated the invention of the public museum (cf. e.g. Bennett 1999) and the political fundament of European integration today. They provoke questions of settledness, citizenship, or contemporary globalisation phenomena that are equally implicitly put on display. The consequent effect is a blurring of the concept of the nation-state. Finally, migration as a museal topic conveys a view on how the institution of the ‘museum’ relates to such a fuzzy thing as mobility, thus provoking questions for further research.

Keywords: Migration, museum, exhibition, Europe, map, object, reflexivity, meta-narrative
Europe, Blurred: Migration, Margins and the Museum

More and more museums all over Europe and inside the European Union in particular have been discovering migration as a topic for temporary exhibitions, and a number of museums on migration have been founded since the end of the twentieth century in the UK, Germany, Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Benelux countries and elsewhere. How and why is this phenomenon being showcased in this way? In this paper, I will analyse the ways in which migration is put on display in temporary exhibitions. The latter operate in modes that differ from those of museums, with their permanent exhibitions. In addition, national historical backgrounds and current political debates that surround the exhibitions and influence them vary widely. Yet because temporary exhibitions are and are also expected to be more courageous when it comes to a provocative thesis or metaphor – as they are points of departure for trends and wider processes of societal (self-)understanding – they create a ‘discursive disturbance’ (Korff & Roth 1990: 21). It therefore seems to be worthwhile to summarize some commonalities that can be observed in their current modes of display. There are two main reasons to focus on such temporary results and ongoing movements inside the museal space: One the one hand, I attribute to these exhibitions a role within a pan-European discourse on the European societies’ relation to migration. On the other hand, temporary migration exhibitions already influence the self-understanding, and work behind the scenes of existing as well as emerging museums as well, and thus have a major impact on what historically is a genuinely European invention.

Migration is ‘overdetermined’: It is a topic that is accompanied by so many – in part mutually exclusive – expectations that criticism from one side or the other is guaranteed (Leggewie 2011: 162ff.); – it also implicitly questions some traditional principles of museal work. Traditionally, the work of museums is closely linked to the notion of settledness. This is reflected most strongly in the ways that collections are organised. Here, objects are linked to a geographical place. They invite both comparisons over time and comparisons between two or more geographical spaces – but they also veil movements across borders that might be equally characteristic of those places. Objects without a genuine geographical place do not fit into such traditional collection systems, and it is through them that the normative impact of collection systems is unveiled. For exhibition visitors, museum displays might be even more closely connected with immobile, placed objects: The movement of things is stopped by glass panes it is in the showcases that things ‘end up’. Most of them stopped moving a long time ago.

The following three aspects shall serve to establish a broader picture of how the topic of migration arguably challenges the ways in which museums have traditionally operated. They also form the structure of this article: firstly, one impact of migration as an exhibition topic might be a blurring of the imagined nation states and consequently of Europe. This happens against a background where transna-
tional social spheres, international connections and cooperations seem to be so all encompassing that academic discourse almost tends to take them for granted. And yet, the nation state is still an undeniable category beyond the surface of everyday life, something which the reintroduction of national border controls by some countries inside the European Union and the Schengen area in 2011 reminds us of. The aim behind this retrogressive move is the regulation and management of migration at a time marked by both an economic crisis and an ever increasing number of immigrants and transit migrants, especially from Northern Africa, crossing the outside borders of the Schengen area. This is even more evident in the case of the museum, an institution invented precisely to help construct the nation as a meaningful point of reference and as a category to organise the world.

Secondly, the way in which migration may question the nation as a conceptual framework materialises in the ways objects are selected for museal displays. In contrast to traditional questions – concerning the place of invention, of production, or of use of an artefact – other aspects become relevant and justify its inclusion in a display: what may a particular thing reveal about the motion of ideas, human beings, knowledge or conflicts? What story of migration or mobility justifies its being placed in a showcase? The shift that is indicated by such questions highlights the ongoing renegotiation of the role of objects. Does migration steer museal institutions towards regarding objects as symbols rather than as epistemic objects – things that embody ‘what is yet unknown’ and that therefore provoke new questions (cf. Korff 2005, Rheinberger 2006: 28)? In what follows, we will see how displaying mobility makes it more difficult to place objects and to fit them into traditional collection systems.

These two aspects consequently lead to a more general, third, dimension: not only the nation as the historical paradigm of the museum is challenged, but also the place and space that a certain museum and its displays relate to, be it the city, the region, the nation or Europe. If practices of mobility are in focus, these seemingly well-defined entities are undermined or ask at least for redefinition under new auspices.

**Discursive Movements**

The museum is not the only institution mirroring a conceptual development and increasing interest in mobility: in the humanities and social sciences as well as in public discourse all over Europe, migrants and migration were for many years – and sometimes still are - perceived as both external and extraordinary phenomena. Migrants figured as the Other, as an undifferentiated collective that seemingly allows for a division between 'Us' and 'Them'. Even today, the dominant imaginations of the migrant within these debates are linked to precarity – both with regard to economy and education or social status. In other words: the cosmopolitan, upper-class, financially independent and polyglot dandy of the early twentieth centu-
ry rarely figures in debates on migration today. Only occasionally do we meet his contemporary incarnation, the middle-class ‘multilingual gourmet taster’ (Werbner 1997: 11; cf. Grillo 2007) or the Green Card holder equipped with a Diploma in Biophysics or Computer Engineering. This narrow view of migration, ignoring the diverse practices and modes of mobility (Urry 2008) seems to broaden: although immersion and integration are still frequently seen as migrant responsibilities, slowly and surely it is being recognized that migration has been an essential part of European societies for centuries and will not cease to be so.

In contrast to the focus on immersion and integration that builds on a model of societies as closed and stable entities, more recent studies within the field of anthropology and social sciences in general indicate a shift: they not only describe and analyse transnational social spheres, but also attempt to characterize migrants and migratory networks or milieus as an avant-garde, both when it comes to transnational milieus and to Europeanization (Balibar 2005, TRANSIT MIGRATION Forschungsgruppe 2007). Viewed from this angle, migrants are considered a crucial factor within the European Union, something that has stimulated a debate on their position in relation to effects of globalization and all-encompassing mobility. Although the mobile individuals themselves do not assume their role intentionally, the effects of migratory practices playing out at the geopolitical margins of Europe put migrants at the very centre of Europeanization processes, and attribute to them a significant impact on changing European nation states. This view differs substantially from research agendas and publications on European integration and Europe as a geopolitical space, in which the impulse of Europeanization is frequently taken to originate from the field of political power situated in Brussels and Strasbourg (Abélès 1992; Shore 2000). In contrast to the rather privileged European citizens who professionally engage with today’s and tomorrow's European actuality in those cities (Poehls 2009), migrants bring questions of citizenship and human rights to the fore on an existential level (cf. Hess 2005; Römhild 2007; Schiller & Çalar 2009; Lenz 2010).

Temporary exhibitions and museums of migration navigate in this contested field of Europeanization, and they do so along with political parties and activists, scientists from various disciplines, media and public opinion – a broad field and a complex discourse with numerous participants where nothing even close to a consensus has been reached (and where any such consensus is probably not even desirable). Its omnipresence effectively turns migration into a classical ‘boundary object’: It is a phenomenon of wide-ranging importance for society that (a) is under constant negotiation and (b) involves the cooperation of a broad range of interests and stakeholders (Star & Griesemer 1989; Trompette & Vinck 2009). Museums and exhibitions on migration are still marginal within the museal field in the sense of Homi Bhabha’s use of the term. He regards precisely the margins as centres of activity. According to Bhabha (2000: 7), such ‘margins’ mark the space from which the impulses for political discourse originates, often evolving from
experiments. In this sense, the issue of migration does indeed seem to demand experimental approaches with respect to both aesthetics and narratives. It might thus set its imprint on future museal practices.

**Mapping Migration**

Let us dwell upon this notion of marginality and start with an object that – if considered an object at all – falls under the category ‘marginal’ within museal representations of migration. Placed in the preface or introductory chapter, next to the entrance or behind showcases with the ‘real’ objects, exhibitions of migration make extensive use of geographical maps. Analogous records of the geographical surface of the world on the one hand, maps are on the other hand inevitably abstractions since they are a ‘result of selection, omission, isolation, distance and codification’ (Corner 1999: 215). Since their inception, maps reflect the appropriation of space, they tell stories about what the world looks like or what it should look like, although they generally omit who is telling this particular story (cf. Rogoff 2000; Schlögel 2006; Jacobs 2008). Bold arrows on large maps are generally used to make visible the historical omnipresence of migration, smaller arrows follow the path of one individual migrant, even smaller acronyms refer to the institutional players involved.

At the *Cité National de l’histoire de l’immigration* (CNHI) in Paris, so far the only *national* museum on migration within Europe, the visitor is confronted with maps even before entering the exhibition. The maps here depict migratory routes and flows throughout the two centuries.
They show migratory movements from the countryside to the growing cities within France, routes from Europe to the Americas or within Asia, and visualize the migratory movements from the former colonies to France. Here, the contours of Europe are still congruent with what is familiar to all of us from geography lessons in school and from atlases. Quite a different idea of Europe emerges from a photo essay that is on permanent display in the following room at the CNHI. We see Kingsley Abang Kum’s route from Cameroon to France, ‘documented’ by Olivier Jobard (cf. Jobard & Sanglier 2006). While it remains unclear whether the protagonists really exist, the narrative unfolds in a realistic, journalistic manner, inviting us to share Kingsley’s story from the departure from his family home, travelling by various means of transportation, with endless hours of waiting and unknown further steps, until he debarks from a bus in the centre of Paris. The photographs are accompanied both by diary entries and by maps. The maps that Kingsley draws during his journey indicate how Europe as an ex ante dreamland both moves out of sight during his trip and morphs its shape as he approaches Europe’s geopolitical borders. The manually drawn maps convey the high hopes with which the word Europe is connoted: while we as exhibition visitors can follow Kingsley’s gaze beyond the horizon, we cannot spot him in the crowd any longer once he has arrived in Europe – a place that no longer seems to be the dreamland. The combination of these rather different representations of space not only gives an impression of how the crisis of representation since the 1980s has had its impact on the museum. It also indicates the affinities between sociocultural history as told in the museal space and the arts, where maps have, for instance, been used by Situationists or Fluxus artists as material and as a genre to create new kinds of space, to provoke a more playful perception of space, and to problematize the highly constructed nature of space (Corner 1999). Although very discreetly, the maps at the CNHI suggest the creativity underlying these maps, namely the creativity of migrants on their transit route.

A scribbled instruction on how to move through Europe inspired museum curators in Rijeka in Croatia for the show Merica. Emigration from Central Europe to America 1880-1914. In this exhibition, we see individual stories and routes of migration. They are complemented by depictions of those agencies, railway and shipping companies along the route that allowed for mobility and made their profits from migration. The display is here arranged like ‘a labyrinth, but with a way out’ (Merica 2011).
The inspiration for this display comes from a small piece of paper: next to a curved line, it contains precise instructions on where to change trains and where to buy the next train ticket on the way from a small village in Croatia to Udine and then further on westwards. Written for someone ‘who does not know where they are going, who does not know the routes’ (Emigration from Central Europe to America 1880-1914 2011), this map shows neither national boundaries nor visa or control mechanisms. Very much in contrast to today’s realities, border controls were then unheard of in this part of the world (cf. Schlögel 2006). Two fundamental aspects of mapping are translated into the exhibition: Firstly, the show highlights the high degree of creativity embedded in finding or inventing a migratory route (Corner 1999: 217): The migrant himself who imagined himself in a different space and place and the helpful person who provided this person with an improvised map – both imagined new paths towards a different way of life. On the map itself, the amount of information has been reduced to a level sufficient for taking the next step towards Merica. Secondly, the mazy exhibition design might
confuse visitors. This intended effect provides evidence of the necessary reading skills without which any map is useless (Corner 1999: 214f).

The creative potential of maps has been used by artists (cf. Rogoff 2000) and also in migration exhibitions to a degree where the category of geography reveals its constructed and limited meaning. Curators, artists and ethnographers aim to unveil how geopolitical decisions on borders, historical as well as contemporary discourses on migration in Europe, political institutions, NGOs and political parties as well as migrating human beings form the discursive space in which migration takes place. In those projects, the space of migration does not appear as a clear-cut entity, but rather as a blurred field of activity where various interests meet and conflict with each other. MIGMAP², for example, completely abstains from geography as a basis for mapping migration. This cooperation between artists and social scientists partaking in the exhibition/research project PROJEKT MIGRATION in Cologne in 2005 provides visual solutions to the problem of mapping migration that are both strange and very familiar at the same time. The team of ethnographers and artists map the players of migration, discourses, places and political decisions and use aesthetics that are reminiscent of weather forecasts, underground maps or of web pages with an overwhelming amount of cryptic abbreviations (cf. Spillmann 2007).

The ‘weather forecast’ map, for example, visualizes how areas of ‘high’ or ‘low’ pressure overlap in relation to public discourse on human trafficking and how this in turn collides with neo-liberal political aims. ‘Weather fronts’ keep discourses on asylum and illegal migration apart, while the discourse on smuggling seems to overlap or interfere with the ‘cloud’ of illegal migration as well as with trafficking. Through all these constantly intersecting and elusive weather systems move streams of ideas based on or opposed to racism, as well as discussions on Human Rights, political attempts to reduce organized criminality or to lead a ‘War on Terrorism’. Here, the common visuals of weather reports are used in order to represent the tradition of spacializing political positions. On the ‘tube map’, political decisions on how to govern and to manage migration in the EU form the various stations. This map invites the visitor to take a trip on the various ‘lines’, following the decisions and their inner logic that is unveiled through the chronological arrangements of the ‘stations’. Connecting stations reveal the interdependencies between political fields and actors. At the same time, the metaphorical tube is not visible from street level – in contrast to the discourses that are visible but seem to be beyond human reach. Political decision processes take place ‘underground’. Invisible from street level where the common citizen and thus the exhibition visitor lingers, the map tells us, political decisions in the European Union follow certain timetables, mechanisms, involve technical knowledge and are embedded in a complex structure that is meant to be used over a longer period of time. In an intriguing way, therefore, (neo-) functionalist ideas of how the Euro-
The European Union has been built by the spirit of political ‘engineers’ are driven to the extreme.

Of course, the tube map and the weather report are closely linked: physically, they both belong to the realm of every day life of many museums visitors and as cultural codes they are equally familiar to most European citizens and thus easy to interpret. The key aspect that relates them to each other, however, is a statement that addresses both Europe and the public perception of migration: firstly, neither the European Union nor Europe is about geography - perhaps it never has been. Margins and boundaries are the effects of political decisions, of discourses, and are as such not meaningfully connected to the borders we find drawn in traditional maps. This position corresponds to the way European borders are being 'performed' today: EU border control, to an increasing degree executed by the EU agency FRONTEX, takes place outside of the EU as well as inside, on motor-ways, at airports or train stations. Borders function as filters, they can no longer be regarded as lines that some are allowed to cross and others not (cf. Fischer-Lescano & Tohidipur 2007; Buckel & Wissel 2010; Laube 2010). Secondly, migration opens up a space that extends somewhere between the discourse clouds and the tube tunnels of politics – the every-day social space of migration. This space seems to become more visible through the aesthetics of tube maps and weather forecasts.

Within the context of exhibitions of migration, maps generate a peculiar effect: while on the one hand clarifying the social phenomenon of mobility, on the other hand they literally undercut the meaning of geopolitical boundaries. In doing so, they blur national and European boundaries. Instead, the ways in which mobility towards, within and departing from Europe are represented, display something else: maps in exhibitions on migration direct our attention towards the question of how borders – as ‘socially performed conceptual entities’ – generate the difference they mark (Green 2010: 261). In that sense, the whole idea of numerous (not all) exhibitions on migration is generated from a more often than not marginal object: a map. Once maps are employed as a means to set the tone for the things on display and once they have been freed from their attributed objectivity, they unveil the illusion of neutrality – and even of universalism – that has guided representational work in the museal space since its inception. Curatorial activity is, in the case of migration most explicitly, a political activity.

**Migrating Objects**

When the Kreuzberg Museum in Berlin opened its first permanent exhibition in the early 1990s, personal belongings of migrants – such as teapots, a silver bowl traditionally used in the hammam, or working tools – were the central objects on display. Their purpose was to connect the stories inside the showcases to the life going on immediately outside of the museum. In a similar way, a small grass-
roots museum in Skala Loutron on the Greek island of Lesvos displays festive clothing, salt and pepper shakers, letters, official certificates and jewellery. All of them were donated by Greek migrant families who had to leave their homes in Asia Minor in 1922 (cf. Clogg 1992: 47ff) in exchange with the Turkish population on Greek territory. Similar examples can be found all over Europe: personal objects have always been more or less present in exhibitions on migration. In contrast to the way political debates, movies, or print media operate, these three-dimensional objects allow for a physical and simultaneous multi-sensory perception of the materiality of migration. The object of migration that continues to be the ‘classic’ is the suitcase (Baur 2009; Poehls 2010), used so frequently that it has turned into heavy luggage in itself.

Inside the museal field, the debate on how, where, why and for whom museums of migration should be founded revolves around objects, and specifically objects that have been donated by migrants or their families. One possible reason behind this might be the fact that these objects often communicate primary emotions such as melancholy. This quality seems not only to be distinct from a certain understanding of ‘professionalism’ inside the museal sphere. The objects also seem to be inconsistent with exhibitions inspired by a more theoretical approach where the curatorial emphasis is not put on strengthening or highlighting the aura of an object or its minute details, but rather on the cultural debates or social background, resulting in a more or less explicit political statement. Through their material qualities and peculiarities, epistemic objects might strengthen this approach by entering into a kind of dialogue with the beholder, resulting in further questions rather than definite answers. It is hardly surprising that the material qualities of salt and pepper shakers rarely lead to them being placed in the category of epistemic objects. This is seldom the case with objects in migration exhibitions in general. For instance, a staff member at the museum in Skala Loutron informed me at a showcase where the above-mentioned objects were placed on small velvet pillows that ‘the objects in themselves have no value’ (Field Notes 2011). Here she was not only referring to the monetary value, but also to the objects’ ability to generate questions beyond an initial emotional impulse. Today, object donations are only accepted ‘when there is a special story connected to them’ that would then be documented and become part of the collection together with the object (ibid., 2011). As their melancholic trait suggests, such traditional ‘objects of migration’ can be considered as symbols or anchors for stories that have to be told in order to make the object meaningful to a third person. Otherwise, they simply point to a place and time elsewhere that remains unrelated to the here and now of the display.

It might be for this reason that many migration exhibitions either look for alternative ways of dealing with objects or try to avoid them completely. The exhibition PROJEKT MIGRATION that was shown in Cologne in 2005, for instance, abstained almost completely from using objects and created new representative
forms such as the maps mentioned above. From a similar political perspective, namely one that focuses on the normality of migration rather than on its claimed exceptional status, the initiators of *Crossing Munich* decided not to exhibit objects as museum objects in showcases, but to make them part of the exhibition design: in Munich in 2009, curators initiated cooperation between artists and ethnographers at a very early stage. Voluminous plastic bags with colourful stripes in blue and red – perhaps the most clichéd objects of contemporary migration – figure here as part of a larger installation and narrative. Instead of being put into a showcase or used as vessels for other, perhaps even more clichéd objects that might have been transported in them, the bags have been attached to each other and mounted to resemble the architectural shape of Munich’s Central Train Station. The Central Station was one of the main places of arrival for guest workers from the 1960s onwards. This presentation turn the bags into de- and reconstructed parts of the exhibition design, and adds an ironic twist to the show: the blue, red, and white striped bags confront the visitor with his or her expectations of what migration and its material omnipresence stereotypically ‘looks like’ in everyday life (cf. Leggewie 2011: 167). Similarly, between commissioned pieces of art, soundscapes, media installations and more traditional showcases with shoes and other objects, the Museum of World Cultures in Gothenburg found a way in its recent exhibition *Destination X* to include the most powerful and therefore omnipresent symbol of migration: the suitcase.
Instead of mounting them as in, for example, the permanent exhibition in the Imperial War Museum North in Manchester as a giant arch, or placing them in a kind of diorama as curators chose in the touring exhibition *C’est notre histoire* in Wroclaw in 2009, the suitcases were attached to each other to form a giant sphere. Together, the cheap and expensive, colourful and black suitcases formed the globe. They hinted at various modes of movement, forced or voluntarily, on a tight budget or with luxury equipment. In doing so, they extended the metaphorical reach of the suitcase that has traditionally been employed to hint at the (cultural) luggage that migrants brought with them, which they unpacked at their final destination to see what its worth might be under new living conditions or that helped them – through the presence of heirlooms – to keep the past alive.

The Museo Diffuso in Turin provides another example of the possible effects of the omission of objects in a migration exhibition. In a temporary exhibition shown in 2009, contemporary as well as historical photographs were used in order to contrast the physical vanishing of borders in the Schengen area with the prison-like situation of migrants in one of Italy’s largest detention centres on the outskirts of Turin. The protagonists of the exhibition, the migrants inside the detention camp, expose their possessions to the photographer’s gaze and thus to the exhibition audience. However, there are no three-dimensional objects inside the exhibition space. The atmosphere of contemplation that traditionally characterizes the museal space is absent. Instead of directing our gaze towards a showcase, we are allowed, almost like voyeurs, to have a look at the tiny personal space that migrants in the detention camp have at their disposal. The black and white photographs seem to add to a sense of political urgency to the show, recalling reportage in a magazine. This specific example reminds us that the specific atmospheric effect of objects in exhibition spaces – beyond their resistance against being used as epistemic objects – might be investigated further, and beyond the thematic focus of this article.

In conclusion, the topic of migration seems to generate from within itself a questioning of how to tell stories in a museal space, how to engage the audience and how to convey information or knowledge. As the few examples that were analysed here indicate, these questions often revolve around the role to be attributed to objects. Objects of migration are often personal heirlooms and bear qualities that are different from a classical epistemic object. They symbolize an additional individual story that needs to be told in order to encourage questions and invite contemplation. The key question is thus whether a museum aims to address its audience on a personal level by departing from individual stories or by referring to a more abstract theoretical level based on political debates – both can be found in migration exhibitions. Naturally, both modes are not mutually exclusive in practice, but their differences are especially visible in migration exhibitions. Indeed, they mirror the way a museum sees its role in society. The debate
on how to represent migration in the museal space thus implies a challenge to the
way museums perceive themselves.

**Museums in Movement**

'Everyone' within the museal world suddenly seems to put migration on display. In the UK, archives and museums jointly work for a more 'inclusive' approach towards cultural heritage; in Germany, the local museums of history in Frankfurt and Stuttgart are being completely reconceptualised, the same applies to the city archive and museum in Munich. Museums in Scandinavia, in the Balkans and in Greece are also turning their attention towards mobility. What are the reasons behind this phenomenon? Are they just pragmatic? Is it the search for new funding or for cooperation that is leading museums to focus on migration? Or is the aim to attract new, significantly younger and more diverse audiences? All of these aspects are of importance for the current turn to migration in museums. The degree to which this is the case depends on the urban (or rural) context of the respective museums and on how much the museums are dependent on external funding and cooperation for their survival. Migration is a buzzword, and hardly any cultural institution in Europe that seeks funding on the regional, national or EU level – be it in the field of performing or fine arts – can be successful without hinting at the migration dimension of the specific project or the impact on intercultural dialogue of its general activity. This trend is both to be welcomed and very general. However, the increasing presence and explicit mentioning of migration in museal displays also indicates some more fundamental changes that exceed the area of funding or cooperation contracts. Specifically, there seems to be a need to make the relation between a preserved past inside the museum and complex realities outside the museum more *explicit*, and focusing on migration is apparently an appropriate way to do this. Migration as a classical boundary object that involves various stakeholders and thus implicates ongoing discussions might not force all museums to begin raising their voices in a political debate, but it might very well strengthen the need for a clear and recognizable position that a museal institution takes in the 'general weather situation' of migration discourses that MIGMAP outlined. This means that museums might be asked to convert the implicit worldview that both its institutional traditions and the collections stand for into an explicit political position.

This might imply a farewell to the usual processes of ‘dissociation, classification, storage, acquisition of meaning’ (Lidchi 2006: 98) that were traditionally applied to things on their way into the museum. The initial *dissociation* of things usually meant either spatial or temporal distance from their origins. Yet neither time nor space separates migration and its objects from the European reality in 2011. Quite to the contrary, the exhibitions presented above reflect how the museal space opens up to current political debates that are anything but ‘dissociat-
ed’: Firstly, exhibitions have often functioned as an ‘outpost in the vast land of exemplification’ (Benjamin 1980: 527) – that is, a place where ongoing debates crystallize in a three-dimensional way. This is particularly the case with exhibitions on migration in Europe. Secondly, museums have also always been places where ideas about the future are presented if not produced. This holds especially true for our context: migration is a core field of EU policies, it represents a major challenge for any traditional understanding of nation states, and it is certainly a phenomenon that brings questions of citizenship, human rights and ‘belonging’ to the fore. These two aspects were usually veiled behind the semblance of universalism and the way in which museums historically meant to represent the world in an ‘objective’ manner: they presented themselves as rather detached from ongoing political debates, commenting maybe from a distanced position outside. The museums and exhibitions we have seen, however, have moved away from this position: they are not outside, but – whether this is intended or not – in the very middle of a political process. In this sense, exhibitions on migration reflect how the process of musealization is today accompanied by a more explicit demand of self-reflection and self-positioning that museal institutions are provoked to undertake by the public, the media, funding institutions, other exhibitions that have been successful in one way or the other, and by political debate. The exhibitions we have seen reflect how a self-reflexive and budding version of cosmopolitanism that is closely linked to the concept of transnationalism is slowly but surely being incorporated into exhibitions: ‘Europeanness’ (Delanty 2005; Beck & Grande 2007).

Conclusion
Generated both from within and from discourses outside the museal field, exhibitions on migration question notions of objectivity or of European universalism. In doing so, they show how various public spheres and discourses interact, and thus encourage museums to play a more central role in the ongoing self-reflection of European societies.

Exhibitions on migration tell several stories at once: firstly, as we have seen, they present stories of migration in a certain city, region or nation, and within a particular period of time. For this purpose, curators make extensive use of maps – with the peculiar effect that these maps blur what seems to be the clear-cut entity of reference of the museum itself or the exhibition. To a stronger degree than other phenomena that turn into museal topics, 'migration' unveils the constructed character of geographic or political entities such as the nation or the European Union. It shows how, hidden below the norm of settledness, mobilities are and have always been omnipresent in and fundamental for European societies.

Secondly and related to this, exhibitions on migration add a new chapter to the meta-narrative of museums (Bal 2006: 15): implicitly, they challenge the rele-
vance of the nation. More specifically, both the historical idea that initiated the invention of the public museum (cf. e.g. Bennett 1999) and the political fundament of European integration today. They provoke questions of settledness, citizenship, or contemporary globalisation phenomena that are equally implicitly put on display. The consequent effect is a blurring, or ‘un-writing’ (Rogoff 2000: 38) of the concept of the nation-state.

Finally, migration as a museal topic conveys a view on how the institution ‘museum’ relates to such a fuzzy thing as mobility, and it leads to a number of aspects that deserve the attention of both museum professionals and researchers.

Further research could give a clearer picture on how the museal space allows art and cultural history to interact with or to contradict each other in a productive way. Furthermore, exhibitions on migration contribute to a larger extent than other exhibitions to a meta-discourse on the current role of museums in Western societies, and they do so by contesting the predominant role commonly attributed to objects. Here, it will be interesting to see how collection systems can be extended towards a greater attention for mobility. Finally yet importantly, exhibitions on migration more often than not explicitly address future developments in society instead of reflecting primarily on the past. They do so by relating migration to urban developments as well as by placing (metaphorically speaking) national and European political discourses inside the showcase. Despite varying contexts, there are some traits that are common for many exhibitions. Their sometimes veiled, sometimes explicit gaze into the future has always characterized museums – here, it becomes explicit. It will be interesting to see how this will affect the museum as an institution embedded in urban space, in Europe, and yet aware of global phenomena.

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Notes
1 Merica (2011)
2 MIGMAP (2011)
3 Exactly the other way around, political activists use travelling exhibitions as a means to present their ideas to a broader audience – making use of the strengths of the medium 'exhibition' and its seemingly 'detached' nimbus. Thus, the open-air exhibition Traces from Lesvos
through Europe (cf. the documentation in: Traces from Lesvos through Europe 2010) that was held in the Migration Detention Centre at Pagani (Lauth Bacas 2010) on the island of Lesvos, for example, presented individual migrants with their dreams and plans for the future. The exhibition was anything but neutral or detached from political discourse.

Benjamin coined this for commercial expositions, but I argue that his judgement also applies to our context.

References


Croatia – Exhibiting Memory and History at the “Shores of Europe”

By Ljiljana Radonic

Abstract

Even though the self-critical dealing with the past has not been an official criteria for joining the European union, the founding of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research and the Holocaust-conference in Stockholm at the beginning of 2000 seem to have generated informal standards of confronting and exhibiting the Holocaust during the process called “Europeanization of the Holocaust”. This is indicated by the fact that the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest opened almost empty only weeks before Hungary joined the European Union although the permanent exhibition had not been ready yet. The Croatian case, especially the new exhibition that opened at the KZ-memorial Jasenovac in 2006, will serve in order to examine how the “Europeanization of the Holocaust” impacts on a candidate state. The memorial museum resembles Holocaust Memorial Museums in Washington, Budapest etc., but, although it is in situ, at the site of the former KZ, the focus clearly lies on individual victim stories and their belongings, while the perpetrators and the daily “routine” at the KZ are hardly mentioned. Another problem influenced by the international trend to focus on (Jewish) individuals and moral lessons rather than on the historical circumstances is that the focus on the Shoa blanks the fact that Serbs had been the foremost largest victim group. The third field, where the influence of “European standards” on the Croatian politics of the past will be examined, is the equalization of “red and black totalitarianism” at the annual commemorations in Jasenovac. While this was already done during the revisions era of President Franjo Tudman during the 1990, today it perfectly matches EU-politics, as the introduction of the 23rd of August, the anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin-pact, as a Memorial day for both victims of Nazism and Stalinism shows.

Keywords: Politics of the Past – “Europeanization of the Holocaust” – Croatia – Jasenovac – “Negative Memory”
Introduction

Starting from the premise that post-communist World War II memorial museums show significant similarities, this paper will consider recent trends in the Europeanization of Memory since 1989. These include the universalization and Europeanization of the Holocaust as a negative founding myth in post-1945 Europe, as well as the Holocaust’s difficult place in the new post-communist national narratives of Eastern Europe. The focus here will be on Croatia. In particular, I will review a post-communist memorial museum—the ultra-modern exhibition at the Jasenovac Memorial Museum which opened in 2006. In so doing, I consider whether certain European memory standards have been established, and if there is a centre and/or periphery to this development. To what extent does the Croatian attempt to confront the Second World War past appear as an answer to the Europeanization of Memory? How and to what extent are remembrance policies Europeanized? How does this development play out in Croatian public discourse? Finally, what have been the consequences of focusing on individual victims and victimization in European memorial culture and museums?

New Holocaust Memorial Museums

When we look at the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest and the Jasenovac Memorial Museum some 100 km southwest of Zagreb, the similarities are striking: both exhibitions are in a darkened room; and the victims’ names are written in white letters on the black background. In the case of Jasenovac, those names can be found not only on the walls, but also hovering on boards above the visitor. The focus of the exhibitions lies on the personal belongings of individual victims, exhibited in glass showcases.

Holocaust Memorial Center, Budapest © http://www.hdke.hu/
Thus, the same focus on individual victims, their stories and belongings can be observed in both museums. Since the two memorial museums show so many similarities and both opened within two years (2004 and 2006) of each other, it is obvious that there seem to be some kind of standards for new European Holocaust memorial museums. The Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest even opened a few weeks before Hungary joined the EU in 2004, although the permanent exhibition was not yet ready; because of this an almost empty building was opened, the only exhibition being the “Auschwitz-album,” which showed photographs taken by a German SS soldier during the arrival of Hungarian Jews in Auschwitz. The collaboration of Hungarian society, especially in carrying out the deportation by Hungarian policemen, thus did not play a role here (Fritz 2008).

Furthermore, the fact that the homepage of the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest was in English until a few months ago and that a button had to be clicked in order to access the Hungarian version, shows that the museum is targeting a completely different audience than the House of Terror at the centre of Budapest (Ungvary 2006: 211), where copied black and white single sheets of paper in most of the rooms were the only pieces of information to be provided in English. It is also unimaginable for the Jasenovac Memorial Museum not to have a bilingual exhibition and an extensive catalogue, while the Holocaust Memorial Center in Oslo, for example, provides no written information in English at all, targeting a solely domestic audience.
This article argues that the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington is the role model behind the aesthetics of these museums, while the political need for post-communist countries to provide such memorial museums results from unofficial memory standards that are being established in the course of the Europeanization of Memory.

**Universalization and Europeanization of the Holocaust**

After the end of the Cold War, the memory-boom in Western countries spotlighted the Holocaust as the negative icon of our era. Before the 1990s, it was only individual events that led to transnational debates about the Holocaust, like the Eichmann-trial in 1961 or the broadcast of the US-serial “Holocaust” in 1978/79. In the meantime, the national discussions have followed their own rhythm, which has been determined by the role of each country in World War II as well as the current political situation (Eckel/Moisel 2008: 13). However, in contrast to earlier decades in Western countries, the extermination of the European Jewry has come to the fore of the view on World War II since the 1980s. This development has been accompanied by a change in focus: instead of the figure of the hero or martyr, which was used particularly in the portrayal of the resistance against the Third Reich, the individual victim has now moved into the focus of remembrance (Rousso 2004: 374). Furthermore, the Holocaust has become a “negative icon” (Diner 2007), a universal imperative to respect human rights in general, a ”container” for the memory of the various victims, as Levy and Sznaider put it (Levy/Sznaider 2005).

Moreover, in Europe this universalization of the Holocaust includes another dimension: the “rupture in civilization” (Diner 1988) has increasingly become a negative European founding myth. The unified Europe after 1945 is understood as a collective sharing a common destiny (Schicksalsgemeinschaft) that has learned a lesson from the Holocaust and developed shared structures in order to avoid a recurrence of such a catastrophe. Since the EU is searching for a new European identity that goes beyond an economic and monetary union, this founding myth is supposed to create such an identity (Judt 2005). This is one of the reasons why the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF)—founded in Sweden as a network of politicians and experts in 1998—aroused so much interest and today already includes 27 mostly European countries (Kroh 2008a).

Furthermore, at the beginning of the new millennium, on 27 January 2000, the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, an international Holocaust conference took place in Stockholm, which was attended by prime ministers and presidents for the first time, and also by renowned experts and contemporary witnesses from 46 states (Kroh 2008b: 111). One of the results of the declaration passed was the recommendation that all countries should implement 27 January or a similar na-
tional date as Holocaust Memorial Day. As of 2010, 34 of the 56 OSCE member states had followed this recommendation. While 22 member states chose 27 January, 12 decided to commemorate another nationally important day. Nevertheless, the formal status and the concrete code of practice differ strongly: in Great Britain “Holocaust Memorial Day” was introduced as an official national Memorial Day in 2000. On this day, the massacres in Rwanda, Armenia, Bosnia or Kosovo are remembered as well as the situation of the disabled or homosexuals. In other countries like France or Sweden, the day has a less political significance, with the focus lying on pedagogical activities. The Europeanization of the memory of Auschwitz is connected to a Europeanization of topics, protagonists and rituals only in a very limited way (Schmid 2009). Nevertheless, the suggestion to join the Holocaust Task Force and implement a Holocaust Memorial Day were the first steps towards some kind of “European standards,” which were not officially applied during the eastern enlargement of the EU, but did play a role unofficially, as shown by the example above of the Holocaust Memorial Center opening almost empty in 2004.

This attempt to retrospectively imbue the Holocaust with some kind of sense, the moral legitimation of the EU as a better Europe emerging from the Holocaust, is problematic in more than one way. The complex events are removed from their historic context in order to create a shared identity. This demands that we abstract from the concrete victims and perpetrators as well as from the specific role of Germany and Austria, important allies in the EU, as Levy and Sznaider (2004: 669) write: “The Holocaust is no longer about the Jews being exterminated by the Germans. Rather, it is about human beings and the most extreme violation of their human rights.” Levy and Sznaider welcome this focus on the individual victim. Yet this tends to result in an obscuring of the different contexts in which “a human being” died and thus promotes the problematic tendency to place everyone killed in World War II on the same level as equally innocent victims, which they address as a slight problem only in relation to the German victims of bombing and expulsion (Dunnage 2010). This universalization dehistorizes the events of World War II in order to make them applicable as a moral lesson (Knigge 2008: 151): since “we Europeans” have learned from the Holocaust so successfully, it seems necessary to understand victims of today’s conflicts, “the Muslims,” the “Bosni ans” or “the Kosovars,” as the “new Jews” (Miller 2010). Understanding Germany as the role model for confronting its past successfully thus allows it to use the motto “Nie wieder Auschwitz” for current political aims: formulations like “the ramp of Srebrenica” or preventing a new Auschwitz in Kosovo were used in Germany in order to legitimize the NATO-war in Kosovo in 1999 although there was no UN-mandate for this and the reasonability of the bombing is questioned today.

Parallel to this Europeanization of the Holocaust, in eastern European countries history has been renarrated after 1989, often with the discovery a “golden era”
before communist rule (Cornelißen 2006: 48). The historical narrative of the hero-
ic anti-fascist struggle was delegitimized together with the communist regimes,
placing the trauma of the communist crimes in the core of memory, often evoking
symbols familiar from the Shoah like rail tracks and wagons. This “divided
memory” (Troebst 2006: 36) in "East" and "West" makes representatives of post-
communist states demand that the communist crimes must be condemned “to the
same extent” as the Holocaust.

As a reaction to these conflicting memories, the EU-parliament recommended
the introduction of a new memorial day in summer 2009: on 23 August, the anni-
versary of the Hitler-Stalin-pact of 1939, the victims of both National Socialism
and Stalinism should be commemorated. Thus, not only has the memory of the
victims of Stalinism been added to the European canon, but furthermore, the vic-
tims of both regimes have also been explicitly placed on the same level. In this
sense, the new Memorial Day is not an addition to 27 January, but its antithesis.
The respectful memory of the victims of communist crimes is in this way again
bound together with political issues: while the Europeanization of the Holocaust
leads to the question of involvement of one's own country in the Nazi crimes, the
new Memorial Day does not feed such a negative memory. One's “own people” is
again understood as an innocent victim of oppression from outside (through Hitler
and Stalin), while the participation in the communist regime is denied and exter-
nalized.

Case study: Croatia

In order to examine in detail the extent to which Croatia’s way of dealing with the
Second World War appears as an answer to the Europeanization of memory, a
case study of Croatia will be conducted in the second part of my article. Since
Croatia is the only remaining eastern European county that will join the EU in the
near future, it is particularly interesting to analyze how remembrance policies are
made European. While there is already some literature on the 1990s, the develop-
ment of recent decades is examined through an analysis of commemoration
speeches and newspaper articles on the Jasenovac Memorial (Radonic 2010).

The 1990s – Isolation, not Europeanization

After the country gained its independence in 1990, just like other post-communist
states Croatia referred to the pre-communist period as a golden era. The Nazi
puppet “Independent State of Croatia” (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska—NDH) was
seen as a “milestone” on the way the Croatia’s independence. The Ustascha-
regime had come to power with the asset stripping of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
in April 1941 and had already begun operating death camps in the summer of the
same year. The largest of these was Jasenovac, a labour and death camp complex,
where almost 100,000 people were killed—around half of them Serbs, as well as Jews, Roma and Croatian political detainees (Mataušić 2003; Goldstein 2001).

The break-up of Yugoslavia coincided with a break with both the anti-fascist narrative and its narrow dogma concerning World War II. Instead of a democratic framework for historiography, each nation developed its own victim-narration according to its national myths. Thus, Croatia was not at all adapting to the Europeanization of memory in this phase. President Franjo Tuđman instead wanted to reconcile Ustascha and Partisans: according to him, they had both fought for the same goal during World War II, albeit in different ways—the Croatian cause (Čulić 1999: 105). In connection with this idea, the Jasenovac memorial area played a great symbolic role: referring to the Spanish General Francisco Franco’s example, Tuđman suggested bringing the bones of the Ustascha and of soldiers of the NDH (“Domobrani”) killed by the partisans near Bleiburg in May 1945 to a “national memorial” in Jasenovac (Ivančić 2000: 132). This was the first approach to exhibiting victim stories in Jasenovac after Croatia’s independence, but Tuđman had to drop these plans following international criticism (Feral Tribune, 4/1/1996; 10/3/1997). That his idea could not be established despite Croatia’s political isolation in the late 1990s, could be understood as evidence of the fact that Croatia was too close to the centre of the Europeanization of the Holocaust for such a revisionist plan.

**Croatian Remembrance Policies go European**

After Tuđman’s death at the end of 1999, a coalition under the leadership of the social democrats won the elections. During the process of democratization, especially the cutting back of the competences of the president and the introduction of efficient checks and balances, the manner in which the past was dealt with in Croatia also changed. In 2003, the former Tuđman-party, the HDZ, again won the elections. Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, who resigned in 2009, was known as a Europe-oriented statesman who broke with the revisionist ideas of his predecessor. At the 2005 commemoration at the KZ Jasenovac Memorial, he emphasized that the “anti-fascist victory over fascism and National Socialism was the victory of those values woven into modern Europe and modern Croatia” (Vjesnik, 25/4/2005), but added that the Homeland War (1991-1995) was also fought against a type of fascism. During a 2005 visit to Yad Vashem, he similarly argued that during the 1990s war the Croats were also victims of the same kind of evil as Nazism and Fascism, and that no one knew better than the Croats did what it meant to be a victim of aggression and crime. The Holocaust History Museum further inspired Sanader to think about a Museum of the Homeland War, as he told journalists after his visit (Vjesnik, 29/6/2005). What makes the episode so telling is that these statements were not followed by any protests. This shift away from historical revisionism, which minimizes the victims of the Ustascha state in the Tuđman-era, to a new view that recognizes the Holocaust but presents Croats
as victims of Fascism, this time of Serbian Fascism, can be understood as an adaptation to the Europeanization of Memory and at the same time as something that demonstrates the problematic dimension of this European development.

Furthermore, during the annual commemorations in Jasenovac, Sanader and his colleagues repeatedly condemned “both totalitarianisms,” the “red and the black” like a kind of mantra, not reflecting that it had been the partisans who had liberated Jasenovac in 1945. (Novi list, 26/4/1999; Vjesnik, 17/3/2004; Vjesnik, 28/11/2006; Novi list, 21/4/2008) This formulation obviously corresponds to European standards perfectly, as the aforementioned introduction of the 23 August as a Memorial Day for both victims of Nazism and Stalinism shows. Totalitarianism is even mentioned in a short Sanader quotation in the Ten year anniversary book of the ITF: “Democracy’s victory over totalitarianism is the victory of the values embedded in modern Europe and modern Croatia” (Task Force 2009: 32).

The New Jasenovac-Exhibition — A Result of the “Europeanization of the Holocaust”

The most striking example of the Europeanization of the Holocaust, however, is the new exhibition at the state-funded Jasenovac Memorial Museum, which opened at the end of 2006 after prolonged debate. The main progress of the new exhibition seems to be the acknowledgment of the fact that mass murder and the Shoa did happen in Croatia. Nevertheless, the second exhibition panel after the entrance room shows Hitler and Pavelić, informing us that during Pavelić’s first visit in June 1941, Hitler gave him full support for the policy of genocide against the Serbian population. Thus, on the one hand it is stressed that the extermination of the Croatian Jews must be seen in the broader context of the Holocaust, which is obviously true, but on the other hand, it also seems very important to stress that the mass murder of Serbs must be seen in this context, too. Yet the fact that alongside the Nazis the Ustascha (and the Romanians in Transnistria; Rozett and Spector 2000) were a rare example of a regime that had operated death camps on their own is not mentioned. In addition, while anti-Semitic Ustascha posters are shown and the exhibition tries to counter anti-Semitic arguments, there is no such approach when it comes to hatred of Serbs or Roma. It is this emphasis on the Holocaust, principally in the aesthetics of the museum (testimonies, belongings of the victims), - which corresponds to international standards of commemorating and exhibiting the Holocaust - that allows the visitor to identify with the victim.

The director, Nataša Jovičić, claimed that “we want to be part of the modern European education and museum system and follow the framework we get from the institutions dealing with these topics” (Vjesnik, 24/7/2004). European standards are mentioned explicitly, with Jovičić stating that the new exhibition is designed to “meet the standards of the Council of Europe and the EU” (Vjesnik, 18/8/2004). Jovičić defended the exhibition by saying that it had been conceptualized together with international experts because she wanted it to be “international-
ly recognizable and in the context of international standards” (Vjesnik, 14/2/2004). Yet these experts only came from institutions concerned with the Holocaust, such as the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, the Anne-Frank-House or Yad Vashem. Presuming that these experts were aware of the particular situation in Jasenovac, where mostly Serbs had been killed, one can suppose that the problem lies somewhere else: the Croatian curators did not model themselves on memorial museums at the sites of former concentration camps in Germany or the Generalgouvernement – which try to show the complex character and daily routine of concentration camps – but on other institutions. “Like at the Anne Frank House,” Jovičić wants to “tell a tragic life story with the help of a few objects”. (Vjesnik, 24/5/2004) Of course, it is understandable that the current focus on individual victim stories is dominant at the Anne-Frank-House. But in Jasenovac a hypermodern exhibition also uses new media in order to spotlight only single victim stories, as described in an article in the state-owned daily Vjesnik: “Even more thoroughly than the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington and the Anne Frank House in the Netherlands the director of the Jasenovac Memorial, the art historian Nataša Jovičić, decided to devote the whole new museum exhibition (in preparation) to the victims”. (Vjesnik, 7/3/2004) Referring directly to the “illustration of the executioner and the victim in world museology,” she planned not to show anonymous dead bodies and weapons of killing as was done before, but to make Jasenovac a “site of life” and of an affirmative message. She joins together the legitimate critic of the shock-aesthetic on the one hand and the attempt to make sense of the events by “sending a message of light to the site of crime” on the other hand. (Vjesnik, 7/3/2004)

However, critics also faulted the new exhibition concept for not showing who the perpetrators were, which nation had the biggest losses and how people were killed in Jasenovac—the “manufacture of death,” as it is called by some scholars. (Novi list, 24/1/2006; 29/1/2006) After a long debate, some brute killing instruments, knives and mallets, were added to the exhibition as well as mentions of the nationality and age of the victims in order to show that not only political prisoners were killed there, as it was often claimed during the 1990s.

Since the director understands the memorial as a “modern and dynamic human rights centre” (Vjesnik, 27/2/2004), the educational centre furthermore presents the Holocaust primarily as a moral lesson, reproducing the dominant dehistorized understanding of it in a way it could be done anywhere else outside the camp area. The exhibition also does not integrate or address the historical site of the concentration camp around it in any way; an educational path has been planned for several years but has still not been implemented. The only illustration of the barracks, which are symbolized by hills, dates back to the sixties when the famous architect Bogdan Bogdanović designed the memorial area and built the flower-monument. Jovičić has stressed numerous times that international experts welcomed the exhibition’s concept, (Vjesnik, 24/5/2004), which an interview with the director and a
scientific advisor of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Diana Saltzman and Arthur Berger, seems to confirm. (Novi list, 2/12/2006) One can thus either reason that most problems of the primal concept of the exhibition have been solved or that the universalization of the holocaust aims only at a symbolic acknowledgment of the Shoa in order to open future perspectives of a global human rights discourse.

However, what Reinhart Kosellek stressed for Germany is also true for Croatia: both cannot merely commemorate the victims, but must also, or even principally, remember the perpetrators (Koselleck 2002). In the Croatian case, there cannot be an exhibition (supported by international experts and meeting international aesthetic standards) that concentrates on the (Jewish) victims in a country and a region where the engagement with one’s own crimes, the so called “negative memory” (see Knigge/Frei 2002), has not yet come very far.

**Memory as a “Draught-horse Towards Europe”?**

Unlike the 1990s, when voices from abroad were mostly seen as coming from anti-Croatian circles, in the last decade in the discussions of the new exhibition concept as well as of the annual commemorations in Jasenovac, reactionary opinions have been seen as an obstacle to striving towards Europe. The identification of the Jasenovac victims by name is seen as a step on the way to “the Europe that all of our thinking people strive towards.” (Novi list, 3/5/2005)

On the other hand, a prominent columnist of the leftist daily Novi list hints at an instrumental understanding of approaching the past. On the occasion of premier Sanader’s visit to Jasenovac in 2005, Branko Mijić wrote: “If this rhetoric had emerged earlier and been perpetuated longer, our image in the world would have been much more positive. This would also have eased our entry into the European community.” (Novi list, 25/4/05) Two months later, on the occasion of Sanaders visit to Israel Mijić added:

> After years of mistrust and suspicion (…) it is certainly a big issue to make a relatively small, but fearsomely (strašno) influential county like Israel take sides with us. An enemy less and a partner more is a big success, especially since our future depends on the mercy of the powerful in more than one way. (Novi list, 29/6/2005)

This instrumental argumentation with an anti-Semitic tendency towards conspiracy theory shows that memory standards need not to be internalized in order to appear European.

One critic of this nationalist discourse furthermore explicitly called for the ruling party to stop using the memory of the Jasenovac victims as a “draught horse towards Europe,” as this would lead to neither closer ties to Europe, respect for the victims of genocide, or to the truth. (Novi list, 15/5/2005)
Conclusion: The Ambivalent Europeanization of Memory

Returning to the pictures of the memorial museums in Budapest and Jasenovac, we can now say the following: (1) There obviously exist some kind of European memory standards, since those two museums are constructed according to the same principals. (2) The standards for establishing such museums are definitely developed further to the west, the US being the aesthetic role model and Germany the centre of the Europeanization of the Holocaust. Thus while Hungary and Croatia are not the centre of this Europeanization, neither do they constitute the periphery, since in contrast to countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Western Ukraine, state-funded memorial museums do exist there. In short, it is not membership in the EU that determines the distance from the centre. (3) It is problematic that the two museums are so similar: Jasenovac is not or is at least not supposed to be a Holocaust Memorial Museum since Serbs were the main victim group there. It should thus be regarded as a consequence of the universalization of the Holocaust that such a dehistorized memorial concentrating on the individual victims (while alluding primarily to symbols from Shoa memory) is possible at the site of a concentration camp in general, and at this concentration camp in particular - in its four-year history, one of the rare examples of a death camp in Europe not operated by the Third Reich and one in which Serbs were the largest victim group.

However, assessing the effects of the Europeanization of the Holocaust as ambivalent also means seeing its positive effects, especially in the post-communist states. Once Hungary had the Holocaust Memorial Center – even though its permanent exhibition opened only years later – it still facilitated educational programs and opposed the revisionist narrative offered at the House of Terror in the centre of Budapest, where Nazi collaborators and communists are treated equally. In order to meet these unofficial European standards, Croatia also opened an exhibition in which the majority of victims’ names hover on glass boards above the heads of visitors. The country also joined the ITF in 2005, which is more than other former Yugoslav successor-states have achieved.

In order to facilitate its integration into the European (memory) community, Croatia had to confront its past more critically than its neighbouring states because of both its role in World War II and the revisionist Tudman-era. Still, the universalization and Europeanization of the Holocaust enable new victim-narratives that are compatible with these European standards. Finally, therefore, if the often-invoked “international community” stopped recycling images from World War II and instead condemned each of the crimes for what they were, this would certainly help to bring about a confrontation with the recent past of the wars in the 1990s. If such a confrontation does not take place, the impulse to identify the victims of various crimes with the Jews, however horrible these crimes were, will always retain the bitter aftertaste of what has become known as Schuld.
und Erinnerungsabwehr (Adorno 2010) —a pathological defence of guilt and memory.

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Is This Us? The Construction of European Woman/Man in the Exhibition It’s Our History!

By Steffi de Jong

Abstract
On the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the non-profit organisation Musée de l’Europe staged the exhibition It’s our history!. The subject of It’s our history! was the history of European integration from 1945 to today. The exhibition was intended to make European citizens aware that – as the exhibition’s manifesto stated: ‘The History, with a capital H, of European construction is inextricable from our own personal history, that of each European citizen. It is not the reserve of those that govern us. We all shape it, as it shapes us, sometimes unbeknown to us. It’s our history!’ One of the means that the Musée de l’Europe chose as an illustration of this supposed interrelation of History and history are video testimonies in which 27 European citizens (one from each European member state) tell their own life stories. The present article explores this use of autobiographical accounts as didactic means in It’s our history!. The article argues that through the 27 Europeans, an image of European woman/man and European integration is advanced that glosses over internal conflicts in Europe’s recent history, leads to the construction of a model European citizen and serves as a symbol for the slogan ‘unity in diversity’ in which Europe appears as more united than diverse.

Keywords: Europe, Musée de l’Europe, witness, biography, Europeanization, museum, testimony

Introduction

In 1926, the German author and war veteran Kurt Tucholsky visited the French World War One Museum in Vincennes. He looked at the pictures painted by war artists and normal soldiers, at posters, at ration stamps, military plates, and improvised shoes and clothes made out of newspapers – and concluded: ‘And after I had seen all of this, piece by piece, very slowly and thoroughly, I shake my head and feel that something is missing. What? Us. This is not us. There we are, standing life-sized in the museum and it is not us.’ Tucholsky’s solution to this dilemma seems macabre. If objects alone cannot adequately represent the war with its horrors, one has to start exhibiting human beings:

One should stuff some of those field marshals, some journalists, some secretaries of state, some army chaplains, perhaps as friendly dummies, as an umbrella stand, say, or with a visiting card box in the mouth, so that for once in their lives they would be good for something – one should put these puppets into the display cabinets and write underneath: FROM GREAT TIMES. Then posterity will stand before them in wonder, regard them and shudder, and understand with pity. (Tucholsky 1926).

This was 1926. In 2007, I enter the exhibition It’s our history! by the Brussels based non-profit organisation Musée de l’Europe. Organised on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the exhibition treats the history of European Integration from 1945 until today. Already in the second room, I am confronted with: human beings. Not mounted human bodies, of course. The latter practice belongs to darker chapters of museum history – to the period of colonial exhibitions, early anthropological museums and Gunther von Hagens’ ethically debatable Body Worlds. No, I am confronted with a video installation. From a large screen, 27 elegantly dressed men and women are looking at me. They are moving almost imperceptibly. Walking through the exhibition, I will meet these men and women again. They will each soon appear on a smaller TV-screen and tell me parts of their life stories.

Video interviews in which ordinary men and women recount episodes from their biographies, like the ones shown in It’s our history!, are an ever more frequent phenomenon in museums. For around a decade, Holocaust and Second World War museums and exhibitions in particular have been including video interviews with witnesses of the war and the Holocaust in their exhibitions (de Jong
Eighty years after Tucholsky’s visit to the museum in Vincennes, exhibiting people in museums on contemporary history has become normality, if in a different, less gruesome, form than the one suggested by the German author.

In the present article, I want to explore this phenomenon of using interviews with witnesses of the past in museums in general and in the It’s our history! exhibition in particular. My thesis is that in It’s our history!, the use of video testimonies serves to solve what I want to call Europe’s memory problem. Through the 27 Europeans who tell their life stories in the exhibition, an image of European woman/man and European integration is presented that glosses over internal conflicts in Europe’s recent history, leads to the construction of a model for the European citizen and serves as a symbol for the slogan ‘unity in diversity’ in which Europe appears as more united than diverse.

**Europe’s Memory Problem**

In 1882, the French scholar Ernest Renan gave the lecture ‘What is a nation?’ at the Sorbonne. In opposition to the ethno-centric nationalist models of his time, Renan argued for a conception of the nation as a cultural construct. For Renan (1990: 19), the conditions for its construction lie in the way in which a nation’s past is represented in the present: ‘To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more – these are the essential conditions for being a people’. More important than the exact nature of these deeds is the belief that ‘the people’ has performed them as a community. Consequently Renan (1990: 11) asserts that ‘forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality’. Historical error must gloss over those deeds that, in the past, divided the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) of the nation. At the same time, suffering in itself, if it is believed to have been a communal act, can be a stronger means of binding a nation together than triumphs ‘for [grievcs] impose duties, and require a common effort’ (Renan 1990: 19).

More than one hundred years after Renan’s lecture, the importance of the interpretation of the past for the construction of a nation has, despite several significant differences in their approaches and interpretations, been largely agreed upon by theorists of nationalism (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Hobsbawm & Ranger 1993). That this is equally important for the creation of a feeling of belonging to the post-national community of the European Union (EU) has by now become a truism in European politics and an EU-friendly scholarship on European culture and heritage. At the latest since the introduction of the so-called Culture Article in the Maastricht Treaty, which set out to ‘bring Europe’s common cultural heritage to the fore’ (CEC 1992), European politicians, with the support of academics and professionals of the culture and heritage sector, have
tried to actively promote the communality of Europe’s past. This attempt has constantly been hindered by three factors: first, the strength of the belief in a specific national heritage, secondly the EU’s own motto ‘united in diversity’, which leaves open the question of how much diversity unity can bear and finally a post-Holocaust memorial culture which has ruled out forgetting. Naively glossing over past antagonisms, as could still be done by the nineteenth century nationalist movements that formed the basis for Renan’s study has become unacceptable after the unprecedentedly bloody history of the first half of the twentieth century, a genocide of such dimensions that it has been defined as a ‘civilisational break’ (Diner 1988) – and the antagonistic past and memory of the people living in the two blocks that Europe had been divided into for around 45 years. Especially regarding the twentieth century with its two world wars, the histories of flight and expulsion, colonialism and decolonisation, migration, Auschwitz and the Gulag that divided and continue to divide the peoples of Europe, the focus has thus been not so much on forgetting as on dialogue. The aim is to get at an, if not common, then at least, commonly acceptable interpretation of the past – the idea being that, as Klaus Leggewie (2011: 7 italics in the original) has recently observed, ‘a supranational Europe can only acquire a stable political identity, if the public debate on and the mutual recognition of contestable memories is as highly rated as agreements, an internal market and open borders’.

**The Musée de l’Europe and the Exhibition It’s our history!**

The exhibition *It’s our history!* can be counted amongst the concrete attempts at not only staging debate on, but actually solving the question of what is common about European memory. The exhibition, which has so far been shown in Brussels and Wroclaw was originally meant as the opening exhibition of a museum on European history in the unofficial capital of Europe, Brussels. This plan for a museum had to be put on hold, inter alia because of a lack of funds and difficulties in finding a permanent location (Charléty 2005; Mazé 2008). However, the idea goes back to 1997 and was developed in a circle of academics and individuals with close links to the European institutions. Its initiator was the lawyer-economist Benoît Remiche, who has worked for the European institutions. Political patronage was given by the Belgian minister of state Antoinette Spaak, the daughter of one of the so-called founding fathers of the European Union, Paul-Henri Spaak, and the Belgian minister of state and then vice-president of the European Commission, Karel Van Miert. The reasons for creating a museum on European history were presented as fourfold. Firstly, the founders of the museum wanted to write the ‘European history of Europe’ (Remiche 2006: 14) in opposition to the national histories shown in national history museums. Secondly, the museum was meant to be an antidote to Brussels bureaucracy and a perceived Euro-fatigue. Thirdly, the initiators of the museum based their project on Pierre Nora’s theory that we are
now living in a society characterised by an ‘end of the tradition of memory’ (Nora 1996: 6). They wanted to create ‘the place of memory that Europe needs’ (Musée de l’Europe 2007). The desired result was that the museum would reintegrate Europeans into their history, ultimately lead to a heightened awareness of European history and promote an active European citizenship. The main target groups were therefore defined as young people and people of the third age – in other words, those who have to be taught about ‘their’ past and introduced into a European memorial community and those for whom a visit to the museum will mean delving into their own memories and whose potentially antagonistic memories have to be streamlined into a European memory.

**Objects of History: The Figure of the Witness in Popular Culture and in Museums**

‘My own life story has reached a climax when I myself became an object in Europe’s history’ (Musée de l’Europe 2007). These are the words of Andreja Rither, a former Slovenian Minister of Culture, museologist, former director of the Museum of Contemporary History in Celje and one of the 27 Europeans that told their personal stories in *It’s our history!* Two considerations mark her declaration. For one thing, we find here the age-old fear of personal oblivion and the wish to preserve the marks that one has left on earth long after one’s death. What better way of doing so than to become an *object of history* – a carrier of the past in a public retelling thereof? Secondly and consequently, the declaration expresses the belief that the individual life story is worth being preserved, important enough to be included into European history and presented to a larger audience.
Already in 1998, the French historian Annette Wieviorka (1998) claimed that we are living in the ‘era of the witness’. Wieviorka argues that since the Eichmann trial, which presented 111 survivors as witnesses for the history of the Shoah, Holocaust survivors have gained ever more importance as witnesses of history, so that today they are amongst the most authoritative carriers of Holocaust memory. Wieviorka’s denomination of our era as the ‘era of the witness’ is today truer than 12 years ago. Not only Holocaust survivors, but also witnesses of all possible historical events are now hardly ever missing from television documentaries on contemporary history. Numberless websites are dedicated to the publication of personal memoirs. We can watch video testimonies on YouTube and in multiple online archives. The book market is flooded with the autobiographies of ‘ordinary people’ and – most importantly for this study – more and more museums are including video testimonies by ordinary men and women in their exhibitions. Personal memory has, in other words, moved from the sphere of what Jan Assmann (1992) has called communicative memory – a memory based on every-day communication between the members of a memorial community – towards the sphere of what he has termed cultural memory – a ritualised memory based on fixed markers of the past. This transfer is marked by two interrelated movements: on the one hand the belief of ordinary people that what they have experienced in their life is worth recording and might be of educative value for a larger audience and on the other hand the willingness of others – generally a younger generation – to listen to and preserve those stories. We have, as the German oral historian Lutz Niethammer (1985: 10) has observed, begun to ask ‘about the subjectivity of those whom we had learned to see as the objects of history’. At the same time, by recording, archiving and exhibiting video testimonies in documentaries and museums, we are turning the very act of remembering into an object of history.

In museums, the use of witnesses can be seen, firstly, as part of a post-modern turn in museology characterised by an attempt to avoid master-narratives (Bennett 2006). Thus, at the Tropenmuseum, in its 2008 exhibition on the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, curators tried, through the use of witnesses, to avoid giving a clear interpretation of a disputed event. Potentially, the presentation of different life stories corresponds to the presentation of different opinions on the event or subject under scrutiny in the exhibition. This allows curators to avoid having to present a clear interpretation of an event. Secondly, as Thomas Thiemeyer (2010: 244) has observed for the musealization of the two World Wars, the use of individuals in museums appeals to the visitors’ emotions and their faculty of empathy and identification. ‘Personal history emotionalises, because it enables identification, generates loyalty and permits sympathy. It appeals to man […] as a species’. This potential of identification means that witnesses are powerful didactic means for museums – didactic means that are well chosen by the curators. In her testimonial video, Andreja Rither is filmed walking through a flea market choosing objects for her museum. In other words, Andreja Rither’s testimony shows the
practicalities of curatorial work: the work that she herself carries out, saving objects from the rubble of Europe’s past, as well as the work carried out by the collaborators of the Musée de l’Europe when they were choosing her and the other Europeans’ stories for inclusion into the museum. In the remainder of this article I will concentrate on this choice of the witnesses for It’s our history!, showing how the chosen witnesses are used to present a common denominator for Europe’s memory.

Who are We? 27 National Symbols for a United European People

Most Europeans consider themselves as nationals of their countries of origin first and only secondly as Europeans – if at all. This is the result that Eurobarometer studies come up with every year. Models of European identity usually take the national dimension into consideration, whether in terms of being encircled by, of existing alongside or of being a constitutive part of European identity (Fligstein 2008, Risse 2010). Indeed, national identities are inscribed in the European Union’s own motto ‘united in diversity’ where diversity refers more to the different national cultures within the EU than to any other elements that might divide the citizens of Europe such as financial inequalities or the differences between country-life and city-life. More than any other dividing element, it is the strength of national allegiances that is considered to be the biggest threat to the emergence of a genuine European identity and that, in an attempt to make this strength fruitful, is turned into a constitutive part of European identity with the motto ‘unity in diversity’.
Entering the exhibition, the visitor of *It’s our history!* is confronted with unity. The group picture shown in the second room represents 27 primarily middle-aged, elegantly dressed men and women, half of them sitting down and half of them standing. Where they come from is not easy to make out. It is only in the museum text that accompanies the picture that visitors are informed that the 27 individuals in the picture are 27 citizens of the EU member states. In accordance with the motto ‘unity in diversity’, the EU appears here as a community composed of the citizens of its constitutive member states.

The group picture is supposed to remind visitors of the so-called ‘family’ pictures that are taken at EU summits. ‘This could have been an official photograph of a European summit with the EU heads of state and government, but it isn’t. These are 27 ordinary European citizens’ (Musée de l’Europe 2007a: 2), the educational guide points out. The genre of the ‘family picture’ which, as an attempt of the European elite to be close to its citizens, works as a signifier of democracy, was here taken up by the museum as a signifier of high politics, only in order to be broken again and become a signifier of the analogy in object between the politicians and the European citizens. No matter how difficult negotiations have been, the family pictures of top politicians tell us, we are still a big European family. No matter how different our experiences are and have been, the group picture of the 27 tells us, we still belong to the same cultural and historical space. But who are we? Who exactly is it that belongs to this space according to the project of the 27? And how is this space defined?

A closer look at the group picture reveals that the people on the picture are ethnically all white. A similar picture to the one in *It’s our history!* was shown in its follow-up exhibition *America – It’s also our history!*, this time representing Americans. The Americans on this picture are male, wear workers’ clothes and stand upright. They are ethnically diverse – and primarily non-white. In short: the United States appears as a representation of the myth of the melting pot. While the States of America are shown as united because of immigration, for the EU, immigration is, according to the exhibition *It’s our history!*, not so much part of reality as a challenge. In one of the final chapters entitled ‘The challenges of globalisation’ visitors are asked to think about the possibility of ‘controlling migratory flows without sacrificing the right of asylum of Europe’s labour needs’ (Musée de l’Europe 2009: 178). In the opening group picture – as in the remainder of the exhibition – Europe appears as nationally diverse, but ethnically white – as united in national diversity.

If the group picture shows the EU as the sum total of the European nation-states, this sum is broken down again into its constitutive parts in the subsequent part of the exhibition. Here the 27 European citizens tell their own stories, which are generally marked by national histories. So are we, if not ethnically, then in our experiences, more diverse than united? Not really.
The Video Testimonies: Diverse in Content but United in Intent

If, in geographic terms, the 27 Europeans represent the 27 EU member states, in temporal terms they can be divided into two groups: those who performed great deeds and were the victims of unjust regimes in the past and those who give testimony on present-day expressions of European integration. With only minor exceptions, this is also an east-west division. In the latter group, there are, for instance, the – almost obligatory – Erasmus student, a Swedish scientist working for the European Organisation of Nuclear Research, a Portuguese entrepreneur running a transportation and logistics company, a Finnish interpreter at the European Parliament, a Bulgarian farmer producing organic yoghurt, a Greek and a Maltese civil servant at the European Commission and the Austrian founder of SkyEurope. The former include a Belgian worker who fought for equal payment in the Belgian national weapon’s factory, a Czech co-signatory of the Charter 77, an Estonian participant in the ‘Phosphorite War’, a Polish fellow campaigner of Lech Wałęsa in the Solidarity movement and a German couple who fled from the GDR through the tunnel dug underneath the Berlin Wall. In one of its exhibition texts, the Musée de l’Europe presents these stories as potentially exchangeable:

The 27 people you will meet here sum up the history of Europe that, for 50 years, has been broken down into the diversity of individual destinies. Others could no doubt have been chosen who have similar stories to tell. But this only goes to prove that what is true for these 27 is also true for a great many other people. At the end of the day, it is true for everyone. For each of us, the history of Europe is our history.

In other words: what unites Europeans is that they belong to a common geographical space, which during the last 50 years has been marked by what It’s our history! presents as the climax of European history so far – European integration. As the most important relic of Europe’s history, the Treaty of Rome is exhibited at the end of the exhibition in a bright, white room in which the only other exhibit is a large acryl painting by the artist Jörg Frank entitled ‘Europa: Work in progress’. The very first room, on the other hand, shows Gunter Demnig’s ‘Friedensrolle’, a lead sculpture of a long roll engraved with the names of the various peace treaties signed in Europe since 260 BC emerging from a typewriter. The roll is intended to show that ‘each [...] peace treaty marked only an interlude in a state of war that had become considered as part of the course’ (Musée de l’Europe 2009: 20). Each peace treaty, that is, with the exception of the Treaty of Rome, which in the topology of the exhibition represents the apex of European history and a new form of peace treaty – the only successful one so far. The 27 stories that are presented between the dark room showing Demnig’s ‘Friedensrolle’ and the Treaty of Rome presented as a relic of European integration, are not so much similar in content as similar in kind. All of them appear as necessary steps on the long way toward European integration: the Solidarity movement as much as the translating work that is being done in the European Parliament at the moment. It is thus not in the different experiences presented that European history is common, but in its teleolo-
gy, in the presentation of European integration as the endpoint in which the different strains of European history meet.

**Forgetting by Remembering: Forming Europe’s Memory**

If the historical climax of Europe is presented as a politically and economically integrated Europe, the goal of the exhibition is also to find a common denominator for memory in this integrated Europe. The title – *It’s our history!* – with its telling exclamation mark, serves on the one hand as an invitation to Europeans to become aware of their own involvement in European history. As the manifesto of the exhibition presented in the lobby states:

> The History, with a capital H, of European construction is inextricable from our own personal history, that of each European citizen. It is not the reserve of those that govern us. We all shape it, as it shapes us, sometimes unbeknown to us. It’s our history!

On the other hand, the title is an appeal to consider this history – whether with a capital or with a small h – as common to all Europeans; as *ours*.

The road to the creation of such a common memory is, as has been illustrated, paved with obstacles. Tellingly, the Musée de l’Europe avoids fully approaching the event that most divides the memory of Europeans: the Second World War. The exhibition starts with the section ‘1945 – Europe, year zero’. European integration appears here as a phoenix emerging from the ashes – total destruction being presented as the unfortunate, albeit necessary starting point for the crooked, although consistent road towards an ever more united Europe. The exhibition does not represent the war with its antagonistic camps, with its victors and defeated, its victims and perpetrators. What it represents are the consequences thereof – the ruins in which supposedly all of Europe lay. Erasing all questions of responsibility, an aerial view of the ruins of the German city of Cologne – not the Polish Warsaw, the British Coventry or the French Caen – is used as an illustration for the destruction of Europe. In its own way, the Musée de l’Europe thus realises a post-modern version of Renan’s dictum that ‘forgetting ... is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation’. The Second World War is presented as the founding myth of the European Union. It is remembered; but it is remembered as a pan-European catastrophe in which all Europeans appear equally as victims, not as a series of culturally and socially explicable actions by human individuals (Krankenhagen 2008).

The problem for the construction of a European memory does not stop with the Second World War, however. Considering the collective and individual memories in Europe, the Musée de l’Europe declares that ‘the most touching testimonies generally come from Eastern Europe’ (Musée de l’Europe 2009: 31), but also that ‘the memory of those who were oppressed is not as serene as those who did not have to fight for their liberty’ (Musée de l’Europe 2009:14). It is especially the
spectre of nostalgia for the lost communist regimes in the states of the former Eastern Bloc that the Musée de l’Europe considers to be threatening. Optimistically, however, it affirms that ‘nostalgia will last for a while during the time Europe will need to truly integrate its new members’ (Musée de l’Europe 2009:133).

The 27 Europeans exemplify what such a true integration should ideally look like. As diverse as the experiences of the 27 Europeans might be, the subject of their testimonies is a return to, respectively a close inclusion, in the EU. While according to the museum text cited above, theoretically every European citizen could have been chosen to give testimony on the history of European integration, in reality, EU-critical or nostalgic voices are largely nonexistent in It’s our history!. (For a discussion of the lack of differentiation between the chosen witnesses, see also the article by Wolfram Kaiser in this volume.) When Klaus Stürmer, the Eastern German who fled with his wife through the tunnel dug underneath the Berlin Wall, talks about his life in the GDR, he falls into metaphors. He remembers getting flowers on the occasion of the elections in the GDR, but ‘they felt like barbed wire’. However, to stay within the metaphor, Klaus Stürmer tore down the barbed wire and fled to an integrated and peaceful Europe. Obviously prompted by the interviewer, he concludes his testimony by saying that he is happy that we have got the EU and that other peoples would love to switch with us. The Lithuanian Caroline Masiulis, whose family had to flee to France and who returned to Vilnius to run the bookshop that her grandfather founded in the nineteenth century after it was returned to the family in 1991, is filmed at the spot that is supposedly the geographical centre of Europe. She remembers the announcement of the location of this centre to have been important news for her. The announcement was made by a group of French scientists in the turbulent year of 1989. These Eastern testimonies of a return to Europe are complemented by Western testimonies of work for Europe – as civil servants, lawyers solving Europe’s immigration problem or as scientists cementing Europe’s position as an important location for research.

Witnesses and Heroes: The Construction of the Ideal European Citizen

While the 27 are used in It’s our history! in order to solve Europe’s memory problem by presenting it as diverse in individual destinies but united in the teleology of Europe’s history, they also appear as model Europeans. Their exemplary character stems from two ideas: witnessing as a civic duty and heroism.

In his study on the practice and idea of witnessing, the media theorist John Durham Peters (2001: 722) points out that the act of bearing witness to something can only have a ‘retroactive character’. ‘A vast quantitative difference separates what we experience and what we are summoned to witness. There’s a lot more sensation around than stories’. We all constantly experience events, but we rarely
know whether, at a later date, we might be called to give testimony on today’s impressions. Apart from some rare exceptions where the importance of an event is evident at the very moment of its occurrence, the attribute ‘from great times’, to come back to Tucholsky’s evaluation, is only accorded in retrospect. Nevertheless, Durham Peters argues (2001: 723), the retroactive aspect of witnessing has

in everyday civic ideology [lead to, SdJ] the idea that citizens have a duty to be informed about the events of the day. [...] With apologies to Matthew 25:13, the motto of witnessing should be: ‘Watch, therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour wherein the event will come’.

Good citizens, in other words, are vigilant citizens. They are aware of what is happening around them and ready to give testimony on it whenever they might be called to do so. It is exactly this kind of citizenship that the Musée de l’Europe promotes in its exhibition. Recording what has happened, from an early age, is the subject of several of the testimonies. Thus, the Spaniard Juan Fernandez Aller gives testimony on Tejero’s 1981 coup d’état. He was seven at the time of the events. Gyula Csics, who was 12 at the time of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 even graphically recorded the happenings in word and picture in a journal, which is exhibited alongside his testimony. While not all of the witnesses were as assiduous in recording what happened, their very presence in the museum exemplifies that they have done their duty as European citizens: they have considered European history as their own and been vigilant about what was happening around them.

If recording European history is presented as being important, actively taking part in it is even more so. The majority of the 27 Europeans are doers. While the Second World War is represented as fate, as that which has happened to us, European integration is represented as being actively brought forward by individuals on an elite level as well as on the ground. The Eastern Europeans said yes to an integrated Europe by either turning their back on a dictatorship, fleeing to the west or by actively, but peacefully, fighting the regime. They took part in the solidarity movement or, like the Latvian Sandra Kalniets, organised the Baltic Way. If the Eastern Europeans were fighting for a better life in a democratic and integrated Europe, the Western Europeans are actively ‘building Europe’ (Shore 2000). The choice for representatives of France and the United Kingdom fell on Roger Lavis and Philippe Cozette. Lavis and Cozette got their fifteen minutes of EU fame when they shook hands at the junction of the construction sites in the channel tunnel between Calais and Dover. In It’s our history!, the scene is shown again, commented on by Lavis and Cozette themselves. In their testimony, the manual work that represents the beginning of the European integration process in the coal and steel factories and the fictional bridges on the Euro banknotes that join European countries together, meet in a concrete act of tearing down (natural) frontiers between the peoples of Europe and building, not a bridge, but a tunnel between them.

Actively participating in European integration, the 27 Europeans not merely appear as witnesses but rather as role models – or heroes. For the German sociol-
ogist Jan Philipp Reemtsma (2009: 10), ‘heroes represent virtues claiming universal validity in an extreme, thus rare expression’. Heroes do something more than ordinary men and they do it for the common good. What the visitors of *It’s our history!* were presented with were historical heroes and heroes of everyday life. If the Musée de l’Europe claims that ‘for each of us, the history of Europe is our history’, this observation serves as a wake-up call for the (European) visitors to consider their own involvement in the history of European integration. In an exhibition that was designed as the opening exhibition of what was to become an ‘identity museum’ (Remiche 2006:1), however, not every European is capable of giving testimony on Europe’s history. Whether incidentally – because that is what happens if a circle of civil servants, curators and academics convinced of the European idea engage in choosing 27 representatives for the European people – or deliberately, a disproportionately high percentage of the 27 Europeans work for or close to the European institutions. They are thus part of what Camille Mazé (2008) has termed a supranational avant-garde – an avant-garde working and living so close to the European institutions that it has become what on a European elite level is called ‘engrenagé’, so entangled into the system of European integration as to have shifted its allegiances form a national or regional level to a European one (Shore 2000: 147ff). Rather than being examples of a culturally rich and heteroglossic Europe, the 27 Europeans are cues for the coming about of an ideal European identity and citizenship in which Europeans would actively take part in building Europe.

**Conclusion**

When Tucholsky visited the museum in Vincennes, he was unable to recognize his generation in the representation of an event that for him has been common to all of those who have taken part in it – if not in its political motivations, then in its tragedy. If the Musée de l’Europe invites its visitors to identify with their own history, it does so for a period of European history in which the experiences of Europeans could not have been more diverse. If Tucholsky was concerned about the picture that future generations would have of his time, then the professionals of the Musée de l’Europe are concerned about the picture that the present population of Europe has of its own past and present today. On the one hand, the witnesses in *It’s our history!* exemplify a common European memory. The different and sometimes antagonistic experiences are shown as having ultimately led to the reunion of the European family represented in the opening group picture. This picture also appears as a representation of a commonly acceptable European memory. With national affiliations being erased, the experiences of Europeans that have been antagonistic for 50 years are here remembered together as part of a communal European memory. On the other hand, the use of witnesses is a means to turn the visitors of the exhibition into good, active European citizens. The 27
Europeans shown in the exhibition have, in one way or another, been active in integrating Europe and, as ideal Europeans, they are aware of their experiences in the past, vigilant about the present and concerned about the future. While the Musée de l’Europe claims that in principle everybody could have been one of the 27 Europeans represented in *It’s our History!*, in reality the curators were careful to leave out examples that might have compromised their representation of European integration as the climax of European history and chose those that could work as examples to be followed by the visitors of the exhibition. Whether the latter reacted in the way in which they were intended to react, whether any of the visitors did actually become better European citizens according to the Musée de l’Europe’s idea is a question that cannot be answered in this article. A question that can be answered here is the one asked in the title: Is this us? Yes and no. It is the prototype of us. It is we Europeans as we ideally should be.

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All translations from German and French are by the author.

Interviews

From Great Men to Ordinary Citizens?
The Biographical Approach to Narrating European Integration in Museums

By Wolfram Kaiser

Abstract
The history of European integration is not easy to tell – in books or, for that matter, in museums. Most importantly, it appears to lack drama. This lack of drama creates a dilemma for museum practitioners who wish to tell stories about the contemporary history of Europe as shared history. In these circumstances, one prominent way of telling stories about European integration history in museums, and the focus of this article, is the biographical approach. Drawing upon research in all of the museums mentioned in this article and many more, and some 60 interviews with museum practitioners from across Europe, this article first discusses three biographical approaches to narrating European integration history in museums. It proceeds to draw out general conclusions about the prospects of mainstreaming European integration in history museums, and about the particular opportunities and pitfalls of the biographical approach and its different varieties.

Keywords: Biographical approach, European integration history, founding fathers, museums, personalization
From Great Men to Ordinary Citizens?

The history of European integration is not easy to tell – in books or, for that matter, in museums. Most importantly, it appears to lack drama. At first sight at least, it seems like a story of tedious negotiations by men in grey suits (and only recently, some women) striking compromises, very often with no immediately obvious direct relevance to the citizens of the present-day European Union (EU); discussions and negotiations, moreover, which take place in a highly complex institutional setting that is incomprehensible to most citizens and that appears to lack transparency and responsiveness to their everyday needs. Most traditional national historical narratives, in contrast, are full of glamorous leaders and drama. Flamboyant nationalists like Giuseppe Garibaldi and Lajos Kossuth caught the imagination of millions. With their allegedly superior statecraft, great statesmen like Otto von Bismarck or Winston Churchill built nation-states or protected them from external threats. For the sake of the nation, moreover, patriotic volunteers died heroic deaths in wars of independence or unification. True, much of this drama may have been ‘imagined’ to create and mould new ‘communities’ (Anderson 1983). However, from this imagination resulted powerful myths of nations and of their past (e.g. Berger & Lorenz 2010). These myths have helped shape collective memory, and they have penetrated museums as prime sites of cultural self-representation (Boswell & Evans 1999).

The apparent lack of flamboyant leaders and of drama in the history of European integration after World War II creates a dilemma for museum practitioners who wish to tell stories about the contemporary history of Europe as shared history. Narratives of shared history now often encompass stories about the experiences of migrant workers and cultural exchanges, for example. However, they also somehow have to address the historical evolution of the present-day EU and its growing role in shaping politics and policy-making across Europe. After all, even though it is not always obvious to its citizens, the EU actually does have a far-reaching impact on their everyday lives and even on those of people in countries like Norway or Turkey that are associated with it through arrangements like the European Economic Area or association treaties.

Post-war European integration increasingly features as a subsidiary theme in many national, regional and thematic museums, especially in the ‘core Europe’ of the founding member states of the EU. In these museums, the greater interest in addressing European integration history in one form or another mainly results from a strong recent trend in history museums in large parts of Western Europe in particular. Here, museum practitioners have been increasingly working to transnationalize their museum narratives in an age of Europeanization and globalization, and to break down, rather than project and confirm, national historical myths. They are doing this for professional reasons, especially to align their museum narratives with recent historical research that has emphasized transnational and pluralistic perspectives on history; for practical reasons, especially to make their
museums more accessible to a greater variety of visitors including foreign tourists; and sometimes also for normative reasons, to counteract populist nationalist political parties that often demand a return to exclusionary nineteenth century myths of the nation, normally in opposition to ‘foreigners’ and ‘Europe’ (Mazé 2008; Kaiser, Krankenhagen & Poehls 2012, chapter 4).

In contrast to these national, regional and thematic museums, the history of European integration is at the heart of the different plans for creating a museum of European (integration) history. They include, most importantly, the project of the European Parliament (EP) for a House of European History (HEH) to be opened in Brussels in 2014 – a museum to be devoted entirely to twentieth century European history, especially the history of the present-day EU. The theme of European integration history was also the focus of the temporary exhibition *C’est notre histoire* which was on show in Brussels in 2007-8 and in Wroclaw in 2009 (Kaiser & Krankenhagen 2010); and it features prominently in the combined memory sites and museums devoted to four of the so-called founding fathers of the EU: Jean Monnet in Houjarray near Paris, Robert Schuman in Scy-Chazelles near Metz, Konrad Adenauer in Rhöndorf near Bonn and Alcide De Gasperi in Pieve Tesino near Trento.

Different museums employ a variety of strategies for telling different stories about the history of European integration broadly speaking (Kaiser, Krankenhagen & Poehls 2012, chapter 6). Thus, post-war integration is sometimes narrated as a peace project that has brought an end to internecine conflict in Europe; as the institutionalization of ‘unity in diversity’ creating purposeful organized cooperation while also protecting the cultural diversity of nations and regions against hegemonic threats from within; or as the careful construction of a set of institutions promoting a new form of European constitutional patriotism embedded in a community of values.

Another prominent way of telling stories about European integration history in museums, and the focus of this article, is the biographical approach. Conceptually, we can identify two dimensions of this approach, although they become amalgamated in museums: first, the inclusion in exhibitions of individual Europeans as crafting the present-day EU and participating in integrating Europe; and secondly, the use of the biographical approach drawing upon objects and testimonies as a narrative strategy for engaging visitors and communicating particular messages about the benefits of European integration and the EU.

In this article, I argue that we can distinguish three modes of the biographical approach: first, the founding fathers myth with its focus on prominent politicians who played a key role in the origins of post-war continental western European integration; secondly, more or less strategically selected testimonies of Europeans, who are not prominent, but who are particularly active participants in integration in their professional or private lives; and thirdly, encouraging visitors to become active participants in narrating European integration history by employing oral
history methods and creating opportunities for them to contribute their personal stories of what we might call ‘lived integration’. This last approach allows for narrative pluralism. It may also be the most attractive for visitors. However, it might create a dilemma for initiators and organizers of normatively driven museum projects like the Musée de l’Europe and the HEH in Brussels who wish to represent European integration as a project with a coherent historical evolution and clear objectives for the future.

Drawing upon research in all of the museums mentioned in this article and many more, and some 60 interviews with museum practitioners from across Europe, I first discuss these three biographical approaches. I then draw some general conclusions about the prospects of mainstreaming European integration in history museums and about the particular opportunities and pitfalls of the biographical approach and its different varieties.

The Founding Fathers: Narrative of European Idealism

The narrative, or myth, of the founding fathers was not invented by museums. It was originally inspired by the American example, where the founding fathers myth is at the core of the prevailing master-narrative about the birth of a nation in the eighteenth century. This particular narrative of the origins of European integration has actually become embedded over several decades in the political rhetoric of institutional and societal actors in the EU who have used it to create their own traditions. This is true, for example, of the European People’s Party (EPP) which has drawn upon the heritage of the likes of Robert Schuman, the French Prime Minister and foreign minister, Konrad Adenauer, the first West German chancellor, and Alcide De Gasperi, the Prime Minister of Italy, to protect its pro-integration core beliefs across many enlargements of the EU and the EPP itself (Kaiser 2007).

The temporary exhibition *C’est notre histoire!* took up the founding fathers myth in its first large room devoted to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951-2 (Tempora 2007, 37-44).
This room, which was structured with beams that looked as if they were made of steel, contained seven cases. Each case was devoted to one politician, with at least one politician per founding member state. The curators exclusively used objects to tell their stories about these founding fathers: busts, photos showing the protagonists at treaty signing ceremonies, their autobiographies in print or musical records with their speeches and, most importantly, objects taken from their everyday lives. These latter included, for example, a pair of glasses from Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister, Jean Monnet’s walking stick, Robert Schuman’s passport and Konrad Adenauer’s watering can from his rose garden. C’est notre histoire! used neither film nor radio footage of the founding fathers in the room that dealt with the creation of the ECSC. It also made no attempt to construct a chronological narrative. Instead, it continued with a room with a large table designed to look like a setting for intergovernmental negotiations in the EU, where visitors could obtain information about select aspects of the EU’s evolution, institutions, and policies.

The four museums of founding fathers are very different institutions of a mixed character. In different ways, they combine the politicians’ renovated private houses as sites of memory with museums and various educational programmes, especially for youngsters. Interestingly, with the exception of Houjarray, which is owned by the EP, these museums originally focused much more on the regional and national political roles of their protagonists. This is especially true of Rhön-dorf and the first West German chancellor, as historiographical and museum narratives of post-war western German history have increasingly adopted Arnulf Bar-ing’s notion, ‘In the beginning was Adenauer’ (Baring 1982). It is only more recently that the founding fathers institutions have begun to strengthen significantly the European dimension of their narratives. They now work together in a loosely
organized network with some joint academic and museum events and publicity. This cooperation has clearly reinforced the ongoing European reshaping of their established narratives. More recently, the four institutions have actually developed plans for organized ‘transnational trips’ – especially for youngsters and pensioners – from one museum to the next. In an analogy with a famous Catholic pilgrimage, they have characteristically called this voyage the ‘Camino de Santiago of the European integration process’.¹

Despite the great differences among these different museums and exhibitions and their objectives, three related characteristics of their founding fathers narratives stand out. First, they focus on the politicians’ private lives and their identities – in the words of C’est notre histoire! – as pater familias. In Rhöndorf, for example, Adenauer with his many children and grandchildren forms the central feature of the private house as a memory site. In the case of Schuman, who was not married, his fervent Catholic beliefs and very simple private life are emphasized, suggesting that he devoted all of his energies and resources to helping others. In fact, the chapel with Schuman’s remains, the European flag and the flags of the 27 EU member-states highlights the sacral character of the site. The Monnet house, in turn, shows the leading French official as the head of a transnational network among Europeanists who worked tirelessly for reconciliation and integration. Making no attempt at a realistic reconstruction of the house’s interior, the organizers have placed telephones from the early post-war period everywhere in the building, thus emphasizing Monnet’s identity as a networker connecting influential leaders across borders.
As the exhibition catalogue of *C’est notre histoire!* claims (Tempora 2007: 38), these politicians (with the exception of Monnet, who was a leading French civil servant) also ‘governed their own country’ like ‘family fathers’ – likewise, they wisely created European institutions to serve the interests of all citizens.

Secondly, the narratives of the founding fathers heavily de-politicize their protagonists’ actions. The catalogue of *C’est notre histoire* only mentions in passing that ‘the majority of them were Christian democrats or liberals, in addition there was one social democrat’ (Tempora 2007: 38). Yet the geographical scope, the institutional design and the ideological orientation of European integration were of course heavily contested in the early post-war period. Adenauer and De Gasperi in particular used their policies of western integration to fight the socialists in domestic politics (Kaiser 2007). At the same time, criticism of the ‘core Europe’ of the six founding member states as dominated by conservative and Catholic forces was widespread among northern European social democrats, especially in Sweden (e.g. af Malmborg 1994). None of this strong contestation features anywhere in the founding fathers narratives. This is just as true of the first concept of the HEH expert group submitted to the EP in December 2008 (Sachverständigenausschuss 2008) as it is of existing museums and exhibitions, where the founding fathers are presented as a family without friction. To paraphrase the German Emperor William II at the start of World War I, the founding fathers – or so it seems – no longer knew any political parties, but only Europe.

Finally, the founding fathers narrative also heavily de-nationalizes their protagonists’ upbringing and orientation. Thus, the museum in Pieve Tesino emphasizes De Gasperi’s fluent German and his role as a Catholic deputy in the Austrian Reichsrat parliament in Vienna until 1918. It also opposes rather boldly the nineteenth-century liberal-nationalist Risorgimento myth, which is still pervasive in Italian collective memory, concerning the universal desire of all ‘Italians’ to become united in one (liberal) nation-state. Instead, it stresses how few people (around 700) from the almost entirely Italian-speaking Trentino region, which was one of three parts of the historical Tyrol, actually moved across the border to fight for this Italian state when Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary in 1915. Similarly, the museum in Scy-Chazelles makes a point of stressing Schuman’s ‘anchrage germanique’, his fluent German, education at German language universities and the influence of Rhenish social Catholicism on his political beliefs. All of this is historically true and was in fact the main reason for aggressive attacks on him especially by communists and Gaullists during the Fourth Republic (Poidevin 1986). In the museum at Scy-Chazelles, Schuman’s transnational and intercultural socialization actually appears as an asset in the attempt to rebuild Europe and institutionalize reconciliation after World War II.

By re-emphasizing the transnational and intercultural dimensions, however, the museum narratives of the founding fathers also write the importance of interests out of the history of European integration altogether – interests that are usually
rhetorically claimed to be of a ‘national’ character although they may be those of particular social and economic groups extending – in many cases – across borders. This is true, for example, of the origins of Monnet’s proposal for a European community in coal and steel. The concrete plan, which he submitted to Schuman in the spring of 1950, was in fact largely rooted in the failure of the purely French modernization plan, which did not take sufficient account of the economic interdependencies especially between France and Germany (e.g. Milward 1984; Lynch 1997). It is also true of Adenauer’s objective of achieving a status of equality for the newly created Federal Republic of Germany (Schwarz 1986: 850-79). In the end, therefore, the founding fathers narrative is one of European idealism; of a few enlightened and purposeful politicians driving the origins and construction of European integration.

27 Selected Europeans: Narrative of Good European Union Governance

One of the many problems of using the founding fathers myth – at least as the only biographical approach in museums – lies in the fact that the social and political connotations associated with the idea of the well-meaning ‘family father’ have little contemporary relevance. In the emerging European society, the pater familias has been on the retreat for some time, and the unavoidable complete absence of women from this particular founding narrative is becoming an issue, too. Moreover, the quasi-monarchical style of governing apparently used by the founding fathers does not chime well with our more pluralistic contemporary democracies and the experience of younger generations either. The founding fathers, ultimately, all come from the founding member states of the present-day EU. It remains unclear how visitors from other member states, which joined the EU later, and sometimes reluctantly, can connect either intellectually or emotionally with these politicians’ post-war experience.

These problems of the founding fathers myth in part explain why testimonies of living Europeans with their own stories of how they participate in integrating Europe in their daily lives have entered museum narratives of European integration. It is also important to note, however, that this representational strategy chimes well with the strong trend to utilize more and more eyewitness accounts in history (and other) museums, which started with museums and exhibitions on the Holocaust (Kushner 2001; de Jong 2011).

In C’est notre histoire! these living Europeans formed the core of the exhibition featuring alongside the founding fathers. In the EP visitors’ centre in Brussels, which opened in 2011, they largely replace the founding fathers. And in the exhibition ‘Die Entdeckung Europas’ in the Europem in Mariazell in Austria – designed for European pilgrims and tourists – they – and only they – represent the EU of lived integration. Interestingly, however, all of these museums, exhibitions
and centres use a representational strategy which they claim the present-day EU has overcome as an organizational principle for the good of Europe, that is, they take what could be coined an ‘intergovernmental’ approach to narrating lived integration. They nominate one individual with one testimony for every member state of the EU just as C’est notre histoire! chose one founding father from each founding member state in addition to Monnet irrespective of the historical merits of the choice. In other words, the testimonies in the first instance do not matter because of the individual person or because of the story they have to tell, or how compelling, exciting or engaging this story might be. Rather, these Europeans are chosen in the first instance because of their nationality. They are effectively supposed to represent their member state in an attempt to draw visitors from all member states into the exhibition and its overall narrative including those from reluctant or involuntary latecomers to EU integration – something discussed in greater detail in Steffi de Jong’s article in this special issue.

In its use to date, this particular biographical approach to narrating European integration and its history is characterized by three striking features. First, the selection of testimonies used is not transparent at all. The exhibition company Tempora has claimed (Benoit interview) that the combination of testimonies for C’est notre histoire! was not guided by any particular rationale. Nonetheless, most of the 27 testimonies clearly appear to have been neatly selected and arranged so as to cover most of the EU’s major objectives and policies. Thus, the Polish eyewitness argues that ‘when life is good for people, they don’t want to fight wars’ highlighting the EU’s contribution to increasing the welfare of its citizens. The military officer from Luxembourg emphasizes that ‘we all know that the priority of the EU isn’t in the military sphere but rather development aid or diplomacy’, thus reiterating the EU’s self-image as ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002). The Swedish employee of the multilateral European Organization for Nuclear Research centre in Geneva, finally, claims that scientific collaboration is ‘all about the common European knowledge capital’ to enhance the EU’s competitiveness. In this latter case, the language used in the interview actually replicates one to one European Commission policy papers and rhetoric.

Second, the testimonies of positive experiences of lived integration very predominantly come from well-educated middle- and upper-middle class professionals; in other words, from much more transnationally socialized and oriented elites who profit most socio-economically and culturally from European integration, just as much the same social groups derived most benefits from national integration and the creation of larger markets in the nineteenth century. The curators of course belong to these more transnationally oriented elites. In their case, using this kind of biographical approach inadvertently amounts to a quasi-autobiographical form of narrating European integration. In fact, in the case of C’est notre histoire!, Belgian professors from the advisory board have intimated (Dumoulin & Witte interviews) that they had to work hard to get the Tempora team to integrate an
older Belgian female communist as one of the 27 Europeans in order to create a contrast. But even her not easily intelligible story about gender discrimination in the 1960s could easily be understood by visitors as a complaint about a conservative Belgian state refusing to implement enlightened European equality rules enshrined in the European Economic Community treaty of 1957-8.

The organizers of the 27 testimonies used in the EP visitors’ centre claim to have learned from this experience (Kleinig interview). They wanted to create a greater social mix by including, for example, a story about a Spanish truck-driver and how he has been affected in his work by EU health and safety regulations. It remains true, however, that all of these testimonies focus exclusively on what the organizers consider as the multiple benefits of European integration and EU governance (European Parliament n.d.). The testimonies will not feature – to take a random actual example from the world of EU enlargement and market liberalization – the middle-aged German butcher who has lost his job in a slaughter-house in Westphalia to a more cheaply employed Polish colleague, and who emigrates to China where he opens a small business for selling German sausages to the Chinese nouveaux riches. Yet, European integration as market integration – like globalization – clearly has created, and will continue to create, socio-economic losers as well as winners – something that could also feature in historical exhibitions on the present-day EU.

Finally, the 27 testimonies in C’est notre histoire! only create a narrative of the multiple alleged advantages of the EU at the time when the exhibition was conceived in 2006-7. This makes them look, in the words of one interviewee who acted as an external advisor to the project (Dumoulin interview), like ‘an extension of Commission propaganda policy’. At the same time, the stories together do not constitute an intelligible chronology. The fragmentation of these individual narratives (as opposed to their standardized presentation with films on TV screens accessible in four languages) creates a dilemma for normatively driven projects like the Musée de l’Europe and the HEH in Brussels, as their initiators and organizers actually want to represent a coherent chronological narrative of the EU’s past evolution and future objectives. For these projects, therefore, drawing upon such testimonies can only ever complement other, more traditional modes of narrating history as a chronology of events.

Museum Visitors: Transnational Narratives of Diversity

It may be at least in part these and other problems associated with the founding fathers and the selected 27 Europeans narratives that are currently motivating the search for suitable means to integrate the visitor and his or her experience of lived integration into museums. This constitutes a possible third biographical approach to narrating European integration, which has advantages, but also pitfalls for curators. This approach is embedded in a much larger trend to narrate history in muse-
ums as history from below, which is clearly influenced by perspectives from social, oral and gender history and anthropology. In this kind of narrative, the history of great men is supplemented or even supplanted by the history of ordinary men, women and children and their historical experiences. In a study of museums devoted to the two world wars, Thomas Thiemeyer (2010) has recently observed the same phenomenon. He has characterized this trend as a shift from the ‘Personalisierung’ of history – in the form of the great men – to a ‘Personifizierung’ of history – in the form of stories of acting or suffering individuals who are unknown (Bergmann 1997; Thiemeyer 2010: 146). This strategy also introduces an emotional human touch into the museum, which in turn can attract visitors, who identify with these (other) ordinary citizens.

At the same time, the trend towards personifying history is also being accelerated by the drive to involve visitors more through interactive devices. The greater use of museum websites, new interactive technologies that can link visitors in different museums and of social network sites can create potential for allowing the visitors to tell their own stories about ‘Europe’ – something that Alec Badenoch also points out in his article in this special issue in his discussion of the Virtual Exhibit project and its planned future interactive features. This approach apparently is also one of the options being considered by the HEH project team. The resulting new opportunities for creating testimonies in a less structured or strategic manner would probably be welcomed by contemporary historians as a valuable source. In fact, to date, sociological and historical research has completely neglected the oral history of cross-border experiences in post-war Europe.

This third biographical approach to Europe also has its potential problems, however, especially for the initiators and organizers of normatively driven projects like the Musée de l’Europe and the HEH. These include, first of all, that most of the testimonies generated in this way and included in some form in museums and exhibitions are unlikely to speak to any links to the present-day EU and its policies. Visitors recounting their transnational experiences may well be oblivious to the EU’s role in facilitating them. Thus, the Spanish truck-driver, if allowed to speak freely and not forced to respond to strategically formulated questions, may well talk about his trips across Europe and how he first ate Norwegian brown cheese and thought it was a caramel dessert, for example. But he will probably not discuss how his trips across Europe might have been induced by the creation of a common market with increased intra-European trade or how he has recently enjoyed extended periods of sleep thanks to EU health and safety regulations.

Secondly, the diversity of languages used in Europe could mean that only a fraction of any such testimonies by visitors of a website or the actual museum or exhibition would be intelligible to other visitors. The EP visitors’ centre has actually dubbed all testimonies to make them accessible in all 23 official EU languages. It is highly likely that the HEH project will do the same. No national or
regional museum could possibly afford the EU institutions’ language policy and practice, however. Curators could of course play with testimonies in different languages as illustrating Europe’s diversity in unity. But unity would be absent from such an impressionist mosaic. If the curators wanted to represent the aspect of unity (or economic and political integration), as is clearly the case with the normatively driven projects, they would then have to represent it in a more structured section of their museum or exhibition.

Thirdly, without guidance visitors might find it easier to make normative statements about ‘Europe’ and what they like or dislike about it or the EU more concretely, rather than giving testimonies of past experiences of lived integration. Such normative statements could well be very interesting, too. They have been used, for example, for the contemporary history section of the National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh where they highlight the great diversity of ideas and images of Scotland and of the views and preferences of the people from various backgrounds who live there. Yet this form of biographical approach might be more suitable for the end of an exhibition, as a kind of afterthought and perspective to the future, rather than as an integral part of any narrative of the history of European integration. Indeed, the initial report by the HEH expert committee (Sachverständigenausschuss 2008) has already suggested that visitors should be encouraged to express their views on the (future of the) EU including, for example, the question of its further enlargement to include a country like Turkey, at the end of the future permanent exhibition.

Nonetheless, visitor testimonies as a biographical approach have one major advantage, and this is their potential for bringing out the contested nature of European integration and the EU; without any political control by curators following the example of ‘Big Brother’ in George Orwell’s novel 1984, such visitor testimonies are bound to produce a multitude of different views of ‘Europe’ and of the EU, including critical or negative ones. Such a pluralistic approach to generating and using visitor testimonies would most likely not only make this form of biographical approach much more credible in the eyes of visitors compared to any strategically manipulated selection; it would also reflect adequately the decline of the so-called permissive consensus about the greater good of integration without citizens taking much interest in it, and the evolution of the EU towards a trans- and supranational polity in which issues become much more politicized and contested just as in the political systems of the member states (e.g. Kaiser, Leucht & Rasmussen 2009).

**Biographical Approaches to Representing European Integration (History)**

The current process of transnationalizing narratives in history museums and exhibitions forms part of a larger search for new narratives – narratives that chime
more with our contemporary experience of the nation-state as bounded and limited in its capacity to act purposefully with a view to providing its citizens with internal and external security and welfare. To some extent, this search for new narratives extends beyond museums to other cultural forums. Thus, the European Cultural Foundation has started a programme, *Narratives for Europe*, for example. Any more transnational narratives of this kind will have to address the history of the present-day EU in one form or another, however. The EU has not been the only driving force behind processes of transnationalization. However, it has contributed very significantly to taming nation states and making their borders much more porous. For the founding member states, it has been at the core of their shared history for more than fifty years already.

This poses the challenge to museums of how to narrate what at first sight appears to be a fairly boring institutional history without much drama. The three biographical approaches discussed in this article promise a way out of this dilemma for curators. Whereas contemporary historians have on the whole emphasized the importance of structural factors for European integration such as the economic benefits of market integration or the importance of the Cold War and United States support for the present-day EU in its early years (Kaiser & Varsori 2010), the focus on individuals is an attractive option for museums. It has at least the potential for engaging the visitors with private stories and through the destinies of individuals. Even the founding fathers narrative could be made much more dramatic than in *C’est notre histoire!*. Thus, it could document Schuman’s escape from German internment, Adenauer’s interrogation by the Gestapo, the secret police of the National Socialists, and Spaak’s work for the Belgian government in exile, for example. This narrative of great men could also employ other means of visualizing their role in the origins of European integration, especially television and radio footage.

Quite apart from the question of its historiographical validity, however, the founding fathers myth as a museum narrative has one crucial downside: it is difficult to enlarge beyond the founding member states. Unlike in the American experience of the western frontier and expansion, the ‘core Europeans’ have not created tabula rasa (such as by leaving a trail of thousands of dead Red Indians) to extend their ‘Empire’ (Zielonka 2006). Rather, in the struggle for transnational narratives of shared history they have to acknowledge and accommodate different collective memories and memory cultures in countries from Sweden to Poland, whether they are influenced by the national welfare state myth and greater degrees of Euro-scepticism as in Scandinavia, for example, or the widespread preoccupation with suffering under Stalinism in East-Central Europe (Leggewie 2011). Wherever possible, co-opting what may be termed the EU’s enlargement fathers like the Spanish Prime Minister Filipe González or the Polish President Lech Wałęsa may help to update the founding fathers narrative for the enlarged EU of 27 member states. This would involve trying to encompass not just the origins of
European integration, but also the subsequent democratic transitions and the EU’s spatial expansions.

Yet it may not only be historically more appropriate and normatively more honest, but also more effective for museums and exhibitions confronting sceptical visitors to opt for narrative pluralism. Personifying the narration of European integration while avoiding strategic choices to praise EU policies would almost inevitably produce such narrative pluralism. However, even narratives of ‘great men’ have potential for bringing out the diversity of experiences and preferences – for example if leading politicians like the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill or the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme were included – politicians, who either supported ‘core Europe’ integration, but opposed their country’s participation as in the case of Churchill, or who fought for a kind of ‘Europe’ quite different from the present-day EU as in the case of Palme.

It is of course doubtful whether those responsible for new museum projects and exhibitions or revisions of existing museums are sufficiently open-minded about tolerating or even, promoting the integration of conflicting narratives of the history, motives and objectives of the present-day EU. For the moment, it appears that at least the normatively driven projects like the Musée de l’Europe and the HEH are in search of their own romantic narrative of European integration. In their narration, the valiant pro-European forces from the ‘founding fathers’ to Commission President José Barroso and the former EP president and initiator of the HEH plan, Hans-Gert Pöttering, are fighting the likes of Margaret Thatcher and Geert Wilders who have hoped, or are still hoping, to radically transform or even abolish the EU. Yet, they – and those who support their diverse alternative views of ‘Europe’ and its contemporary history and future – are just as much part of the history of European integration as Barroso, Pöttering and the so-called founding fathers.

Notes


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